Madafferi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

The Second Ground of Appeal - The No Evidence Ground 74 The no evidence ground encompassed grounds 3, 4, and 5 of the amended notice of appeal. As counsel for Madafferi said these grounds reduce to one point which relates to the Minister's reliance upon the outstanding sentence of four years eight months and six days said to be awaiting Madafferi in Italy. 75 In the Minister's statement of reasons for his decision published on 21 December 2000 he said, inter alia: "3. Before exercising my discretion to set aside the original decision and making a decision to refuse the visa, I had formed a reasonable suspicion, under section 501A(2)(c), that Mr Madafferi did not pass the character test, due to the fact that in 1984 he was convicted of the crime of "attempted extortion" and was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment. I also took account of the fact that Mr Madafferi was convicted on four other occasions in 1980 and 1982, receiving sentences of 22, 30, 8 and 36 months imprisonment, and that he was sentenced in absentia in 1986 and 1993, and as a result, has a current arrest warrant in Italy, where he faces an outstanding sentence of 4 years 8 months and 6 days. . . . 6. I then considered whether it was in the national interest for Mr Madafferi's visa to be refused. I took into account the comments provided by Mr Madafferi's legal representatives that there is nothing to suggest that removing Mr Madafferi from Australia would be in the national interest and that Mr Madafferi's input into Australian society has been, and continues to be beneficial. I also considered Mr Madafferi's criminal background and his past and present general conduct. I noted that the Italian authorities have issued a warrant of arrest for Mr Madafferi and that Mr Madafferi faces an outstanding sentence of 4 years 8 months and 6 days in Italy. I also considered the effect on Australia's 'reputation' and 'good name' in the international community should Mr Madafferi be allowed to remain. On balance, I found that due to the seriousness of Mr Madafferi's convictions and his outstanding warrant of arrest and sentence in Italy, it would be in the national interest to refuse his visa. . . . 12. I also considered the likelihood that the conduct may be repeated (including any risk of recidivism). I took into account the fact that the Italian authorities have issued a warrant of arrest which required Mr Madafferi to serve a consolidated sentence of 4 years, 8 months and 6 days imprisonment in respect of various unserved and previously suspended sentences." 76 Mr Madafferi had adduced evidence before the primary judge from an Italian lawyer, Francesco Antoniazzi. The effect of his evidence, as summarised in the submissions filed on Madafferi's behalf, was that: "(i) The operation of Italian law in 1993 and 1995 resulted in various sentences being applied first in 1993 by reason of reversal of an amnesty applied to an earlier sentence(s) and secondly in 1995 by a sentence made in absentia some 12 years after the offence occurred. These two matters occurred whilst the Appellant was in Australia and resulted in a consolidated prison term of 4 years, 8 months and 6 days. (ii) Article 172 of the Italian Penal Code operates to extinguish a sentence not served by a subject that remains outstanding for a period of either 10 years or equivalent to double the term of imprisonment imposed whichever period is the greater. (iii) The prosecution authorities in Italy by application dated 7 August 2000 had applied for an "Order of Extinguishment" in respect of the sentence of 4 years, 8 months, 6 days. This application came before a Court on 15 February 2001 which declared a sentence imposed on the Appellant be in part extinguished. (iv) Following the declaration made 15 February 2000, the Italian Court further declared on the evidence of the Italian lawyer, that the remaining sentence to be served by the Appellant to be 1 year, 8 months and 6 days from August 2000. (v) In respect of the sentence, 1 year, 8 months and 6 days, the Italian law operates so that if the Appellant does not commence to serve the remaining sentence before 19 May 2002, the remaining sentence will be extinguished on and after 19 May 2002 be (sic) operation of Article 172 of the Italian Penal Code after which time no further term of imprisonment will need to be served." 77 Mr Antoniazzi agreed in cross-examination that the declaration of extinguishment would not operate until it was made by a court. It was submitted to the primary judge that the Minister had based his decision on the fact that the Appellant had a current arrest warrant in Italy where he faced an outstanding sentence of four years, eight months and six days when in truth the outstanding sentence would inevitably be reduced on the determination by an Italian Court on the application by the Italian prosecution of 7 August 2000 and that, in any event, any sentence to which he was liable would expire if not commenced by 19 May 2002. 