© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2022] FCA 1578
Federal Court of Australia
2022-12-09
Wigney J
Original judgment source is linked above.
WIGNEY J: 1 On 9 September 2022, the Court made an interim control order (ICO) pursuant to s 104.4 of the schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (The Criminal Code) against the respondent, Mr Radwan Dakkak: McDonald v Dakkak [2022] FCA 1065 (the ICO Judgment). The applicant, Ms Amelia McDonald, a senior member of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) who holds the rank of Detective Superintendent, Enduring Risk and Disruption Investigations and Known Quantity Entity Management, now applies for confirmation of the ICO without variation pursuant to s 104.14(7)(c) of the Code. 2 Mr Dakkak does not oppose the confirmation of the ICO, though he does propose a modification to one of the controls. 3 In order to confirm the ICO, it is necessary for the Court to determine whether the conditions that must be satisfied or complied with before action can be taken under s 104.14(7) have been satisfied or complied with. It is also necessary to consider the evidence adduced and the submissions made in respect of the order. 4 Most importantly, before the ICO is confirmed, the Court must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, of the "matters" referred to in ss 104.4(1)(c) and (d) of the Code. In the particular circumstances of this case, those matters are, in summary, that: Mr Dakkak has been convicted in Australia of an offence related to terrorism, a terrorist organisation or a terrorist act; and the controls to be imposed on Mr Dakkak by the order are reasonably necessary and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes of protecting the public from a terrorist act or preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act. 5 For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that all the requirements for confirming the ICO have been satisfied and that the ICO should be confirmed, though with a slight variation to one of the controls.
BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION 6 The background to this application is spelled out in detail in the ICO Judgment. This judgment should be read in conjunction with that judgment. Following is a very short summary of the relevant background facts. 7 On 18 December 2020, Mr Dakkak was convicted of two offences of associating with a terrorist organisation contrary to s 102.8 of the Code. The offences involved Mr Dakkak associating with a number of people who he knew were members of, or directed the activities of, a terrorist organisation known as Islamic State. 8 On 31 December 2020, the Court made an interim control order (the first ICO) against Mr Dakkak: Booth v Dakkak [2020] FCA 1882. 9 On 5 February 2021, Mr Dakkak was charged with an offence of contravening a control order contrary to s 104.27(1) of the Code and was remanded in custody. He was convicted of that offence on 11 April 2022 and sentenced to a period of imprisonment: R v Dakkak [2022] NSWDC 181. That period of imprisonment ended on 15 September 2022. The circumstances of the offence were that Mr Dakkak searched for, accessed, viewed and downloaded online extremist materials in contravention of the ICO then in place. 10 The ICO the subject of this confirmation application was made on 9 September 2022, shortly before Mr Dakkak was released from custody.
CONDITIONS THAT MUST BE SATISFIED BEFORE THE COURT CAN CONFIRM AN ICO UNDER S 104.14(7) OF THE CODE 11 For s 104.14 of the Code to apply, three conditions must be satisfied: s 104.14(1A) of the Code. 12 First, an ICO has been made in relation to a person: s 104.14(1A)(a) of the Code. 13 Second, an election under s 104.12A to confirm the order has been made: s 104.14(1A)(b) of the Code. 14 Third, the Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that s 104.12 and s 104.12A(2) have been complied with in relation to the order: s 104.14(1A)(c) of the Code. As will be seen, s 104.12 and s 104.12A include a number of separate conditions and requirements, some fairly formal and others not so formal.
The first and second conditions: ss 104.14(1A)(a) and (b) 15 I am satisfied that the conditions in ss 104.14(1A)(a) and (b) have been satisfied in this case. 16 As has already been noted, an ICO order was made against Mr Dakkak on 9 September 2022. 17 As for the election, s 104.12A(1) of the Code provides that at least 48 hours before the day specified in the ICO as the date on which the person may attend court for the court to confirm, revoke or declare the ICO to be void, the senior AFP officer who requested the ICO must elect whether to confirm the order and give a written notification of the election to the issuing court. There is evidence that on 17 November 2022, Ms McDonald signed a notification of an election to confirm the ICO made in relation to Mr Dakkak: annexures AO-1 and AO-2 to the affidavit of Aydin Ozden dated 6 December 2022 (Ozden 2).
