Judgment (Defendant's applications re Plaintiff's List of Documents)
1 On 4 November 1999 I delivered a judgment on the defendant's Notice of Motion for further discovery: ([1999] NSWSC 1081: DLJT: 50). On 17 November 1999 the plaintiff delivered a List of Document pursuant to the orders I made.
2 It is a long document which purports to categorise the Discovery in accordance with the categories and classes of documents to which I referred in my orders. At this point it can be mentioned that the plaintiff has marked '' in Part 1 of Schedule 1 documents that he "does not produce for inspection". In the same Part 1 of Schedule 1 are documents marked '**' in respect of which a claim for client legal privilege is made, the documents relating to the files and ledger cards of former clients of the plaintiff's firm.
3 Documents are enumerated in Part 2 of Schedule 1 in respect of which litigation privilege and confidential communication privilege is asserted.
4 The defendant makes what in reality are several applications. The first is an application for inspection of those documents marked ''. It makes a fresh application for particular discovery in relation to documents identified in three categories: documents provided by the plaintiff to Inspector Woodhouse in November 1998; documents provided to Inspector Woodhouse on 8 March and 22 March 1999; documents that now are MFI 22 in the trial being documents in respect of which privilege was held to have been waived during the cross-examination of Dr Dent. An application for particular discovery is also made with respect to the plaintiff's diaries in the light of the evidence contained in Exhibits D, E and F in the Discovery Application, a memorandum of the plaintiff in relation to Shane Olive.
5 The circumstances of the argument relating to the defendant's applications could at best be described as intolerable in that counsel were obliged to conduct the matter over three separate days, interrupted by other applications in relation to other aspects of the proceedings. Submissions concluded on 15 December but the Court's attention to them could not be paid however until after the conclusion of further interlocutory applications on Thursday 16 December.
6 For the defendant it is submitted that given the purpose of discovery being that all documentary material of the other party is to be discovered so that it can consider its effect on its own case and its opponents case and decide how to carry on the proceedings, and to put before the Court in due course all relevant documentary evidence, documents in respect of which no claim for privilege is made, which came into existence prior to the litigation, which are "relevant" by reason of their being discovered, cannot be precluded from inspection on discretionary grounds unless not to do so would permit an abuse of process or where disclosure would involve "trade secrets" or cognate matters: Church of Scientology of California v Department of Health & Social Security(1979) 1 WLR 723; Kimberley Mineral Holdings Limited (In Liq.) & Anor v McEwan (1980) 1 NSWLR 210. The situation is to be distinguished from that which founded the exercise of my discretion in what is known as the "Corrs Subpoena" judgment ([1999] NSWSC 428: DLJT: 39 - 7 May 1999) in relation to subpoenaed documents. Those documents were precluded from inspection on a discretionary basis by reason of their purpose being to attack the credit of the defendant's witnesses and to be deployed in defence of the justification case. The discretion exercised pursuant to Waind v Hill (1978) 1 NSWLR 372 is not available in the circumstances I have outlined. I agree with the submission that nothing said by Clarke J in Marcus v Provincial Insurance Co. Limited (unreported, 11 May 1983) in the circumstances with which his Honour was there concerned, nor anything said by Santow J in Broadwater Taxation & Investment Services Pty Limited v Hendriks (unreported, 9 September 1993), derogates from the fundamental position advanced for the defendant. I have had regard to the submissions of Mr Hall that there is no limitation in respect of the time of the creation of the documents nor a restriction to the "abuse of process / trade secrets" bases, however I am not by them persuaded.
7 Thus, to put it shortly, the Waind v Hill discretion exercised in the Corrs Subpoena judgment is not available for exercise here, and in any event, I do not accept the proposition that the "compilation" of the group of documents including, pre-litigation documents, said to be for the forensic purpose of attacking the defendant's witness, merely by reason of that fact, that is, the compilation of such documents, provides a basis for non-inspection. For example, in relation to the photographs, the plaintiff in his list has "selectively" identified documents within the various categories which he is prepared in fact to have the defendant inspect.
8 Order 1 of the orders set out below reflects the application of the view I have formed.
9 With respect to the documents '**', it is the plaintiff's position that he will abide the order of the Court in relation to the files in respect of which it is merely asserted that they were former client files. I propose to order that those documents, including the ledger cards be made available for inspection. As to the latter, there is authority in support of the proposition that privilege does not attach to such material; Re Packer (1984) 15 ATR 651; Allen Allen & Hemsley v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 89 ATC 4294.