Issues 10, 11 and 12: fiduciary duty
- The critical feature in determining whether a relationship is fiduciary is that the putative fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of the putative beneficiary in exercising a power or discretion which affects the interests of that beneficiary, whether in a legal or in a practical sense [34] . Neither side suggested otherwise.
- Where a contractual relationship is said to have fiduciary characteristics, the contract nonetheless regulates the basic rights and liabilities of the parties, and any fiduciary relationship must accommodate the terms of the contract so that it is consistent with them and does not alter their operation [35] .
- The terms of the contract to which any fiduciary obligation must conform include not only those that are expressed within the contract but those that are implied, including "in fact" [36] (that is to say, on the basis explained in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [37] ).
- "Vulnerability" is generally taken to indicate the existence of a fiduciary relationship. Is the putative beneficiary vulnerable to the putative fiduciary's abuse of its position? Where vulnerability in this sense is lacking, ordinarily no fiduciary relationship will be implied [38] .
- Where the relationship between contracting parties is one of mutual trust and confidence, it may be appropriate to infer that the relationship is fiduciary [39] . Likewise, where parties join in a common business enterprise and where the relationship between them is one of mutual trust and confidence, all parties must seek to realise, for the advantage of each participant, all the assets committed to the joint venture [40] .
- Where (in contrast to the present case) parties have entered into a commercial contract and have negotiated and documented in full detail all of their rights and obligations, it would ordinarily be inappropriate to impose a fiduciary duty upon one of those parties. However, this is not because the contract is "commercial" but, rather, because mere vulnerability to breach, where the consequences of breach are adequately covered by the contract, does not give rise to the need for the intervention of equity [41] .
- In general, it seems to me, where parties enter into a contract under which each is doing no more than pursuing its own interest, it would be difficult to impose upon one of them a fiduciary obligation. For example, in a contract of sale, the vendor is pursuing its legitimate interest in maximising the price of its asset, and the purchaser is pursuing its legitimate interest in acquiring that asset for the best possible price, to put to whatever use it has in mind.
- However, where parties enter into a contract to pursue a mutual aim - one in which each of them has an interest - the situation is likely to be very different. Each of them will depend on the other - place trust and confidence in the other - to cooperate to achieve the outcome to which their contract is directed, and to do so for the benefit of each. Although, no doubt, each party has its own individual and legitimate interest in entering into the bargain, the bargain is one not merely for the achievement of that interest, but also for the achievement of the joint interest. That, I think, is one reason why parties to a contract that may properly be described as one of "joint venture" have been found to owe fiduciary obligations to each other.
- Nonetheless, it is not enough to find that the contract may properly be described as one of "joint venture". As the plurality reasons in United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd [42] demonstrate, it remains necessary to examine the form of the joint venture and the content of the obligations that each party to it undertakes.
- In the present case, were it necessary to do so, I would conclude that each of PPPM and PM Works owed fiduciary obligations to the other, at least under the joint venture agreement (as I have called it) before it was varied in late August or early September 2014. The joint venture agreement was one for the mutual benefit of both. Undoubtedly, each reposed trust and confidence in the other to work together to secure and maximise the benefits that would flow to each from performance of that agreement.
- In general terms, and specifically in the case of CBA, it was PM Works that had the commercial relationship with potential customers (and in the case of CBA, with the party who had contracted for the provision of training services). Where, as was the case with the CBA contract between PM Works and CBA, PM Works was the party that dealt with CBA and administered the CBA contract, PPPM was, at least in theory, vulnerable to abuse.
- However, it is not necessary to express a concluded view. That is because, on the assumption that a fiduciary relationship did exist (and ignoring the inconvenient truth that if it did, it must have been mutual; and that if it did, its content was never precisely defined), the circumstances that are said to amount to breach of the suggested duty go nowhere near establishing it. Those circumstances are set out in Mr Assaf's written closing submissions at paras 160 to 164:
160. First, by excluding PPPM from delivering project management courses to CBA, let alone to another client, PMWorks has taken advantage PPPM's contribution to the joint venture (namely PPPM's intellectual property in its courseware) for its own benefit. For example, notwithstanding that PMWorks re-write the CBA project management courseware, it remained largely based on PPPM's courseware. In that way, PMWorks has leveraged PPPM's intellectual property for its own advantaged, when that material was supposed to have been used for their joint advantage.