The third condition: compliance with s 104.12 and s 104.12A(2) of the Code 18 Sections 104.12 and 104.12A(2) of the Code require certain documents to be served on the person the subject of the ICO and that the person be informed about certain matters. 19 Section 104.12(1) provides, among other things, that as soon as practicable after an ICO is made, and at least 48 hours before the day on which the person may attend court for the court to confirm, revoke or declare the ICO to be void, an AFP member must: serve the order personally on the person in relation to whom the order was made; inform the person of the information specified in s 104.12(1)(b); and ensure that the person understood that information. 20 The information specified in s 104.12(1)(b) is: the effect of the order; the period for which the order (if confirmed) is in force; the effect of ss 104.12A, 104.13, 104.14, 104.18 and 104.27 (and, if appropriate, s 104.22); that the person has a right to obtain legal advice and legal representation; that the person may have appeal and review rights in relation to the decision of the issuing court to make the order; the person's right to attend court on the day specified for the purposes of s 104.5(1)(e); the right of the person or one or more representatives of the person to adduce evidence or make submissions under s 104.14(1) if the order is confirmed; that the person may have appeal and review rights in relation to any decision of the issuing court to confirm the order; the person's right to apply under s 104.18 for an order revoking or varying the order if it is confirmed; and the right of the person or one or more representatives of the person to adduce evidence or make submissions under s 104.19(3) or s 104.23(4) in relation to an application to revoke or vary the order if it is confirmed. 21 Subsection 104.12A(2) provides, relevantly, that the senior AFP officer must also serve on the person in relation to whom the ICO was made a copy of the notification of election to confirm, together with the documents referred to in ss 104.2(3)(aa) and 104.3(d) of the Code. Those documents are, in summary, some of the documents that were required at the ICO stage: the statement of facts relating to why the ICO should be made; the statement of facts, if any, relating to why the ICO should not be made; the explanation as to why each of the proposed obligations, prohibitions and restrictions should be imposed; and a statement of facts relating to why any of the obligations, prohibitions or restrictions should not be imposed. 22 I am satisfied that each of the requirements or conditions in ss 104.12 and 104.12A(2) of the Code have been complied with in this case. The evidence establishes that the ICO and a document explaining the ICO were served on Mr Dakkak on 14 September 2022: affidavit of Aydin Ozden dated 4 October 2022 (Ozden 1) at [2]. The following documents were served on Mr Dakkak on 6 December 2022: the notification of election to confirm the ICO; the evidence adduced in support of the application for the ICO, including the s 104.2(3)(aa) and s 104.3(d) documents; and written submissions filed in support of the application for the ICO (according to Ozden 2 at [2]-[3]). The AFP officer who served those documents informed Mr Dakkak of the s 104.12(1)(b) information and took appropriate and satisfactory steps to ensure that Mr Dakkak understood that information: Ozden 2 at [4]-[5]. 23 It follows that the conditions necessary for s 104.14 of the Code have been satisfied and the Court can entertain the application to confirm the ICO made in relation to Mr Dakkak.
