31 The schedules in paras 24, 26 and 27 of Mr Walker's affidavit describe 47 documents although Documents 202 and 203 are included in the para 24 schedule and also the para 27 schedule.
32 As to Documents 184, 185 and 215, Mr Walker says at para 8 of his 14 March 2014 affidavit that these documents are emails (from officers of either Mango or BMD or both) to representatives of Mango and BMD (other officers) which were copied to either Mr Walker or Ms Melinda Smith (of Minter Ellison), or both. Mr Walker says he and Ms Smith were copied into these emails so as "to be provided with information by our clients for the pre-dominant purpose of enabling us to provide legal advice to our clients".
33 As to Documents 202 and 203, Mr Walker says that these documents are emails from Mr Stocks to representatives of the applicants (other officers of Mango and BMD or an employee of one of those entities) which "discuss legal advice" given to Mango and BMD by Minter Ellison. Mr Walker says at para 9 of the 14 March 2014 affidavit that these emails "were prepared for the pre-dominant purpose of ascertaining information to enable the applicants to obtain legal advice relating to existing and contemplated litigation".
34 The documents described at [12] which are concerned with the negotiations between Mango and BMD (and their lawyers) and the former trustees through their firm SV Partners (and their lawyers), on the evidence, are Documents 0035, 0036, 0037, 191, 198, 207, 208, 213, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225 and 226. The evidence of Mr Walker, Mr Rodgers and Mr Atkinson is that the negotiations (reflected in oral and written exchanges) were conducted on a "confidential" and "without prejudice" basis. The negotiations with the former trustees began, on the evidence, on 13 August 2010 (see para 37 of Mr Walker's affidavit of 11 January 2013) and were concluded by 6 October 2010 according to Mr Rodgers (see para 35 of Mr Rodgers's affidavit of 5 December 2012).
35 The negotiations between Mango and BMD (and their lawyers) and Mr Slatter (and his lawyers, Clayton Utz), were also conducted, on the evidence, on a confidential and without prejudice basis. The documents relevant to the Slatter negotiations on the evidence of Mr Walker recited at [18] are Documents 0533, 0564, 0565, 1202 and 1755.
36 Document 1620 at [12] is described as a Calderbank letter from Minter Ellison to Hume Lawyers (although the correct description may be Hunt Lawyers) as part of a "without prejudice" negotiation. Document 1623 is a Calderbank letter from Minter Ellison to the Queensland Law Group as part of a "without prejudice" negotiation. Document 217 is a without prejudice letter from Minter Ellison to Mills Oakley Lawyers concerning the assignment of rights under the Share Sale Agreement and the settlement of monies owed to TVM (the assignee of the benefit of a guarantee).
37 Subject to a matter to be mentioned shortly, as to Documents 225, 226 and 1202, I am satisfied that "without prejudice" privilege attaches to the documents at [12]. The privilege has not been waived by Mango, BMD, the former trustees or Mr Slatter or the parties to the exchanges relevant to Documents 1620, 1623 and 217. The qualification is that I propose to look at Documents 225, 226 and 1202 to determine the objection to production concerning those documents.
38 I accept the propositions put to the Court by counsel for Mango and BMD to the effect that "without prejudice" privilege, attaching to communications between parties to a dispute in the course of negotiating a resolution, or attempted resolution of that dispute, protects disclosure of those communications in a proceeding between a party to those communications and a person who was not engaged in those communications, unless the protection from disclosure is waived by all parties to the protected (privileged) communications (Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd v Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276 at [13] and [17]; Alstom Power Ltd v Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) [2009] SASC 100; 262 LSJS 265; Heron Wood Pty Ltd v Ampol Petroleum (Vic) Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 83). That has not occurred.
39 Documents 202 and 203 are also said by Mr Walker at para 25 of the 24 January 2014 affidavit to form part of confidential "without prejudice" protected communications concerning either negotiations with the former trustees or with Mr Slatter. As already mentioned, Mr Walker's 14 March 2014 affidavit asserts that the basis for the claim of legal professional privilege (made at para 27 of the earlier affidavit) is that each document (which discusses Minter Ellison's legal advice) was brought into existence for the predominant purpose of gathering information to enable Mango and BMD to obtain legal advice concerning the existing and contemplated litigation.
