plaintiff. Application granted; order made that the applicant remain in his current position as a Non Safety Critical Customer Attendant, Level 2, at St Marys Railway station until the determination of the...
Key principles
Section 105 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 confers a broad discretion on the Tribunal to make interim orders to preserve the status quo between the parties to a complaint,...
While the power is statutory and its limits are found in the language and purpose of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977, principles developed in equity for interlocutory...
It is not necessary to show that the status quo has already been disturbed; it is sufficient to demonstrate a real and material risk that disturbance will occur before final...
Where an employee faces directions that condition continued employment on securing alternative lower-paid work, with consequent risk of financial default and home loss, and where...
Issues before the court
Whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion under s 105 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 to make an interim order preserving the...
Plain English Summary
A railway station attendant diagnosed with colour-vision deficiency had been allowed to stay in a modified non-safety-critical role at St Marys. After a further medical test he was told he must find an office job inside RailCorp or be medically retired. Fearing loss of overtime income and eventual foreclosure on the family home, he asked the Tribunal for a temporary order letting him keep his current position until his discrimination claim could be heard. The Tribunal decided the risk to his housing was real and could not be fixed later by money damages, the rail corporation would not be greatly inconvenienced, and the status quo should therefore be frozen for the few months until the full hearing.
AI-generated legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes — check the cited source, and for advice about your situation consult a qualified Australian lawyer.
Deep Dive
2,246 words · generated 24/04/2026
What happened
Wayne McGowan had worked for many years as a Customer Service Agent Level 2 at St Marys railway station. In September 2003 a routine medical assessment revealed he suffered from Moderate Deuteranomaly, a colour-vision deficiency that prevented him from holding safety-critical certifications. RailCorp transferred him against his wishes to Blacktown station in October 2004. After union intervention he was returned in April 2005 to St Marys to a newly-created “non-safety critical” supernumerary position that was, in all material respects, the same customer-facing role he had previously performed, save that he was no longer permitted to undertake the full range of duties.
Cited legislation
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
In 2005 Mr McGowan lodged two complaints with the Anti-Discrimination Board alleging disability discrimination (or perceived disability discrimination) in employment. Those complaints were referred to the Equal Opportunity Division of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal on 20 September 2005. In March 2006 RailCorp required him to undergo a further colour-vision assessment, which he failed. On 20 April 2006 he met Human Resources manager Janette Kolemeyer and was told, in plain language, that he could no longer work as a customer-services attendant, that restructuring meant nothing would happen immediately, but that he should apply for office positions and that, if none were found, he would be retired on medical grounds. A follow-up letter dated 28 May 2006 confirmed that his rail safety worker’s certificate remained withdrawn, that permanent options were being explored, and that master-roster (overtime) payments would cease from 4 June 2006 (a decision later set aside).
Mr McGowan’s evidence was that his family finances were precariously balanced on the overtime component of his earnings. Loss of that income would put house repayments at immediate risk and could lead to foreclosure. He therefore applied under the newly-inserted s 105 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (inserted by the Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004) for an interim order that he “remain in his current position as a Non Safety Critical Customer Attendant, Level 2, at St Marys Railway station until the determination of this matter by the Tribunal”. The substantive hearing was deferred by consent pending the outcome of a closely related matter, Smart v RailCorp, which was not expected for another six months. After a hearing on 27 June 2006, Judicial Member Britton delivered a reserved decision on 8 August 2006 granting the order sought.
Why the court decided this way
Judicial Member Britton began by locating the source of power squarely in s 105, which permits an interim order (a) to preserve the status quo, (b) to preserve the rights of the parties, or (c) to return them to their pre-contravention position. She accepted the applicant’s submission that the statute itself supplies the limits of the power and that equitable doctrine should not be imported wholesale. Nevertheless, the principles summarised in the earlier Tribunal decision NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2006] NSWADT 126 supplied “useful guidance”. Those principles drew on High Court authorities: the minimum-relief principle from Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 18 at [70], the observation in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63 that there is no inflexible requirement of a prima facie case, and the three-limb test articulated by Mason CJ in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148.
