That has been made the central idea upon which the appel-
lant's argument before us has turned. It really involves much
more than the construction of this deed: it involves the cardinal
notion of what is meant by a share in a partnership as dis-
tinguished from joint ownership of the property belonging to the
partnership. It assumes that the property sold by Sir Samuel
McCaughey to Vincent and Robinson was identical with the
property sold to him by his co-partners, and it treats Vincent
and Robinson as "sub-purchasers." The observation that the
transaction is a "substituted transaction " is consequential. But,
with the greatest deference to Ferguson J., there is a fallacy in
the position. The property sold by Sir Samuel to his purchasers
was the concrete land as land, and the stock and chattels as such.
What he bought from his co-partners was not realty, and was
not so many head of cattle or so much plant. The nature of a
share in a partnership as stated in Lindley on Partnership, 7th
ed., at p. 377, is, in substance, quoted by Pollock on Partnership,
8th ed., at p. 74, in these words: "The share of a partner in the
partnership property at any given time may be defined as the
proportion of the then existing partnership assets to which he
would be entitled if the whole were realized and converted into
money, and after all the then existing debts and liabilities of
the firm had been discharged."