40 I am willing to look at each of those emails (Documents 202 and 203) to determine the claim of privilege.
41 Apart from Documents 202 and 203, Mango and BMD claim legal professional privilege in relation to the other 11 documents set out at [30] as well as Document 189.
42 The position on the affidavit evidence in relation to these documents is this.
43 Document 1932 is a draft Heads of Agreement prepared by Minter Ellison. Document 2030 is a draft letter prepared by Minter Ellison. Document 176 is a memorandum with handwritten notes of Mr Atkinson summarising Mr Walker's advice. Document 181 is a draft letter prepared by Minter Ellison. Document 184 is an email from Mr Atkinson to officers of the applicants and Mr Walker communicating information to enable legal advice to be obtained. Document 185 is in the same category as Document 184. Document 215 is in a similar category to Documents 184 and 185. Document 227 is a file note made by Mr Atkinson of a teleconference between representatives of Mango and BMD also involving Mr Walker. Document 228 is in the same category as Document 227 and so too are Documents 229 and 230. The content of Document 189 is described at [29].
44 Having regard to the explanation on the evidence of the circumstances surrounding each of these documents, I am satisfied that a claim for privilege from production on the ground of legal professional privilege is made out on the evidence and it is not necessary for the Court to examine each document.
45 The remaining 10 documents under challenge are those at [20] with the exception of Document 189 (which I have already dealt with).
46 These documents are the subject of a claim of "common interest legal professional privilege" (para 26 of Mr Walker's 24 January 2014 affidavit). As mentioned earlier, Mr Walker's evidence is that Documents 1885, 1886, 1888 and 190, comprising two file notes and two memoranda all made by the lawyers for the former trustees, were provided to Mr Walker by Mr Rodgers on a confidential basis in the course of without prejudice communications to identify issues to be addressed in trying to reach agreement between Mango, BMD and the former trustees. Some of the documents are said to contain the legal opinions of Rodgers Barnes & Green.
47 Document 1891 is an email sent by Rodgers Barnes & Green to Mr Walker. Document 1932 is the draft Heads of Agreement arising out of the negotiations.
48 Mr Walker's evidence is that Documents 2050, 2053, 2054 and 2057 are exchanges between Mr Walker and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in providing advice concerning a dispute between Mango and Mr Spencer and Ms Perovich, brought to the Bank's attention by Mr Spencer and Ms Perovich, in connection with KHD's resolution to extend (or seek to extend) the existing Commonwealth Bank finance facilities available to KHD for the Mango Hill project.
49 I am satisfied that Documents 1885, 1886, 1888, 1891, 1932 and 190 are documents protected from production as communications passing between Mango, BMD and the former trustees (by their respective lawyers) as confidential without prejudice communications related to steps taken in the negotiation and attempted resolution of the issues between Mango and BMD on the one hand, and the former trustees, on the other. The privilege has not been waived. I am willing to look at Documents 2050, 2053, 2054 and 2057 to determine the objection to production on the ground of privilege.
50 Apart from without prejudice privilege, Mango and BMD say that the privileged communications (comprising exchanges, legal advices and draft documents) between the former trustees and Rodgers Barnes & Green, made available to Mr Walker (Documents 1885, 1886, 1888, 1891 and 190), were made available in confidential circumstances for the purpose of investigating issues to be addressed and processes to be implemented by the former trustees, Mango and BMD, in seeking to reach agreement concerning the claims made by the former trustees against Mango and BMD, and Mango's claim to a transfer of the Perovich shares (as property of the bankrupt estate).
51 Thus, it is said that Mango and BMD received the privileged documents (through Mr Walker) in pursuit of a common purpose with the former trustees "standing alongside" each other in pursuit of the "selfsame interest" (Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1981] QB 223 at 243), with the result that Mango and BMD received the privileged communications subject to a duty of confidence which protects the privileged documents in the hands of Mr Walker, Mango and BMD, from disclosure (Formica Ltd v Export Credits Guarantee Department [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep 692 at 699).