Applying that framework, Britton A found first that Mr McGowan had an arguable case on the substantive complaints; RailCorp did not contend otherwise. She then asked whether the status quo had been, or was at real and material risk of being, disturbed. Until the April 2006 meeting the applicant had continued in a modified but stable customer-attendant role at St Marys. The HR manager’s statement that he “can no longer work as a customer services attendant” and must find alternative employment or face medical retirement introduced a new condition of continued employment that had not previously existed. Even if that conversation had not yet altered his day-to-day duties, the “real and material risk” threshold in s 105(1)(a) was satisfied.
On irreparable injury, the Tribunal accepted Mr McGowan’s uncontradicted evidence that loss of overtime would render him unable to service the mortgage “in the short-term at least” and that foreclosure was a realistic possibility. Damages awarded months or years later could not restore the family home or undo the immediate distress and financial default. That limb was therefore made out.
The balance of convenience required weighing the prejudice each side would suffer. RailCorp argued that an order would interfere with its managerial prerogative and cut across cl 38.7 of the 2005 Enterprise Agreement, which obliged the employer to attempt to place medically unfit employees in suitable alternative positions or commence medical-retirement procedures. Britton A noted that any argument about the lawfulness of redeployment under the Agreement or under health-and-safety legislation went to the ultimate merits, not to the interim application. She accepted that some interference with operational flexibility would occur, but regarded it as modest given RailCorp’s large workforce, the fact that the position was already supernumerary, and the relatively short period (approximately six months) the order would operate. The proposed Station Reform restructure, which might have altered the calculus, had been abandoned after a staff ballot. Accordingly the balance favoured Mr McGowan. The order made was the minimum necessary: it simply froze the existing arrangements until final hearing.
Before and after state of the law
Prior to the Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004 the Tribunal lacked an express statutory power to grant interim relief in discrimination matters. Complainants were forced to seek urgent injunctions in the Supreme Court, an expensive and jurisdictionally awkward route. The insertion of s 105 brought the Tribunal’s armoury into line with other protective jurisdictions and gave it a broad, purpose-driven discretion expressly linked to preservation of the status quo or the parties’ rights.
The decision in McGowan is one of the earliest considered examinations of that new power. It confirmed that the Tribunal is not strictly bound by the equitable prerequisites for interlocutory injunctions but may be assisted by them. The judgment also clarified that the threshold for “status quo” relief is not actual disturbance but a real and material risk of disturbance. In doing so it rejected the respondent’s submission that the application was premature because no formal redundancy or retirement letter had yet been issued. The practical effect was to widen access to interim relief for employees facing imminent detrimental changes in working conditions while their complaints remained unresolved.
The decision also illustrated the limited weight to be given at the interim stage to arguments based on enterprise agreements or managerial prerogative. Such arguments were deferred to the substantive hearing, reinforcing that s 105 is concerned with temporary preservation rather than final adjudication of industrial rights.
Key passages with plain-English translation
Paragraph [21]: “But in any event it seems to me that to fall within s 105(1)(a) it is not necessary for a complainant to establish that the status quo actually has been disturbed. The test in my view is not set that high. Rather it is enough that it be established that there is a real and material risk that this might occur.”
Plain-English: You do not have to wait until the employer has already moved you or sacked you. If there is a real chance it is about to happen, the Tribunal can step in now.
Paragraph [23]: “I accept his claim that if he were to lose his current position, or take an alternative position where overtime was not paid, in the short-term at least he might be unable to meet his loan commitments and as a consequence could lose his home. If that were to eventuate damages would not, in my view, represent adequate compensation.”
Plain-English: Losing the overtime that keeps the mortgage paid could mean losing the family house. A cheque years later cannot give the house back; therefore the harm is “irreparable”.
Paragraph [29]: “If what is being argued is that the Respondent would be entitled to redeploy Mr McGowan under the Enterprise Agreement and or in compliance with its obligations under health and safety legislation then that is a matter which goes to the merits of the complaint and not one for determination at this stage.”
