C.1 Why the Proposed Claim is Arguable
10 MPG alleges that VRPL was knowingly involved in several contraventions by VAH of statutory norms under the Corporations Act and ASIC Act, namely:
(1) ss 728(1)(a) and 1041E(1) of the Corporations Act - specifically, that VRPL was involved in VAH's making of the "Cash Balance Representation" and the "Velocity Acquisition Rationale Representation" in the notes prospectus released by VAH to promote the issue of the notes, both of which are alleged by MPG to have been misleading or deceptive;
(2) s 728(1)(b) of the Corporations Act - specifically, that VRPL was involved in VAH's omission in the notes prospectus of the existence and terms of a secured loan facility entered by VRPL from 27 August 2024 (FASOC (at [8])) (Velocity Loan), VAH's practice of treating the drawn and undrawn balance of the Velocity Loan as unrestricted cash and the rationale for VAH's acquisition of Affinity's stake in Velocity, being due to the potential loss of the Velocity Loan were Velocity to be sold by way of IPO;
(3) s 1041H(1) of the Corporations Act and s 12DA of the ASIC Act - specifically, that VRPL was involved in the making of the "Cash Balance Representation" and the "Velocity Acquisition Rationale Representation" and the omission of the matters referred to at (2) above in the Offering Circular for the US Notes; and
(4) s 674(2) of the Corporations Act - specifically, that VRPL was involved in VAH's failure to disclosure to the ASX the true rationale for its acquisition of Velocity being due to the potential loss of the Velocity Loan were Velocity to be sold by way of IPO (described as the "Velocity Acquisition Rationale Information").
11 VRPL's alleged involvement in VAH's alleged contraventions can be distilled down to two matters of substance. The first is with respect to VAH's available cash balance, including (specifically) VAH's treatment of the drawn and undrawn loan balance of the Velocity Loan as "unrestricted" cash. MPG alleges that such treatment was erroneous and had the purported effect of inflating its cash balance (FASOC (at [46C])). The second relates to the "true but undisclosed reason" for VAH's acquisition of Affinity's stake in Velocity, being because the alternative option for the disposal of Affinity's stake was by way of an IPO, which would lead to VAH's loss of the Velocity Loan and, consequently, its loss of $450 million of purportedly unrestricted cash, which cash was said to be critical to VAH's liquidity position.
12 MPG developed its submissions as to arguability as follows.
13 First, VRPL's participation in VAH's alleged contraventions is said to flow from the fact that: (1) it made the Velocity Loan available to VAH; (2) VRPL regularly extended its maturity date and the size of its facility; and (3) importantly, VRPL permitted VAH to treat the drawn and undrawn loan balance as part of its unrestricted cash (T22.25-23.6; FASOC (at [89L(c)])). MPG submits that the documents disclosed in discovery reveal that "Compliance and Reporting Notes" which VAA was required to submit to VRPL to disclose its restricted and unrestricted cash balance routinely reported an unrestricted cash balance which included the entirety of the Velocity Loan facility (see FASOC (at [103G])), notwithstanding that its obligation to report its unrestricted cash balance each month required it to exclude any cash held by VRPL (cl 4(b) of the Velocity Loan Agreement). It is said those documents similarly disclose the absence of any inquiry by VRPL into VAH's use of the loan funds, despite the fact that the terms of the Velocity Loan Agreement, Loyalty Trust, Investment Mandate and Investment Policy prescribed how such loans could be used. Accordingly, MPG contends that it is "readily arguable" VRPL managed the Velocity Loan in a manner which facilitated VAH's representations as to its financial position and the availability of unrestricted cash, and otherwise supplied VAH with access to funds which motivated VAH's acquisition of VRPL from Affinity.
14 Secondly, it is said that VRPL had the requisite knowledge for each of the contraventions that flow from the "Cash Balance Representation" and the "Velocity Acquisition Rationale Representation". MPG submits that the evidence establishes VRPL was aware of:
(1) the terms of the Loyalty Trust Deed, the Investment Policy, and the Velocity Loan Agreement, and accordingly, must have been aware of the discretion vested in VRPL to refuse further drawdowns and the pre-conditions (see FASOC (at [8C])) which applied before VAH was entitled to request a further drawdown;
(2) VAH's cash balance from month to month (Compliance & Reporting Notices were submitted to VRPL each month pursuant to the Velocity Loan Agreement disclosing VAH's purportedly unrestricted cash balance);
(3) VAH's purportedly unrestricted cash balance as reported, including the drawn and undrawn value of the Velocity Loan facility (given that its company secretary, Ms Sharyn Page, was also company secretary of VAH and attended board meetings where the treatment of the Velocity Loan as unrestricted cash was routinely discussed);
(4) the contents of the notes prospectus (given that Ms Page attended meetings of the Due Diligence Committee established by VAH as part of the preparing the notes prospectus (DDC), executed a Verification Sign-Off Certificate and VAH Management Questionnaire with respect to the contents of the prospectus); and
(5) in the light of the above, that the "unrestricted cash position" was disclosed in the notes prospectus as being substantially higher than the figures reported to it in the Compliance & Reporting Notices and at a quantum which included the total value of the Velocity Loan (notwithstanding that access to the loan was subject to a range of pre-conditions which did not give VAH free and unrestricted access to, and use of, those funds).
15 Thirdly, and relatedly, MPG contends that these matters are not displaced by evidence given by Ms Platford, the solicitor for VAH, that: first, the corporate structure of VAH and Velocity Group indicates that "VRPL's only role was to act as the corporate trustee of the Loyalty Trust" (Platford (at [64])); and secondly, VRPL was not "involved" in the due diligence process for the preparation of the notes prospectus because, notwithstanding that Ms Page was in attendance at meetings of the DDC, signed a verification certificate as to the content of the notes prospectus, and assisted in responding to the "VAH Management Questionnaire", she only did so in her capacity as company secretary of VAH, not VRPL. MPG submits that these matters do not assist VAH's contentions as to arguability because:
(1) Ms Platford's evidence goes no higher than hearsay or opinion evidence and is incapable of establishing any factual proposition to a level that would render the proposed claims against VRPL untenable;
(2) even if VRPL's role was limited to its function as corporate trustee, this proposition elides the conduct in which VRPL was required to engage (and did allegedly engage) in carrying out that role, on which the accessorial claims against it depend (for example, it is said that VRPL's role as lender under the Velocity Loan entailed, inter alia, consulting with the Investment Committee with respect to such decisions as extending the maturity date or facility limit of the loan, assessing whether repayment of the loan was required to protect Velocity members' interests in determining whether to call upon repayment of the drawn loan balance, and otherwise exercising its fiduciary duties as trustee to ensure the protection of trust assets); and
(3) although Ms Page may have been performing certain functions associated with the due diligence process on behalf of VAH, this does not displace a finding that she possessed certain knowledge of matters or that such knowledge may be attributed to VRPL. It is said that VAH's submission that Ms Page's conduct and knowledge must be disregarded by virtue of the separate corporate personality of VAH and VRPL is contrived when such separation does not appear to reflect the realities of VRPL's operation: cf ACCC v Productivity Partners Pty Ltd (t/as Captain Cook College) (No 3) [2021] FCA 737; (2021) 154 ACSR 472 (at 585-586 [581]-[585] per Stewart J).