These are my reasons for saying that the material claims are bad.
But, apart from any such ground of invalidity, the claims for a
mere process consisting in the application of well-known chemical
compounds and heat to the hair, a part of the human creature,
raise a serious question in relation to subject matter. Can the
discovery or improvisation of a mere process or method of treating
any corporeal part of the human being afford subject matter for
a patent? To be patentable an invention must relate to an art.
Perhaps the widest statement is one of the earliest. In Boulton v.
Bull (1) Eyre L.C.J. said : - " It was admitted in the argument at the
Bar, that the word ' manufacture' in the statute was of extensive
signification, that it applied not only to things made, but to the
practice of making, to principles carried into practice in a new
manner, to new results of principles carried into practice. Let us
pursue this admission. Under things made, we may class, in the
first place, new compositions of things, such as manufactures in the
most ordinary sense of the word; secondly, all mechanical inven-
tions, whether made to produce old or new effects, for a new piece
of mechanism is certainly a thing made. Under the practice of
making we may class all new artificial manners of operating with the
hand, or with instruments in common use, new processes in any art
producing effects useful to the public." But the ultimate end in
view is the production or treatment of, or effect upon, some entity.
" Applications of old things to a new use, accompanied by the
exercise of inventive power, are often patentable though there be
no production of a new thing. But in every case the invention
must refer to and be applicable to a tangible thing. A disembodied
idea is not patentable " (Edmunds and Bentwich, Copyright in
Designs, 2nd ed. (1908), pp. 20, 21.)