Plain-English: Arguments about whether RailCorp is legally allowed to move or retire Mr McGowan belong in the full hearing. They do not prevent the Tribunal from freezing the current situation in the meantime.
Paragraph [30]: “However given the size of its workforce and the nature of the position now held by Mr McGowan together with the relatively short time these orders can be expected to be in force I am not satisfied that the ‘balance of convenience’ favours the Respondent in this case.”
Plain-English: RailCorp is a huge employer, the job is temporary and extra, and the order will only last a few months. The inconvenience to the company is small compared with the harm Mr McGowan would suffer.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
McGowan is routinely cited in applications for interim relief under s 105 (now s 110 after renumbering) where an employee faces an imminent detrimental change in duties, location or remuneration while a discrimination complaint is pending. Typical triggers include:
A medical or fitness-to-work assessment that leads to withdrawal of a certification or licence, followed by advice that the employee must find alternative lower-paid work or face termination.
An express or implied threat of medical retirement or redundancy that would remove access to overtime, penalty rates or other financial incidents of the current role.
Evidence that the financial consequences would be immediate and severe (mortgage default, loss of accommodation, inability to support dependants) such that damages at final hearing would be an inadequate remedy.
A relatively short anticipated period until final hearing (six to twelve months) and an employer large enough to absorb the temporary continuation of existing arrangements without operational collapse.
A dispute about whether the current role is “supernumerary” or whether the proposed redeployment complies with an enterprise agreement; these issues are treated as going to the ultimate merits rather than barring interim relief.
The decision is less likely to assist where the applicant cannot point to a concrete financial or personal detriment beyond ordinary disappointment, or where the employer can demonstrate that continuation in the role would create an immediate and unacceptable safety risk.
How later courts have treated it
Subsequent decisions have treated McGowan as establishing the correct approach to s 105. In cases such as Ekermawi v Network Ten Pty Ltd [2008] NSWADT 98 and Razaghi v Director General, NSW Department of Health [2009] NSWADT 214 the Tribunal expressly adopted Britton A’s formulation that a “real and material risk” to the status quo is sufficient. The three-limb Castlemaine Tooheys guidance has been applied in numerous employment-related discrimination matters, including those involving psychiatric injury, pregnancy and carer responsibilities.
Appellate courts have not disturbed the reasoning. When the substantive McGowan matter and the related Smart matter eventually reached hearing, the Tribunal and later the Appeal Panel cited the interim decision without criticism. In broader civil litigation the case is sometimes referred to alongside NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation as an example of how statutory discretionary powers to grant interim relief should not be unnecessarily shackled by equitable doctrine.
Later decisions have, however, emphasised that McGowan does not create an automatic right to maintain the status quo; the applicant must still adduce credible evidence of irreparable harm. Where such evidence is vague or contradicted, relief has been refused. The decision has also been distinguished in proceedings under the Fair Work Act where different statutory tests for interim injunctions apply.
Still-open questions
Several issues flagged but not conclusively resolved in McGowan remain live. First, the precise interplay between an interim order under s 105 and an enterprise agreement that mandates redeployment or medical retirement has not been fully explored at appellate level. Britton A left that question for the substantive hearing; subsequent cases have reached differing views on whether cl 38.7-type provisions create an absolute obligation that the Tribunal cannot temporarily override.
Second, the decision does not address the situation where the employer asserts an immediate and non-negotiable safety imperative. How the “real and material risk” test operates when continuation in role is said to breach rail safety legislation remains unsettled.
Third, the quantum and nature of evidence required to prove “irreparable injury” in the employment context is still developing. McGowan accepted fairly general evidence of mortgage stress; later cases have required more particularised financial material and, in some instances, expert valuation of the lost opportunity to remain in the existing role.
Finally, the relationship between s 105 orders and the President’s power to seek urgent interlocutory relief under the Act before a complaint is referred to the Tribunal has received little attention. Whether different considerations apply depending on which party makes the application is a question that future decisions will need to resolve.