THE MATERIAL THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED BEFORE ACTION IS TAKEN UNDER S 104.14(7) 24 Sections 104.14(3) and (3A) of the Code specify certain material that the Court must consider before taking any action under s 104.14 of the Code. Those subsections provide as follows: (3) Subject to subsection (3A), before taking action under this section, the court must consider: (a) the original request for the interim control order; and (b) any evidence adduced, and any submissions made, under subsection (1) in respect of the order. (3A) To avoid doubt, in proceedings under this section, the issuing court: (a) must take judicial notice of the fact that the original request for the interim control order was made in particular terms; but (b) may only take action on evidence adduced, and submissions made, under subsection (1) in relation to the confirmation of the order. 25 The combined effect of ss 104.14(3) and (3A) of the Code is, in summary, as follows. 26 First, before making an order confirming an ICO or otherwise, the Court must take into consideration the terms of the ICO which has been made. It is, however, unnecessary for either party to tender the ICO, as the Court must in any event take judicial notice of it. 27 Second, the Court can only act on the evidence adduced for the purposes of, and the submissions made at the hearing of, the confirmation application. It follows that, even if the evidence and circumstances remain unchanged from the time that the ICO was made, the person who applies for confirmation of the ICO is required to tender afresh the evidence relied on at the ICO stage and, it seems, repeat the submissions that were made at the ICO stage. 28 The Court has, in accordance with ss 104.14(3)(a) and (3A)(a), considered the original request for the ICO and has taken judicial notice of the fact that the original request for the ICO was made in particular terms. 29 Ms McDonald has adduced evidence in relation to the confirmation order in accordance with s 104.14(1) of the Code. That evidence included the evidence adduced at the ICO stage. Ms McDonald also made submissions in relation to the confirmation order. Those submissions included or incorporated the submissions made at the ICO stage. 30 Mr Dakkak filed an affidavit sworn by him on 17 November 2022: cf s 104.14(1)(c) of the Code. That affidavit was solely directed to Mr Dakkak's opposition to what he contended was the "extensive broadness and restrictive nature" of control order 6. Mr Dakkak claimed that control order 6 impacted the "practice of [his] faith". His evidence was that when he sought an exemption from the AFP in relation to a "religious book" it took over a month for the AFP to approve the exemption. Mr Dakkak proposed that control order 6 be qualified by the inclusion of the word "predominantly" and that "Australian bookstores" be added to the list of exemptions. 31 Mr Dakkak's evidence and submissions concerning control order 6 are addressed in detail later in these reasons. 32 I have, as required by s 104.14(3), considered the original request for the ICO, the evidence adduced and the submissions made by, or on behalf of, Ms McDonald and Mr Dakkak. I have also, in compliance with s 104.14(3A), taken judicial notice of the fact that the original request for the ICO was made in particular terms, but otherwise only acted on the evidence and submissions in relation to the confirmation of the ICO.
SATISFACTION IN TERMS OF SS 104.4(1)(c) AND 104.4(1)(d) of the code 33 The effect of ss 104.14(6) and (7) is that, where s 104.14 applies, the Court may do one of four things. 34 First, the Court may declare, in writing, the ICO to be void if satisfied that, at the time of making the order, there were no grounds on which to make the order: s 104.14(6) of the Code. 35 Mr Dakkak did not contend that I should declare the ICO to be void, or that there was any basis for the Court to be satisfied that, at the time of the making of the order, there were no grounds on which to make the order. 36 Second, the Court may revoke the order if, at the time of confirming the order, the Court "is not satisfied as mentioned in" s 104.4(1)(c): s 104.14(7)(a) of the Code. 37 Third, the Court may confirm and vary the order by removing one or more obligations, prohibitions or restrictions if, at the time of confirming the order, the Court is satisfied as mentioned in s 104.4(1)(c) but is not satisfied as mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d): s 104.14(7)(b) of the Code. 38 Fourth, the Court may confirm the order without variation if, at the time of confirming the order, the Court is satisfied as mentioned in ss 104.4(1)(c) and (d): s 104.14(7)(c) of the Code. 39 Ms McDonald contended that the Court should take the fourth option and confirm the ICO without variation. She did, however, ultimately propose a variation to control order 6 to accommodate or take into account some of the concerns raised by Mr Dakkak in relation to that order. 40 Mr Dakkak, in substance or effect, contended that the Court should take the third option and confirm and vary the order. He did not oppose confirmation of the ICO and appeared to concede that the Court should be satisfied as mentioned in s 104.4(1)(c), but submitted, in effect, that the Court should not be satisfied as mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d) unless control order 6 was varied as proposed by him. He appeared to concede that the Court could be satisfied as mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d) in respect of all of the other control orders.