78 In his reasons for judgment his Honour noted that counsel for the Minister had submitted that the Minister emphasised the Italian warrant to indicate that it represented "unfinished business" with respect to past events in Italy. His Honour said: "I agree. I do not consider the fact that Mr Madafferi faced a shorter sentence than that of four years, eight months and six days would impact upon the Minister's ultimate decision. The fact remained that he faced a prison sentence if he returned to Italy. An outstanding prison sentence was "other evidence or material" which justified the making of the decision." [42] 79 It was submitted that the question before the primary judge was whether the Minister based his decision on a particular fact and whether that fact existed, not what the Minister might have thought had the correct facts been before him. The Minister had acted upon the fact that the appellant faced the outstanding prison sentence at a time when prosecution authorities in Italy were in the process of reducing it. Further, it was said, the Minister acted on the fact that the sentence was immutable at a time when the prosecution authorities were seeking to reduce it and where, in any event, it would expire if not commenced by 19 May 2002. 80 The relevant ground of review under Pt 8 of the Migration Act as it stood prior to the amendments of October 2001 was to be found in s 476(1)(g) which provided: "476(1) Subject to subsection (2), application may be made for review by the Federal Court of a judicially-reviewable decision on any one or more of the following grounds: . . . (g) that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision." This was to be read with subs 476(4): "476(4) The grounds specified in paragraph (1)(g) is not to be taken to have been made out unless: (a) the person who made the decision was required by law to reach that decision only if a particular matter was established, and there was no evidence or other material (including facts of which the person was entitled to take notice) from which the person could reasonably be satisfied that the matter was established; or (b) the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist." 81 This ground of review reflects that in s 5(1)(h) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act as elucidated in s 5(3) of that Act. There being no suggestion that the Minister's view about the outstanding sentences in Italy concerned a matter of the kind contemplated by par (a), the only relevant part of s 476(4) for present purposes is par (b). That paragraph has been interpreted as meaning that a decision will be "based … on the existence of a particular fact" if that fact is "critical" to the making of the decision - Curragh Qld Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 at 220 (Black CJ, Spender and Gummow JJ agreeing). The criticality requirement was derived from the judgment of Mason CJ in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 357-358. That is not to say that the decision must turn on the impugned fact alone before the ground under s 476(1)(g) can be invoked: "A decision may be based upon the evidence of many particular facts; it will be based upon the existence of each particular fact that is critical to the making of the decision. A small factual link in a chain of reasoning, if it is truly a link in a chain and there are no parallel links, may be just as critical to the decision, and just as much a fact upon which the decision is based, as a fact that is of more obvious immediate importance. A decision may also be based on a finding of fact that, critically, leads the decision-maker to take one path in the process of reasoning rather than another and so to come to a different conclusion." 82 This ground does not, however, provide a doorway for review of a decision-maker's conclusions or inferences as though their content constituted "particular facts" whose existence could be controverted: "The particular fact is to be distinguished from the ultimate fact in issue, or a conclusion based upon a series of particular facts, although one of those particular facts may qualify under s 476(4)(b)" - Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 34 at [34]; See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam (2000) 179 ALR 495 at 502. 83 Paragraph 476(4)(b) states a necessary condition to be satisfied if the ground under s 476(1)(g) is to be made out. It is not a sufficient condition. For it must be shown that there was "… an absence of evidence or other material upon which the decision was based" - Curragh at 221. The requirements of s 476(1)(g) read with s 476(4)(b) were stated succinctly by the Full Court in Charaev v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 178 ALR 554 at 557: · the decision of the tribunal was based on a fact; · there was no evidence of that fact before the tribunal; · the fact is disproved. 