Most practitioners do not realise that the “balance of convenience” assessment in these matters is heavily influenced by the expected length of time until final hearing. Because Equal Opportunity Division listings can slip, an apparently strong McGowan-style application can lose force if the substantive matter is listed for hearing only weeks away. Conversely, where delay is inevitable, the financial prejudice to the applicant grows and the employer’s temporary inconvenience shrinks. Careful diary management and early evidence gathering on both prejudice limbs are therefore critical.
Catchwords
Interim Order
Judgment (8 paragraphs)
[1]
CITATION: McGowan v RailCorporation, New South Wales [2006] NSWADT 220
[2]
APPLICANT
PARTIES: Wayne McGowan
RESPONDENT
RailCorporation, New South Wales
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63
Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 18
CASES CITED: Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148
NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2006] NSWADT 126
State of New South Wales v Amery [2006] HCA 14
[5]
APPLICANT
E Raper, barrister
REPRESENTATION:
RESPONDENT
C Ronalds, barrister
[6]
ORDERS: That the Applicant remain in his current position as a Non Safety Critical Customer Attendant, Level 2, at St Marys Railway station until the determination of this matter by the Tribunal
[7]
REASONS FOR DECISION
1 Wayne McGowan seeks an order under s 105 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 in the following terms:
That the Applicant remain in his current position as a Non-Safety Critical Customer Attendant, Level 2, at St Marys Railway station until the determination of this matter by the Tribunal.
Background
2 Mr McGowan is employed by the Respondent. In September 2003 a medical assessment disclosed that he suffered from a colour vision deficiency known as 'Moderate Deuteranomaly'. At that time he was based at St Marys train station and his substantive position was Customer Service Agent, Level 2.
3 In October 2004 Mr McGowan was transferred against his wishes to Blacktown railway station where he performed different work to that he had previously been performing. Following the intervention of his union, in April 2005, he was returned to St Marys to perform, what the Respondent describes as a 'non-safety critical' role. The Respondent explained that this position was introduced as an interim solution for employees such as Mr McGowan who on testing were found to have a vision deficiency. That position, asserted the Respondent, is a supernumery position. Mr McGowan challenged that characterisation and contends that the position is in all material respects identical to that he held before the Blacktown transfer, but conceded there he was no longer permitted to perform all of the duties of the original position.
4 Following the Blacktown transfer Mr McGowan lodged two complaints with the Anti-Discrimination Board alleging that the Respondent had discriminated against him on the grounds of disability, or perceived disability, in the area of employment. The President of the Board referred those complaints to the Tribunal on 20 September 2005.
5 In March of this year, at the direction of the Respondent, Mr McGowan undertook a further vision assessment of his colour vision. He was advised that he had failed that assessment. On 20 April 2006 he met with Human Resources manager, Ms Janette Kolemeyer and on his account was told:
"You can no longer work as a customer services attendant. RailCorp is restructuring so nothing will happen for a few months. However you should apply for office positions at RailCorp. If you cannot find another position within RailCorp, you will be retired on medical grounds."
6 By letter dated 28 May 2006 Ms Kolemeyer advised Mr McGowan that:
His rail safety worker's certificate remained withdrawn.
Permanent employment options were being explored
Master roster payments would cease effective 4 June 2006. [This decision has since been set aside.]
7 Mr McGowan claims that he has become very distressed about what he sees as his uncertain future at RailCorp. He is concerned that if forced to take an office based job, he would lose access to overtime and, as a consequence, struggle to meet his financial commitments. He claimed that if he lost his job or was forced to accept a position that did not offer regular overtime he would be unable to meet his immediate financial commitments, which include house repayments, and that ultimately this might mean that the bank would foreclose on the mortgage.
