The present case
23 Let me explain various points about the common fund order that I made in the McKay proceeding.
24 First, it was not made to ensure the financial viability of either or both proceedings or to advance the interests of the funders. Each proceeding had a substantial number of signed up group members, such that they were both financially viable in any event. And it was apparent from inception that funding equalisation mechanisms could have been implemented on settlement as they indeed were.
25 Second, the common fund order made in the McKay proceeding could be seen as the price extracted as the quid pro quo to enable that proceeding to go forward as the one open class proceeding. Utilising that mechanism, I could in essence drive down the commission rates of the funder in the McKay proceeding, to the advantage of the group members and to the disadvantage of the funder (see [2] above). In that context then, the common fund order was principally of advantage to the group members in the McKay proceeding.
26 Third, any early common fund order and its notification to group members enables them to make an informed choice as to whether to stay in an open class proceeding.
27 Fourth, the funder in the McKay proceeding never received any bankable advantage from the common fund order. The rate stipulated was said to be a maximum. Moreover, it could always be varied at the time of the s 33V(1) procedure. More generally, in other contexts the rate is not even stipulated in orders of that type. If one reflects on this, from the perspective of a funder there was heightened risk under an early common fund order as compared with book-building. Risk was in fact injected. Book building pre-supposed contractual commission rates that the Court had no express power to ratchet down. Contrastingly, common fund orders allowed commission rates on a sliding scale set wherever the Court considered appropriate.
28 Fifth, let me make a more general point. What has been permitted for some time now under previous Full Federal Court authority are closed class proceedings, notwithstanding that the text, context and purpose of Part IVA all point to the desirable model of open class proceedings. Such permission promoted book building with its attendant vices, high contractual commission rates that could not be lowered by Court order, and consequently funding equalisation mechanisms applied in the context of high contractual commission rates. Judges under such arrangements, and given that they could not vary contractual commission rates, accepted them. Under such a rigid structure, commission rates could not be driven down. In those contexts, judicial efforts focused on other areas such as seeking to reduce the applicant's legal costs. No real efforts were made to deal with high commission rates. I do not recall a reported case prior to Money Max where any efforts were made as part of judicial case management to reduce the contractual commission rates, which were usually around 35 to 40%. Judges seemed to accept all of this as a fait accompli and applied funding equalisation mechanisms. And even then they over-looked the fourth point discussed above at [21]. But common fund orders addressed that vice to the advantage of group members. It gave the Court direct control over the commission rate. Thereafter, there has only been downward pressure on commission rates. This is the context in which I made the common fund order in the McKay proceeding.
29 Now on the present applications I made funding equalisation orders that the parties asked me to make. I do so for the following reasons.
30 First, in each case both funders agreed to reduce their otherwise contractual commission rates such as to bring the overall percentage rates down to within tolerable levels and even under the benchmark that I had set for the common fund order. If they had not done so, I would not have approved the settlements.
31 Second, if I had not approved the settlements and the commission rates were subsequently still not reduced, I may have entertained making an expense sharing order in the nature of a common fund order under s 33V(2), and with no resort to equitable principles being necessary. Now the issue before the High Court in BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster (2019) 94 ALJR 51 did not concern a settlement approval process. Relatedly, it did not discuss the ambit of the express power under s 33V(2). Moreover, and I say this with some hesitation although after careful reflection, there is no considered majority dicta which clearly precludes s 33V(2) from being used for that purpose.
32 Let me make two concluding observations.
33 First, one advantage of early common fund orders was that it assisted to resolve the problem of competing class actions, whether each competing action had their own litigation funder or only one of the competing actions had a funder. For the Court, it did not matter how many group members each had signed up or at what contractual commission rates. If one action was to be the winner, the associated funder had to accept the rate to be ultimately struck by the Court under a common fund order. That was the price the Court, in essence, extracted. Control of the commission rate was ceded to the Court as the price of success. But that flexibility is now lost. Anyway, these are matters for another day.
34 Second, and flowing from BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster, I now have less flexibility to deal with commission rates. In my respectful view, this is something that the legislature should address sooner rather than later, informed by Professor Vince Morabito's impressive empirical research. Trial judges need flexible tools to regulate these funding arrangements and to tailor solutions to each individual case. And preferably that regulation should take place closer to the outset of proceedings rather than at the other end, particularly where competing class actions are in play.
I certify that the preceding thirty-four (34) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Beach.