84 It was submitted on behalf of the Minister, there was evidence before him of the appellant's Italian criminal record. There was no suggestion that his liability under Italian law had changed or would change. In these circumstances it cannot be said that there was no evidence to justify the making of the decision. In any event, as the learned primary judge found, a fair reading of the Minister's reasons indicate that it was the fact of "unfinished business" in Italy rather than the particular length of the outstanding consolidated sentence that was of significance in the Minister's decision. Neither the criterion of criticality nor the requirement that there was "no evidence" before the Minister is satisfied. The no evidence ground is not made out. The Third Ground of Appeal - The National Interest 85 This was designated as par 6 in the amended notice of appeal. In support of this ground it was submitted that it is a condition of the exercise of ministerial power to set aside the AAT decision and refuse the grant of a visa, that the Minister is satisfied that the refusal is in the national interest (s 501A(2)(e)). The criticism of the Minister's reasoning in this respect focussed on par 6 of his Statement of Reasons which has been set out earlier. This, it was said, revealed that the Minister took into account only the matters upon which he found Mr Madafferi to have failed the character test and the prospective "matters" which he faced in Italy. Having established that the reason for which Mr Madafferi failed the character test rendered the refusal of the grant "in the national interest" as an abstract question, the Minister, it was said, did not return to consider whether "the refusal" was in the national interest in the particular case. It was submitted that the Minister had failed to apply the staged decision-making process required by s 501. In essence his decision was based on the circumstances which resulted in Mr Madafferi not satisfying the character test. It did not turn on the particular circumstances justifying refusal of a spouse visa in the national interest as "involving a significant threat to the national interest as a whole community as a nation" - Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2000) 182 ALR 657 at 743 (Kirby J). Reliance was also placed on the alleged error of the Minister in relying upon his finding that there was a consolidated sentence of four years, eight months and six days imprisonment awaiting Mr Madafferi in Italy. The Minister, it was said, erred in law because he regarded the failure of the character test as determinative of his decision. 86 The Minister in considering the national interest under s 501A(2) may properly have regard to the circumstances which underpin the failure to satisfy him that an applicant for a visa passes the character test. There may be circumstances in which the seriousness of a person's criminal history will be sufficient to satisfy the Minister that the refusal of a visa is in the national interest. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Gunner (1998) 84 FCR 400 at 409 the Full Court referred to the seriousness of the visa holder's crimes in that case and said: "It is the seriousness of that conduct which has to be assessed in the national interest. Obviously enough, the national interest dictates that people who engage in sufficiently serious crime should not have the benefits of an Australian visa." While, as Gaudron J observed in Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor at 675 this does not mean that convictions which result in a person failing the character test are themselves sufficient to entitle the Minister to determine that it is in the national interest that a visa be cancelled convictions of a sufficiently serious character can lead to that conclusion. After observing that the terms of s 501(3), under consideration in that case, made it clear that national interest considerations are separate and distinct from the question whether or not a person passes the character test her Honour said: "That is not to say that the matters which result in a person failing the character test may not also provide the foundation for the minister's satisfaction that it is in the national interest that that person's visa be cancelled." 87 Her Honour went on (at 676): "To say that the conduct which leads a person to fail the character test may also provide the foundation for the minister's satisfaction that it is in the national interest to cancel his or her visa is not to say that it will always do so. Both issues must be considered separately. And where the same conduct is relied upon for both purposes, there must be something in the nature, or the seriousness of that conduct, or in the circumstances surrounding it to found a satisfaction that it is in the national interest to cancel the visa of the person concerned." 88 Kirby J in the same case accepted that the words "in the national interest" could not be given a confined meaning (at 742). As he said: "However broad may be the jurisdiction conferred by the constitutional writs, they do not permit a court to substitute for the satisfaction of the minister, provided by the Act of Parliament, the satisfaction of judges who are not accountable to the Parliament or the people in the same way as the minister." Nevertheless, in the particular case, he found it impossible to regard the matters placed before the Minister as sufficient to sustain a reasonable or rational conclusion that the cancellation of the prosecutor's visa was "in the national interest". His Honour set a high threshold for the enlivening of the national interest criterion by reference to the Minister's indication in the relevant second reading speech discussing the proposed power to be conferred upon him by s 501 that: "… in exceptional or emergency circumstances, the minister, acting personally will be given powers to act decisively on matters of visa refusal, cancellation and the removal of non-citizens." 