Section 105
8 Inserted into the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (AD Act) as a result of the Anti-Discrimination Amendment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2004, s 105 provides:
1) The Tribunal may, on the application of the President after a complaint is made and before the complaint is declined, terminated or otherwise resolved by the President, or referred to the Tribunal, or on the application of a complainant or respondent at any time, make an interim order:
(a) to preserve the status quo between the parties to the complaint, or
(b) to preserve the rights of the parties to the complaint, or
(c) to return the parties to the complaint to the circumstances they were in before the contravention of this Act or the regulations alleged in the complaint occurred,
9 Section 105 gives the Tribunal wide discretion to grant an interim order. The AD Act provides no express guidance on how that discretion is to be exercised. This provision was considered in some detail in NZ v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2006] NSWADT 126. In that decision the Tribunal summarised the principles that have been applied by the courts when granting interlocutory orders and noted the following:
[11]. A court in granting interlocutory relief, should generally grant the minimum relief necessary to do justice between the parties and it should specify the circumstances in which the order will cease to operate: Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 18, per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ at para 70.
[13] [t]here is no inflexible rule that a prima facie case for final relief must be made out by the applicant for an interlocutory relief in the Courts: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63, per Gleeson CJ at para 18.
[15] [t]he power of a statutory court to grant interim injunctive relief should be viewed in the light of the enabling statute …
[16] [w]here the power to grant interim injunctive relief derives from statute, as does the power of the Tribunal to grant interim orders, the statutory power is not to be limited by any limitation which is not strictly required by the language and purpose of the statute conferring the power to make interim orders.
10 The Tribunal also referred to the well-known test set out by Mason CJ in Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148:
[I]n order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.
11 Having considered these principles the Tribunal concluded at [17] "[t]hat the limits of its power to grant an interim order are found in the purpose of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 and in the wording of Section 105 of the Act itself".
12 The Applicant submitted that the Tribunal ought be cautious about importing equitable doctrine into s 105 and contended that the extent to which the discretion is fettered is to be found exclusively in the AD Act itself. It is enough, it was submitted, to establish that there is a serious risk that the status quo is threatened.
13 While I accept that the parameters of the Tribunal's power to make an interim order are to be found in s 105 itself, nevertheless the principles referred to above, in my view, provide useful guidance as to how that discretion ought be applied.
Findings and Conclusions
14 At the request of the parties the Tribunal has deferred listing this matter for final hearing until such time as the matter of Smart v RailCorp 051131 has been determined. This matter is on all fours with the facts that form the basis of Mr McGowan's complaint. I understand Smart will not be determined for another six months.
15 It is not disputed that in relation to the substantive proceedings the Applicant has an arguable case. The Respondent submitted, however, that the orders sought ought not be granted because Mr McGowan has not shown he will suffer irreparable damage; the order sought is too wide and, for example, would prevent the Respondent terminating Mr McGowan's employment for any reason; and, the orders are at odds with the relevant enterprise agreement.
16 The Respondent advised at hearing that a staff ballot was underway, the outcome of which would determine whether a proposal to restructure RailCorp ('Station Reform') would be adopted. The Respondent submitted that if Station Reform was implemented the orders sought by Mr McGowan would effectively quarantine him from the across-the-board restructure proposed by Station Reform, and, in effect, make him a "protected species". After the hearing the Respondent notified the Tribunal that the ballot had been lost and Station Reform would not be proceeding. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider the submissions on this point.
17 Application premature The Respondent contended that Mr McGowan's application is premature because he continues in the Modified Position he has held since April 2005 and has not, as he feared, been made redundant or medically retired. To date the only thing that has happened, contended the Respondent, is that Mr McGowan has been advised that he should consider alternative employment. This advice, it is argued, cannot be elevated to anything more than "career counselling".
18 While the Respondent is correct that no action has been taken to terminate Mr McGowan's employment, his uncontradicted account of his meeting with Ms Kolemeyer reveals that he was told he could no longer work as a customer services attendant and while nothing will happen for "a few months" he will be retired on medical grounds unless he manages to find alternative employment.
19 Prior to this conversation the status quo concerning Mr McGowan's employment with the Respondent was that he held the substantive position of customer services attendant, albeit carried out in a modified role. What has changed is that he has now been directed or encouraged to find alternative employment if he is to continue with RailCorp and advised that if he fails to do so his days with the Corporation are numbered.