161. Secondly, in relation to the CBA engage itself, PMWorks acted in conflict between its own interest, and its duty to act for PPPM's benefit.
162. Specifically, PMWorks' exclusion of PPPM from delivering courses to CBA was predicated on negative feedback from CBA. Mr Finnerty's evidence is that when Mr Banerji proposed the variation on 25 August 2013, he said that, "To move matters forward, PMWorks has decided that it would be better if PMWorks created the workbooks required by CBA. CBA had expressed a preference for the PMWorks facilitators to deliver the PM courses". [43] This is also clear from the variation proposal document itself, which said "Whereas the CBA do like some Peak Performance facilitators, they do believe that there is a lack of complete understanding of their environment and the changing requirements of the bank. It is clear that this is now a necessity to provide the inspirational leadership to underwrite the training and take the students on a journey of professional development." [44]
163. The problem with this was that PMWorks had its own significant financial interest in CBA's feedback on PPPM being sufficiently negative so it could side line PPPM's role in the CBA engagement. If PMWorks was able to deliver the courses itself, and did not have to pay anything to PPPM, it could increase its gross profit margin on those courses by about 400%. [45] If it only had to pay PPPM the royalty proposed under the Variation Agreement, it could increase its gross margin on those courses by about 200%. [46]
164. Accordingly, PMWorks faced a conflict of interest in addressing CBA's feedback, and in how it used any feedback from CBA in its dealings with PPPM. If it were to act in PPPM's interest, it either would have permitted PPPM to explore and address the feedback with CBA directly, or it would have done this rigorously itself. If it were to act in its own interest, it would do neither of these so it could use this as basis for side lining PPPM's role. This was not a conflict that PMWorks could resolve unless it permitted PPPM to explore and address the feedback directly. It did not do that - indeed it did not even rigorously explore the veracity of CBA's feedback by checking with the other presenters on the day [47] - and as a consequence, PMWorks acted in conflict of interest in proposing the Variation Agreement, and in excluding PPPM, on the basis of CBA's feedback.
- As to the first suggested breach, the assumption is (and in my view, the assumption is made clear in para 162) that PM Works should have challenged CBA's repeated expressions of dissatisfaction with both the facilitation services provided by PPPM and PPPM's course material. That assumption lacks any commercial reality. CBA was the customer. It was in a position to dictate whether, and if so to what extent, it would take any services under the contract. It is easy to infer that if PM Works did not structure its services (both as to delivery and as to content) in the way that CBA said it required, CBA would not commission the further performance of those services. There was nothing to stop CBA from entering into a similar contract with another service provider, amenable to its oft-repeated requirements than PPPM's submissions suggest PM Works should have been.
- Again, the submission that PM Works has taken advantage of PPPM's intellectual property in its course materials, and has "leveraged" that material "for its own advantage" is simply incorrect. It is true that PM Works rewrote the course material at the direction of CBA. However, as I have now said more than once, Dr Stejer's evidence, which I accept, is that in about September 2014, he designed his own PM training course from scratch, and wrote the course materials from scratch. It is simply not correct to say that he used PPPM's course materials, or "leveraged" them.
- Finally, although this point was not addressed by either side, if a fiduciary relationship does exist, it must of necessity be mutual, because of the mutuality of trust and confidence. It is a little difficult to see how PPPM, consistent with any fiduciary duty that it might owe PM Works, could suggest to PM Works that it should jeopardise the whole relationship with CBA, and everyone's hopes of gaining from the exploitation of that relationship, so as to maintain PPPM's original share of whatever remuneration might flow from the provision of services.
- Accordingly, I conclude that there was no breach of any fiduciary obligation that was owed.
- It is not necessary to decide whether Mr Banerji instigated any breach. Nor is it profitable to speculate upon this point. The relevant facts are clear and limited. If others should take a different view to mine as to breach of any obligation that was owed, the assessment of Mr Banerji's liability will be a simple matter of applying an uncontentious test to equally uncontentious facts falling within a very short compass.