Decision as to costs
10 It was submitted for the University and Mr Singleton that, since the original decision sought to be set aside by Mr McGuirk's appeal is a decision as to costs, his appeal is against a decision as to costs.
11 Mr McGuirk submitted that his appeal is against the order of the Appeal Panel dismissing his appeal; and although what he seeks, in addition to setting aside that order of the Appeal Panel, is the setting aside of the original order as to costs, his appeal is not properly characterised as an appeal against a decision as to costs. Mr McGuirk referred to the case of Wheeler v Somerfield [1966] 2 QB 94.
12 In my opinion, the case of Wheeler does not directly support Mr McGuirk's position. In that case, an appeal was brought on substantive matters and also as to costs. The appeal as to the substantive matters failed. The English Court of Appeal held that leave was not required to pursue that part of the appeal that related to costs, because the appeal had included bona fide substantial grounds.
13 In the present case, there are no separate substantive matters that are the subject of the appeal. There is only the decision upholding the original order as to costs, and the original order as to costs itself, that are challenged.
14 In relation to appeals to the Court of Appeal from orders of the Court in a Division, s 101(2)(c) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 requires leave in the case of an order "as to costs only which are in the discretion of the Court". That wording does indicate that, if the Court in a Division were to dismiss an appeal from a decision of a Local Court as to costs on the ground that no error of the Local Court was shown, leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal would not be required under s 101(2)(c), because the decision appealed against did not relate to costs "in the discretion of the Court". However, in such a case, an appeal would lie as of right only if the requirement in s 101(2)(r) of involvement of $100,000 or more was satisfied.
15 Section 119 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act does not have the same wording: that is, it is not worded so as to be limited explicitly to decisions as to costs that are in the discretion of the Appeal Panel. The question is whether such a limitation is implicit. Mr McGuirk relied on the terms of the second reading speech relating to s 119 to support the view that it was intended to have the same effect as s 101(2)(c) of the Supreme Court Act. In my opinion, such a limitation is not implied. The legislature could have used the wording of limitation contained in s 101(2)(c), and did not do so; and it is of some significance that there is not the alternative threshold provided by the requirement of involvement of $100,000 or more.
16 In my opinion, there should not be a narrow construction given to the words "decisions as to costs". There is some force in Mr McGuirk's submission that the decision of the Appeal Panel related to questions of bias and apprehended bias in the Tribunal, which could be of importance; but ultimately, what Mr McGuirk is challenging is orders that do no more than reject a challenge he made to an order as to costs. In those circumstances, in my opinion Mr McGuirk's appeal is an appeal against a decision as to costs.
17 Accordingly, I would dismiss his appeal as incompetent, unless I am prepared to grant leave to amend.