Satisfaction as mentioned in s 104.4(1)(c) of the Code 41 Subsection 104.4(1)(c) provides, in summary, that before making an ICO, the Court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities of one or more specified facts or circumstances. Ms McDonald submitted that the Court should be satisfied on the balance of probabilities of the facts or circumstances specified in subparagraph (iv) - that Mr Dakkak had been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to terrorism or a terrorist act. 42 At the ICO stage, the Court accepted that Mr Dakkak had been convicted of an offence relating to terrorism: ICO Judgment at [19(e)]. Mr Dakkak did not contend that the Court erred in so concluding at the ICO stage, or submit that the offence of which he was convicted was not an offence relating to terrorism or a terrorist act. 43 The meaning of the expressions "an offence relating to terrorism" and "an offence relating to a terrorist act" was considered in McCartney v EB (2019) 263 FCR 170; [2019] FCA 183 at [29]-[33]. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the offence of associating with a terrorist organisation, being the offence that Mr Dakkak was convicted of in December 2020, is an offence relating to terrorism or an offence relating to a terrorist act. 44 Accordingly, I am satisfied "as mentioned in" s 104.4(1)(c) of the Code.
Satisfaction as mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d) of the Code 45 Subsection 104.4(1)(d) of the Code provides, in summary, that the Court may make an ICO if it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on the person by the order is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of either: protecting the public from a terrorist act (subparagraph (i)); or preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act (subparagraph (ii)); or preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country (subparagraph (iii)). 46 At the ICO stage, the Court considered the proposed obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on Mr Dakkak at considerable length: ICO Judgment at [22]-[63]. The Court was ultimately satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions that were included in the ICO as made were reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act, or preventing the provision of the support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country: s 104.4(1)(d)(ii) and (iii); ICO Judgment at [66]. The orders made by the Court also indicated that the Court was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions that were included in the ICO as made were reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act: s 104.4(1)(d)(i) of the Code. 47 Mr Dakkak did not adduce any evidence, or make any submissions, concerning any of the control orders other than control order 6. I will accordingly separately address control order 6 and Mr Dakkak's submissions concerning it. 48 As for the balance of the control orders, Mr Dakkak did not contend that the Court at the ICO stage erred in concluding that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions in those were reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes referred to in ss 104.4(1)(d)(i), (ii) or (iii). Nor did he submit that anything had changed since the ICO stage. 49 For essentially the same reasons as those given in the ICO Judgment, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions imposed on Mr Dakkak by the ICO are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purposes referred to in ss 104.4(1)(d)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Code. 50 In making those findings, I have given particular weight to Ms McDonald's detailed explanation of why the control orders should be imposed: affidavit of Amelia Jane McDonald sworn 17 August 2022 at [64]-[131]. 51 As for control order 6, that control order prohibits Mr Dakkak from accessing, acquiring or possessing material which has certain qualities, or address or relate to certain topics, unless the material is published or broadcast by certain organisations. As noted earlier, Mr Dakkak contended, in effect, that control order 6 was not reasonably necessary, or reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of either protecting the public from a terrorist act, or preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act. He claimed that control order 6 was too broad and restrictive and would impact on the practice of his faith. He submitted that control order 6 should be varied so it only prohibited him from accessing material that "predominantly" addressed or related to the specified topics and that "Australian bookstores" should be added to the list of "exemptions". Mr Dakkak's evidence was that it took the AFP over a month to consider an exemption request which appeared to relate to a book in an Australian bookstore. 52 Ms McDonald relied on an affidavit of another senior AFP officer, Mr Peter Fogarty, who holds the rank of Superintendent in Enduring Risk and Special Investigations. Mr Fogarty's evidence addressed the circumstances in which Mr Dakkak had sought exemptions from control order 6 pursuant to paragraph 21 of the control orders. That evidence explained why it had taken the AFP over a month to address Mr Dakkak's exemption request. 