In Western Australia it was apparently thought, in 1948, that expressly introducing the words of the judgment of Real J. into the amended definition of "worker" would give the Western Australian Act the effect that his Honour had thought the Queensland Act of 1905 had. But words from a judgment in a Queensland case do not, when transplanted into a Western Australian statute, get their meaning from the context whence they came but from the context into which they are put. They must be interpreted as part of the Western Australian statute in the light of common practices in the timber getting industry. They give the benefit of the Act to workers there who are paid what, in economic effect although not in legal character, amounts to wages for manual work. They look to the nature of the services for which the remuneration is in reality a return. They prevent persons employed to work and working in the ways stated in the definition from being excluded from the Act because they are, in law, independent contractors. They also prevent their being excluded because the remuneration can be expressed to be, not for doing work, but for supplying timber on which work had been done. That was a difficulty that had arisen in some cases elsewhere than in Western Australia when it was sought to apply workers' compensation legislation to timber getters. But, to get the benefit of the extended definition, the remuneration must be in substance for manual labour. The expression "manual labour" is here, I think, used in the sense it has been held to have in decisions concerning its use in various statutes in England, Employers' Liability Acts, Workmen's Compensation Acts, the National Health Insurance Act, the Truck Act, the Factory and Workshop Act. Generally it may be said that "manual labour" excludes services which are primarily by way of skilled direction and supervision, clerical work and other activities in which manual operations are casual, merely incidental, or accessory to the main purpose. As Lord Sumner said, "the Courts have almost uniformly looked to the real and substantial work to be done, to the main duty of the employee and the general nature of his employment, to that which is primary and substantial in his operations and not to that which is merely incidental and accessory": Jaques v. Steam Tug Alexandra [1] . Of the many cases to this effect it is enough to mention Bound v. Lawrence [1] ; Re Dairymen's Foremen and Tailors' Cutters [2] ; and Re Gardner [3] , followed in Tansey v. Renown Collieries Ltd. [4] . If the question in this case were whether Marshall was employed to do manual labour the Board could, in my view, have found that he was. He was employed to work himself, with only one swamper to help him, in felling, trimming and carting timber. The work he contracted to do did not cease to be manual labour because in doing it he used a mechanical power saw and a motor truck with a winch as well as an axe. I do not think that the tools a man uses determine whether or not the work he does or is employed to do, is manual labour. To take some illustrations: a man using a pneumatic drill to break up concrete is engaged in manual labour just as much as is a man attempting the same task with a pick and crowbar. A man cutting logs at a saw bench with a circular saw - "working in connexion with milling" as the Act puts it - is, it seems to me, engaged in manual labour just as much as is a man splitting firewood with an axe. The Act in terms indicates that in the timber industry a man working in connexion with the hauling or carriage of timber may be engaged in manual labour as well as a man working at felling or sawing. But the question is not, as was suggested, whether the work of the deceased man was, in substance, manual labour. That is not an irrelevant consideration. But it is misleading to regard it as the question that the Board had to determine. It was not, and the Supreme Court did not think that it was. The actual question is whether the deceased man's remuneration was in substance a return for the manual labour he bestowed upon the work. That is a more difficult question. In the first place, what is meant by "the remuneration of the person so working"? If it were justifiable to interpret this by reference to the passage in the judgment of Real J. quoted above it would mean the money from his contract that remained to the deceased after he had paid his swamper. But I do not think it is legitimate to construe the words of the Act by reference to the somewhat questionable use that was made of them elsewhere. "The remuneration" of the deceased must, for the purposes of the definition, be taken, I think, to mean what he was to have as the consideration for his performance of his contract, that is to say £3 per load of logs delivered. What then is the effect of the requirement that the remuneration must be "in substance a return for the manual labour bestowed by him upon the work"? It is, I think, intended to differentiate the working contractor, whom the Act assimilates to the position of an employee paid by wages, from the contractor who is himself an undertaker, an employer, and for the purposes of the Act to be considered as such rather than as a working employee. The distinction is a real one, but it depends upon economic rather than ordinary legal criteria. The phrase "in substance" is frequently used in legal writing, although it does not very often appear in statutes. Its common use is in connexion with definition and classification, or "characterization", as it is now often called. There the question is, looking to substance and not to form, what for the purpose in hand is a thing's essential quality? The expression "in substance", and the word "substantially" in that sense, are related to the distinction that the old logicians described as that between propria and accidentia. That it seems to me is the sense in which the expression is used in the Act. It follows that the inquiry that the Act demands is not that which the Board made. The Board found that, "because a substantial part of the remuneration paid to the deceased was for manual labour bestowed by him on the work in which he was engaged", he was a worker within the definition. This, however, involved treating the phrase "in substance" as if it were equivalent to "to a substantial extent". But we are concerned with "in substance" as determining the essential character of the remuneration - not with whether it was substantial, either in the sense of "large" or in the sense of "not unsubstantial": cf. Palser v. Grinling [1] ; Atkinson v. Bettison [1] .