20 It seems to me that as a consequence of that meeting the status quo between the parties has been disturbed. Mr McGowan has been notified in plain language that to maintain his employment with RailCorp he must take steps to find alternative employment. On the evidence before me there is nothing to indicate that this had previously been a condition of his continued employment.
21 But in any event it seems to me that to fall within s 105(1)(a) it is not necessary for a complainant to establish that the status quo actually has been disturbed. The test in my view is not set that high. Rather it is enough that it be established that there is a real and material risk that this might occur. I am satisfied on the evidence thus such risk exists in this case.
22 Accordingly I am satisfied that an interim order is necessary to preserve the status quo between the parties. Having made that finding I will proceed to consider whether the circumstances of this case warrant an exercise of the discretion granted under s 105.
Irreparable Damage
23 Mr McGowan's evidence is that his family's finances are precariously balanced. I accept his claim that if he were to lose his current position, or take an alternative position where overtime was not paid, in the short-term at least he might be unable to meet his loan commitments and as a consequence could lose his home.
24 If that were to eventuate damages would not, in my view, represent adequate compensation.
Balance of convenience
25 The Respondent contended that if the proposed order is granted it will suffer prejudice as its ability to make operational and staffing decisions will be restricted.
26 The Respondent also contended that the effect of the proposed order would be to cut across the provisions of the enterprise agreement which governs the terms and conditions of Mr McGowan's employment and should not be granted on that basis.
27 Clause 38.7 of the RailCorporation New South Wales Rail Infrastructure Corporation and State Rail Authority of New South Wales Enterprise Agreement 2005 provides:
Where an employee is determined by medical advice as permanently unfit for their normal duties, the Employer will attempt to place the employee into a suitable alternate position and the employee will thereafter be paid the rate of pay of the position into which they have been placed. Alternatively, if no suitable alternate positions are available, medical retirement procedures will commence…
28 The Respondent submitted that it is not open to the Tribunal to step in and interfere with the operation of this provision citing in support the decision of Gleeson CJ in State of New South Wales v Amery [2006] HCA 14 at [5] to [15], in particular the following:
[The Department of Education] does not need to justify the Act [ Teaching Services Act 1980(NSW) ], with its distinction between permanents and casuals, or the differing statutory incidents attaching to the status of permanent or casual, or, in particular, the amenability of permanent officers to relocation. That is the work of Parliament, not the Department. Nor does it need to justify the award, which is the work of the Industrial Relations Commission and, no doubt, the outcome of industrial interaction involving different interest groups within the teaching service.
29 It is not clear to me how Amery is relevant in the context of this application. If what is being argued is that the Respondent would be entitled to redeploy Mr McGowan under the Enterprise Agreement and or in compliance with its obligations under health and safety legislation then that is a matter which goes to the merits of the complaint and not one for determination at this stage. The issue here is not whether the decision to move Mr McGowan to Blacktown or whether the option of redeployment or retirement provided for under the Enterprise Agreement constitutes unlawful discrimination. Nor is the issue the interplay between Clause 38.7 of the EA and s 54 of the Act. Rather the issue is whether this is an appropriate case to exercise the discretion granted by s 105 of the AD Act to order that the status quo be preserved until the merits of Mr McGowan's complaints of unlawful disability discrimination have been determined.
30 If the order sought is granted the Respondent's managerial prerogative will be interfered with and I accept that as a consequence it will suffer some prejudice. However given the size of its workforce and the nature of the position now held by Mr McGowan together with the relatively short time these orders can be expected to be in force I am not satisfied that the 'balance of convenience' favours the Respondent in this case.
31 For these reasons I have decided to exercise my discretion to grant the application sought.
Orders
That the Applicant remain in his current position as a Non-Safety Critical Customer Attendant, Level 2, at St Marys Railway station until the determination of this matter by the Tribunal.
[8]
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated.
Application granted; order made that the applicant remain in his current position as a Non Safety Critical Customer Attendant, Level 2, at St Marys Railway station until the determination of the matter by the Tribunal.