52 It may be that the former trustees and Mango and BMD were pursuing a "common interest" in seeking to isolate issues and resolve questions leading to a settlement agreement. Perhaps each of these parties, in truth, had a "common objective" in seeking to resolve competing interests. In any event, I accept that disclosure to Mr Walker of communications protected by legal professional privilege, as between the former trustees and their lawyers, occurred in confidential circumstances as part of without prejudice negotiations in the course of seeking to resolve matters in issue between them.
53 In doing so, the former trustees did not waive legal professional privilege over the documents.
54 The law seeks to encourage the resolution of disputes by negotiation as serving the public interest.
55 Confidential disclosure for that purpose of privileged material does not have the effect of waiving for all purposes, privilege from production of documents for which legal professional privilege properly attaches. The privilege, of course, is the client's privilege not that of the lawyer. Here, the former trustees have not waived their privilege by disclosure of the documents in the circumstances described in the evidence. Nor have they otherwise elected, on the evidence, to waive privilege. Their position as to this particular application is not known.
56 Mr Whitton, the new trustee, says that any claim of privilege enjoyed by the former trustees concerning the communications between them and their lawyers is a privilege which also now belongs to him. It may be that Mr Whitton stands in the shoes of the former trustees for all purposes and any privilege the former trustees enjoyed, only subsisted in them in their capacity as trustees, with the result that the right to assert or waive privilege passed to the new trustee upon appointment. However, the former trustees as the parties in whom the privilege vested at the relevant time (as a right of action to prevent unauthorised disclosure) may continue to have a relevant interest in the privilege and retain a remedial entitlement to protect that right attaching to communications passing between them in the administration of the estate at the relevant time and their lawyers at that time.
57 In the result, I propose to look at Documents 202, 203, 225, 226, 1202, 2050, 2053, 2054 and 2057 for the purpose of determining the objection to production on the ground asserted.
58 By para 3 of the interlocutory application, Mr Spencer and Ms Perovich seek an order that Mango and BMD discover any other documents relevant to the issues in the action which Mango and BMD have presently failed to discover. On 5 January 2012, orders were made that the parties make discovery by list of documents according to categories to be agreed. Exchanges took place between the solicitors for the parties in an attempt to agree the categories. A document described as "Schedule A" to proposed orders was exchanged between the parties. Agreement was reached as to the categories in that document apart from one category. In any event, discovery was conducted in relation to a category described as:
All dealings including communications, documents, recordings and/or evidencing communications between the applicants, or their solicitors, and the former trustees, or their solicitors, regarding the bankruptcies of Spencer and Perovich or the administration of the estates of Spencer and Perovich.
59 Mango and BMD say that they have made discovery as required by the Federal Court Rules 2011 and the orders of the Court in relation to discovery by categories. Two lists of documents have been prepared and sworn to by Ms Palmer verifying each list of documents. As mentioned earlier, Ms Palmer asserts grounds of privilege in relation to particular documents/communications. Those grounds have been elaborated upon in the affidavits referred to in these reasons filed on behalf of Mango and BMD. That evidence better describes both the documents for which privilege is asserted and the grounds of privilege relied upon (as compared with the relatively brief affidavits of Ms Palmer verifying both lists). There is nothing in the material filed on behalf of the second and third respondents which suggests any basis for finding that discovery on the part of Mango and BMD is inadequate. There is no evidence upon which the Court ought to go behind the affidavits of Ms Palmer so as to warrant ordering further discovery as sought by the second and third respondents. This question is an entirely different one from the specific challenge to the claims of privilege which have been dealt with extensively in these reasons.
60 I accept that the description of the documents for which privilege was sought and the grounds of privilege ought to have been more fully described and set out in the affidavits of Ms Palmer. For present purposes, I propose to reserve the costs of the present application for later determination, that is, the costs related to paras 1 and 3 of the interlocutory application. The costs related to para 5 of the interlocutory application are also reserved for later determination. The parties are required to advise the Associate to Greenwood J of the dates counsel will be available for the determination of the security for costs part of the interlocutory application.
I certify that the preceding sixty (60) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Greenwood.