53 Mr Dakkak made a similar submission in respect of control order 6 at the ICO stage. The Court declined to vary control order 6 as proposed by Mr Dakkak and reasoned as follows (ICO Judgment at [44]-[48]): In general terms, Control 6 prohibits the respondent from accessing and possessing certain material. It was the respondent's breach of Control 6 of the first interim control order that led to his conviction for the Contravention Offence. The respondent's concern is that this control could be breached inadvertently or unintentionally. He appeared to suggest that the Contravention Offence was of this character or was an example of a de minimis breach. As I stated at the hearing, I do not propose to go behind the findings of the sentencing judge in respect of the Contravention Offence. However, I accept that, in operation, it is possible that Control 6 could be breached inadvertently. I have reflected on whether the terms of Control 6 could be modified to cater, expressly, for inadvertence, including by conditioning the control, in the case of electronic access, to exempting access for a limited time period, as the respondent suggested. I have reached the view that any attempt to modify the terms of the control, as proposed, is likely to lead to a substantial weakening of the measure, and possible uncertainty in its application. I am persuaded that the question of whether the control is breached is best determined by objective circumstances. The onus should be placed on the respondent to act responsibly and carefully, mindful of the controls placed upon him. Further, as the applicant submitted, should the respondent innocently or unwittingly access prohibited material, it is within his competence to make disclosure of that access by bringing it to the attention of the AFP in a timely fashion. The respondent also raised the question of whether an additional exception to Control 6 should be permitted to allow him to purchase, from an Australian bookstore, a publicly available book. I am not persuaded that, at the present time, such an exception should be provided. This is because the terms of Control 6 are specific as to the subject matter in respect of which access is prohibited. Given the particular nature of the prohibited material, I do not see Control 6 as acting as a substantial impediment to the respondent purchasing or otherwise acquiring books from an Australian bookstore within the permitted scope of the control. If there is doubt whether the respondent can access a particular book from an Australian bookstore, he can request an exemption under Control 21. 54 Despite that finding at the ICO stage, Ms McDonald proposed some variations to control order 6 to meet some of concerns that had been raised by Mr Dakkak. In particular, Ms McDonald proposed that the following additional paragraphs be added to control order 6: 6.2. Control 6.1 does not apply to material in a book that you purchase from an Australian retailer of books provided that you notify the AFP Superintendent of the title of the book within 24 hours of purchasing the book. 6.3. If at any time you become aware that a book that you have notified the AFP Superintendent of pursuant to Control 6.2 contains material of a nature identified in Control 6.1(a)-(c) (Prohibited Material), you must notify the AFP Superintendent within two hours, identifying the section/s of that book that contain Prohibited Material, by reference to chapters and/or page numbers. 6.4. If the AFP Superintendent notifies you in writing that the exception in Control 6.2 will cease to apply to a specified book, Control 6.1 will apply to the material in that book from 5 pm on the next day after that notification is sent. 55 In his submissions at the hearing, Mr Dakkak initially maintained that control order 6, including the variation proposed by Ms McDonald, was still disproportionate and created a risk of him inadvertently contravening the control order. Ultimately, however, after the terms of the proposed control order were explained to Mr Dakkak and Ms McDonald agreed to a further minor variation, he appeared to accept that control order 6 was reasonable and appropriate. 56 Having considered the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions imposed on Mr Dakkak by control order 6 as varied are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act and preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act: s 104.4(1)(d)(i) and (ii). I am satisfied that the minor variation made to control order 6.3 reasonably and appropriately deal with Mr Dakkak's concerns as to the breadth of the order and the possibility of inadvertent breach. That variation is appropriate, but it is not made because I am not satisfied "as mentioned in" s 104.4(1)(d), for the purposes of s 104.14(7)(c). 57 I am satisfied as mentioned in s 104.4(1)(d) of the Code in respect of the orders proposed by Ms McDonald in their entirety.
CONCLUSION IN RELATION TO CONFIRMATION 58 I am satisfied that the relevant conditions that must be satisfied before s 104.14 applies have been satisfied or complied with. 59 On the basis of the evidence adduced and the submissions made in accordance with s 104.14(1) of the Code, I am also satisfied "as mentioned in" ss 104.4(1)(c) and (d) of the Code. I therefore propose to make an order pursuant to s 104.14(7)(c) of the Code confirming the ICO with the proposed variation to control order 6. I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Wigney.
Associate: Dated: 21 December 2022 ANNEXURE
McDonald
Dakkak