Prejudice to affected parties
64 The parties who may be affected by an abridgment of time are the bankrupts and the creditors, including the applicants.
65 If the time for the provision of the material is not abridged, the bankrupts would lose the opportunity to have their proposals for compositions considered by the creditors and the chance to have their bankruptcies annulled under s 74(5). The principal application was bitterly fought. A significant issue underlying that litigation was that the applicants sought to prevent the trustee from calling a meeting of creditors to consider the bankrupts' proposals for composition. The delay in the holding of a meeting was substantially due to the litigation. The bankrupts finally succeeded. It would be a hollow victory if they could not have their proposals for compositions considered by the creditors. I accept that there would be considerable prejudice to the bankrupts if the time for the delivery of material were not abridged.
66 The question of whether there is prejudice to the creditors is important. I accept that there is likely to be some form of prejudice to many of the creditors if the abridgment of time is granted. While 63 of the creditors were served six days before the meeting, the remaining 66 will only have received the relevant material three days before the meeting. The creditors in the latter category, in particular, have a very limited time to consider, assess and decide upon the proposals and decide whether and how to participate in the meeting. Their consideration and assessment of the proposals is made more difficult by the lack of information that the trustee is able to provide.
67 However, the short time for consideration and the lack of information is likely to be a greater problem for the bankrupts than the creditors. The trustee has recommended against acceptance of the proposals. If creditors are concerned that they have had insufficient time and information to evaluate the proposals, it seems unlikely that they would be prepared to accept the proposals. Those creditors who are willing to accept the proposals are likely to feel that they have had sufficient time and information to be able to do so.
68 There are some measures which the trustee has taken to attempt to ameliorate prejudice to the creditors. One measure was to hold the meeting at 2.30 pm. That effectively gains the creditors half a working day. Another measure is to make facilities available for creditors to attend the meeting by telephone. However, these are minor matters in the scheme of things.
69 It is relevant that the creditors are not unfamiliar with the history of the dealings and proceedings between the applicants and the bankrupts and the history of the administration of the estates. Perovich's original proposal for a composition was the subject of a report provided by the former trustees to the creditors on 15 October 2010. While it is true that the terms of the proposal have changed since then, many of the matters discussed in that report remain relevant. In addition, the current trustee issued reports to creditors on 23 December 2010, 21 February 2011 and 3 December 2013.
70 It is also relevant to consider whether the creditors may be prejudiced if the Court were to deprive them of the opportunity to consider the proposals for compositions.
71 In early 2011, creditors to the value of approximately $28 million identified to the trustee that they would like the opportunity to consider the proposals for composition that were then made. Although the proposals have changed, it is at least likely that many of the same creditors would wish to have the opportunity to consider the present proposals.
72 The judgment of Allsop J (as the Chief Justice was then) in Labocus Precious Metals Pty Ltd v Thomas is instructive and it is worthwhile setting out the relevant passages at some length. His Honour said:
54 Parliament has set out in ss 73 and 74 and Division 6 of Part IV a regime for the annulment of bankruptcy by the action of creditors. Creditors do not act judicially or quasi-judicially in this process. The procedure is placed in the Act for the efficient and timely disposal of matters without the interference of the Court. This is not preventing the bankrupt status being removed. It is a non-curial procedure for the removal of that status. One would look at the provisions accordingly, requiring a businesslike approach by the trustee informing creditors of relevant information, leaving, as far as possible, the decision to be made by practical people of business. The Court should not take any narrow or pedantic view of the structure of the Act for compliance. The procedure is to be followed against the background of the need to inform creditors of relevant matters and to allow creditors to make up their own minds as to what they wish to do.
55 It goes without saying that the procedures required should be viewed from the perspective of the interests of all creditors. In a given case, which is not this one, a Court might look very carefully at any procedure leading to a composition dominated by creditors related to the bankrupt or reflecting a lack of commercial morality or sharp practice. Parliament, however, has chosen to provide in s 74(5) for the annulment and thus for the consequences that flow therefrom: Oates v Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 27 FCR 289, Re Coyle (1993) 42 FCR 72, Theissbacher v MacGregor Garrick & Co [1993] 2 Qd R 223, Pascoe; in the matter of Hudson [2005] FCA 1421, Worrall v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 51 FCR 304 and Union Club v Battenberg (2006) 66 NSWLR 1.
56 Relevant also, in addition to the interests of the parties, is the interest of the public, as I have said, in a discharge context: see in particular Re Barton 43 FLR 245. The important changes, retrospectively, to the status of the former bankrupt brought about by annulment and the operation of s 74(5), with the consequential permission of the erstwhile bankrupt to move about the community with full status, also inform the need to construe the provisions with an eye to substance over formality and not subvert the intended practical freedom sought to be given to the bankrupt by procedural issues not affecting in any given case the substance of the legitimacy of the expression of the creditors' views.
