I am of the same opinion. The respondent was summarily convicted, and sec. 183 of the Justices Act gave him an absolute right to appeal on complying with certain conditions. Those conditions were complied with, and he therefore was an appellant. Sec. 187, in prescribing the security for his appearance, directs that he should enter into a recognizance to appear before the Court to which the appeal is made, and to submit to the judgment of the Court. He cannot, in my opinion, by breaking the requirements of the Statute, put himself in a better position than if he complied with them. Then the Act goes on to provide for the hearing of the appeal, and sec. 191 provides that there may be a rehearing in either of two cases: If the parties agree, or if the Court to which the appeal is made so orders. But that is only, as has already been put by the Chief Justice, a matter of procedure; it is not the main order in the case; and if the appellant chooses to abandon his whole appeal he abandons it altogether, including any agreement for rehearing or any incidental order for rehearing which may have happened to be made. I think, therefore, that the view taken by his Honor Mr. Justice Rooth, that the order for a rehearing was the main order, was not correct; and that is shown very distinctly by this, that secs. 192 and 193 provide for cases where a decision is not affirmed by the appellate Court, and where the decision of the justice is affirmed by the appellate Court. If the decision is affirmed, then the order made by the justice, embodied in that decision, has to be carried out; the conviction stands, in other words, until it is set aside. It never was set aside, and although the appellant was enabled to take steps to challenge it, and did take steps to challenge it, he abandoned his right to do so; and the only consequence is that, having formally abandoned it, the original conviction stands. I agree therefore that the appeal should be allowed.