89 With respect to that view, the bar of national interest does not seem to be set that high by the words of the Act which must be the primary guide to legislative intention. The question of what is or is not in the national interest is an evaluative one and is entrusted by the legislature to the Minister to determine according to his satisfaction which must nevertheless be obtained "reasonably" - Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor at 698 (Gummow and Hayne JJ, Gleeson CJ agreeing). Callinan J agreed with Kirby J that the constitutional writs do not entitle the judges to substitute for the satisfaction of the Minister the satisfaction of the judges (755). 90 In considering the national interest question in par 6 of his reasons, the Minister made reference to a number of factors: · the submissions by Madafferi's legal advisers that his input into Australian society had been and continued to be beneficial; · Madafferi's criminal background and his past and present general conduct; · the warrant of arrest and outstanding sentence awaiting Madafferi in Italy; · the effect on Australia's "reputation" and "good name" in the international community; · the seriousness of Madafferi's convictions. Given the range of other matters which the Minister's reasons canvassed, including the effect of removal from Australia on Mr Madafferi's family, his ties to the Australian community, the welfare of his children and other matters, there is a certain artificiality in separating out par 6 as though it represented the only way in which the Minister addressed the issue of national interest. There is nothing to suggest that the Minister has erred in law in his consideration of this factor and this ground of appeal therefore fails.

The Fourth Ground of Appeal - Fettering of Discretion 91 This ground was designated 7 in the amended notice of appeal. Section 499 of the Migration Act provides, inter alia: "499(1) The Minister may give written directions to a person or body having functions or powers under this Act if the directions are about: (a) the performance of those functions; or (b) the exercise of those powers. . . . (2) Subsection (1) does not empower the Minister to give directions that would be inconsistent with this Act or the regulations. (2A) A person or body must comply with a direction under subsection (1). (3) The Minister shall cause a copy of any direction given under subsection (1) to be laid before each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after that direction was given." Subsections (1A) and (4) are not material for present purposes. 92 In his Statement of Reasons at par 8, the Minister said: "I also proceeded in accordance with the Government's view on serious crimes as set out in my General Direction number 17 - "Direction Under s 499 Visa Refusal and Cancellation Under section 501 of the Migration Act" ("my Direction"). I still consider that my Direction properly indicates how I consider the powers and functions of the kind here under consideration should be exercised. In accordance with this I gave consideration to three primary considerations and other considerations." 93 As noted earlier (par 42) the primary considerations identified by the Minister were: · the protection of the Australian community taking into account the seriousness and nature of Mr Madafferi's conduct and the likelihood that the conduct may be repeated (par 9); · the expectations of the Australian community (par 16); · the best interests of Mr Madafferi's three children aged 4, 7 and 9 (par 17). 94 General Direction No 17 is expressed as providing "… guidance to decision-makers in making decisions to refuse or cancel a visa under section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 ("the Act")". It acknowledges the two stage process involved in decision-making under s 501 stating: "When a visa applicant or visa holder does not pass the Character Test, decision-makers will decide whether to refuse the application or to cancel a visa. Exercise of this discretion will take into account a wide range of factors including the expectations of the community, the nature of the crimes committed, the non-citizen's links to Australia and any relevant international law obligations." The Direction comprises two parts. Part 1 deals with the application of the character test. Part 2 provides directions on primary and other considerations to be taken into account in determining whether to refuse or cancel a visa and the weight to be given to those considerations. 