The argument for the respondent, in my opinion, ignores the fact of dissolution of the partnership. It treats the partnership as still subsisting, and as being unaffected by the fact of dissolution, though it has in fact been dissolved and though the operation of s. 10 (3) is expressly made conditional upon a dissolution having taken place. The respondent's argument in the present case produces the result that Connolly and Laffer, if they were alive, would be entitled to the money in question in the same shares, &c., as if the partnership were still in existence though it has been dissolved. Section 10 (3) does not require or justify such an hypothesis. The section might have so provided, but it does not do so. To ignore the fact of dissolution, with its attendant circumstances (which determine the rights, duties and liabilities to which the section gives effect) is to contradict the fact which brings the section into operation. So also s. 11 recognizes, in my opinion, the effect in each particular case of the death of a particular person who, if he had been alive, would have been entitled to the money, and so brings into operation the law relating to the administration of the estates of deceased persons, and the law dealing with testamentary dispositions and intestacy. Section 10 (3), in my opinion, operates in a similar manner in the case of dissolved partnerships. Neither the legal effect of the dissolution nor the legal effect of death, in the circumstances in which the dissolution or the death took place, is to be ignored. On the contrary, there is to be full recognition of the rights, duties and liabilities arising from those events. If ss. 9, 10 and 11 are regarded as express special exceptions from the general provisions of s. 29, many of the suggested difficulties disappear.