57 These considerations go not only to the construction and interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act, but also to assess the consequences of any breach of that which the statute provides for: Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355. When a statute provides for compliance with procedures laid down therein, the consequences of an absence of such compliance upon acts performed pursuant thereto must be assessed. Those procedures, if breached in some aspect, must be examined in their context in order that the Court can understand what Parliament intended to be the consequences of such breach.
58 The question whether information put forward by the bankrupts is sufficient in detail and underlying commercial substance to amount to a proposal will generally be a judgmental decision for the trustee. It may arise at the point of refusal by the trustee to convene a meeting on the basis that there is insufficient reliable material to allow her or him to give an opinion for the purposes of s 73(2A). It may arise at the point of someone seeking to restrain a meeting on the basis that what is being put is not a proposal. In those cases, a substantial question that will arise will be whether there is a proposal of sufficient clarity and reality to permit a judgment of the trustee under s 73(2A).
59 Here, the trustee took the view that there was a proposal. An opinion purporting to be under s 73(2A) was given. Voting took place. The issues are whether there was a proposal and whether the trustee gave an opinion for the purposes of s 73(2A) and if not, whether that made the resolutions, the meeting, the composition and the annulments nullities.
60 In my view, the statute should not be construed in a way which leads to the automatic ineffectiveness of acts taken under it when there has been some failure of procedure. The reasons for my saying that are as follows. First, the trustee, as here, is an officer of the Court and under the control of the Court. Her or his judgment about the adequacy of the proposal and whether it should be put to creditors can be assessed on that basis. Secondly, review of the trustee's conduct is available under ss 178, 179 and 30. Thirdly, a composition under s 73 can be set aside or terminated under ss 222, 222A, 222B, 222C and 222D: see in particular s 76B. For instance, the Court may set aside a composition if its terms are unreasonable or not calculated to benefit the creditors generally: s 222(1)(d), or for any other reason, s 222(1)(e). See also s 222C(1)(f) and (g). A further sequestration order can be made: ss 222(10) and 222C(5).
61 Given the pervasive control before and after and in connection with a process under the control of an officer of the Court skilled in the kind of business judgments involved, and the participation of self-interested creditors, and given the clear intention of Parliament to remove unnecessary Court interference, I do not think an intention of Parliament can be discerned to make a nullity of all consequential acts if some part of the procedure in s 73 has not been complied with.
73 As these passages indicate, the procedure under ss 73 and 74 is largely designed to allow the creditors to make up their own minds as to what they wish to do without the interference of the Court. The creditors should not lightly be deprived of the opportunity to make their own decisions upon the proposals. While the provision of material has not occurred in accordance with reg 4.18 and there is likely to be prejudice to at least some of the creditors, the creditors are capable of making their own decisions based on what material they have. Among the decisions open to them is rejection of the proposals on the basis that they have not had enough time or information to properly consider them.
74 It is also relevant that it is the trustee who seeks the abridgment of time. The trustee has evidently decided that the bankrupts' proposals were proposals for the purposes of s 73(1). The trustee was prepared to give an opinion under s 73(2A). The trustee has made submissions in support of his application and evidently considers that the proposals can properly be considered by the creditors within the constraints of the time and information available.
75 Any prejudice to creditors can be limited by allowing them liberty to apply to set aside the orders abridging the time prescribed under reg 4.18. None of the parties submitted that it was not open to make an order giving liberty to the creditors to apply to set aside such an order. The applicants did make a faint submission that it would be too late to undo an annulment of the bankruptcy under s 74(5) if a composition is accepted by the creditors, but the submission was not developed. That submission seems inconsistent with the applicants' earlier submission that it is likely that any resolutions accepting the proposals for compositions would be set aside. I consider that an application under the liberty to apply provision can be made even after any resolution accepting the proposals is carried.
76 Even leaving aside a liberty to apply provision, as Allsop J pointed out in Labocus Precious Metals Pty Ltd v Thomas at [60], there are a number of provisions in the Bankruptcy Act allowing the Court to set aside or terminate a composition. For example, a Court may set aside a composition "for any other reason" under s 222(1)(e). It would be open to creditors to apply to set aside any composition on the basis that there was an inadequate opportunity to consider the proposals and the trustee's report.
77 While there is likely to be prejudice to many of the creditors if the abridgment of time is granted, such prejudice can be limited by allowing creditors liberty to apply to set aside the order for abridgment; and is, in any event, limited by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that allow creditors to apply to set aside a composition.