95 In Pt 2 of the Direction which deals with the exercise of discretion where a non-citizen has not passed the character test, it is said, at par 2.2: "2.2 The Government is mindful of the need to balance a number of important factors in reaching a decision whether or not to refuse or cancel a visa. In making such a decision, a decision-maker should have regard to three primary considerations and a number of other considerations. The primary considerations are set out at paragraphs 2.3-2.16 and other considerations are set out at paragraphs 2.17-2.23. Decision-makers should note that no individual considerations can be more important than a primary consideration, but that a primary consideration cannot be conclusive in itself in deciding whether to exercise the discretion to refuse or to cancel a visa. Decision-makers must have due regard to the importance placed by the Government on the three primary considerations, but should also adopt a balancing process which takes into account all relevant considerations." Paragraph 2.3 then states: "2.3 In making a decision whether to refuse or cancel a visa, there are three primary considerations: (a) the protection of the Australian community, and members of the community; (b) the expectations of the Australian community; and (c) in all cases involving a parental relationship between a child or children and the person under consideration, the best interests of the child or children." 96 Under the subheading, "Protection of the Australian Community", factors relevant to an assessment of the level of risk to the community from the entry or continued stay of a non-citizen are identified as including: "(a) the seriousness and nature of the conduct; (b) the likelihood that the conduct may be repeated (including any risk of recidivism); and (c) whether visa refusal or cancellation may prevent or discourage similar conduct (general deterrence)." Examples of offences considered by the Government to be "very serious" are set out in par 2.6. These include offences of murder, manslaughter, assault or any other form of violence against persons. Decision-makers are required to take into account as relevant considerations any relevant factors provided by the non-citizen as mitigating factors, whether the offence is or is not classified as an offence in Australia, whether a lighter sentence would be incurred in Australia for a similar offence and whether the non-citizen has been pardoned (par 2.8). Factors relevant to recidivism are set out at par 2.10. Also identified as a factor under the heading of "Protection of the Australian Community" is general deterrence which may be relevant in a number of ways: (a) the nature of the offence may be such that visa refusal or cancellation may deter others from committing similar offences; and (b) the visa refusal or cancellation in respect of a non-citizen who has been involved in a criminal scheme or schemes may discourage or prevent another person or persons from engaging in similar schemes. Under the heading "Expectations of the Australian community" the direction states: "2.12 The Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia. Where a non-citizen has breached, or where there is a significant risk that they will breach this trust or where the non-citizen has been convicted of offences in Australia or elsewhere, it may be appropriate to refuse the visa application or cancel the visa held by such a person. Visa refusal or cancellation and removal of the non-citizen may be appropriate simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences are such that the Australian community would expect that the person would not be granted a visa or should be removed from Australia. Decision-makers should have due regard to the Government's view in this respect." 97 The third primary consideration, "The best interests of the child" is also dealt with in the Direction in pars 2.13 to 2.16 inclusive. It is put that, in general terms, the best interests of a child will be served if the child remains with its parents. Countervailing considerations are identified, including a history of abuse or physical or emotional trauma arising from the non-citizen's conduct (par 2.15). In considering the best interests of the child, decision-makers are directed to have regard to a number of matters: (a) the nature of the relationship between the child and the non-citizen; (b) the duration of the relationship; (c) the age of the child; (d) whether the child is an Australian citizen or permanent resident; (e) the likely effect of any separation from the non-citizen on the child; (f) the impact of the non-citizen's prior conduct on the child; (g) the time, if any, that the child has spent in Australia. (h) the circumstances of the probable receiving country, including the educational facilities and the standard of the health support system of the country to which the child may have to go, or return to, should the non-citizen be permitted to enter or remain in Australia; (i) any language barriers for the child in the probable country of future residence, but taking into account the relative ease with which younger children acquire new languages; and (j) any cultural barriers for the child in the probable country of future residence, but taking into account the relative ease with which younger children adapt to new circumstances. 98 After dealing with the primary considerations, the direction then refers to "OTHER CONSIDERATIONS" and states at par 2.17: "When considering the issue of visa refusal or cancellation, other matters, although not primary considerations, may be relevant. It is the Government's view that where relevant, it is appropriate that these matters be taken into account but that they be given less individual weight than that given to the primary considerations." Other considerations are listed non-exhaustively and include: (a) the extent of disruption to the non-citizen's family, business and other ties to the Australian community; (b) genuine marriage to, or de facto or interdependent relationship with, an Australian citizen; (c) the degree of hardship which would be caused to immediate family members lawfully resident in Australia; (d) family composition of the non-citizen's family both in Australia and overseas; (e) the likelihood of the non-citizen seeking to evade any outstanding legal matter or ongoing liability; (f) the likelihood of the non-citizen breaching any conditions attached to the outstanding legal or ongoing matter, any cost or bilateral implications of such a breach (eg extradition); (g) the nature and seriousness of the offence(s) or alleged offence(s) (in the context of seeking to evade an outstanding legal matter); (h) any evidence of rehabilitation and any recent good conduct; (i) whether the application is for a temporary visa or permanent visa; (j) the purpose and intended duration of the entry to or stay in Australia, including any significant compassionate circumstances; (k) the fact that a non-citizen has been formally advised in the past by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs about conduct which brought him or her within the deportation provisions at s 200/201 of the Act or the visa refusal and cancellation provisions at s 501. The Direction also refers to other international obligations. 99 The language of the Direction and the range of factors it requires to be taken into account is so broad that it is difficult to see how, even when treated as binding on officers of the Department, it could be said to fetter their discretion. It is not binding on the Minister. It was submitted for Mr Madafferi, however, that the vice in the Direction is that it codifies the weight to be given to three primary considerations to the extent that no other consideration such as the effect on the family unit or the fact that the offences were committed before arrival and other matters can ever prevail. 100 There is support in a number of single judge decisions for the submissions made on behalf of Madafferi. In Aksu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 65 ALD 667 Dowsett J held that the predominance given to the primary considerations by Direction 17 rendered it inconsistent with the intention of s 501 that the discretion to cancel a visa be unfettered. His Honour accepted, however, that it was still necessary to determine whether the Minister's use of Direction 17 was such as to deprive his decision of validity. He was held in that case to have inappropriately followed the Direction by assuming that each primary consideration bore at least as much weight as each other consideration. Aksu was followed by Cooper J in Ruhl v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 184 ALR 401. In Ruhl, unlike Aksu, there was no indication on the decision record that the Minister regarded himself as bound by the Direction. Cooper J held this was not the critical question. The question was whether the Minister "voluntarily applied the provisions of Direction 17 to his decision-making and thereby unlawfully fettered his discretion under s 501 of the Act" [32]. In Javillonar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 854 Stone J held that both Aksu and Ruhl were correct in their interpretation of Direction 17, when binding on a delegate, as inconsistent with the discretion conferred by s 501. However this did not mean that its voluntary application by the Minister would constitute an error of law: "For the applicant to succeed it would be necessary to show, not merely that the Minister was guided by the policy expressed in Direction 17, but that in making his decision the Minister attributed weight to factors in accordance with Direction 17 without independent consideration". [42] Her Honour found that the Minister was guided by the Direction. The evidence however did not disclose the relative weight he applied to the various factors and whether he followed Direction 17 in that respect. Her Honour said: "52. In summary, the problem with Direction 17 is that, contrary to s 499(2), it is inconsistent with the unfettered discretion given in s 501 because it purports to predetermine the relative weight to be given to various factors without the necessity of independent consideration of the relevant case. In the absence of any indication of the weight attributed to the factors relevant to Mr Javillonar's case, I am unable to conclude that the Minister did not give the necessary independent consideration to the relevant factors and therefore the ground of review under s 467(1)(e) is not made out." 101 In Turini v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 822 Whitlam J declined to follow Aksu and Ruhl holding that Part 2 of Direction 17 is not inconsistent with s 501(2). In the subsequent case of Jahnke v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 897, Drummond J agreed with what Whitlam J said in Turini about the reasoning in Aksu in so far as that case suggested that the primary considerations mentioned in Direction 17 were "direct outcomes" of a person failing to satisfy a decision maker that the person passed the character test. His Honour said at [21]: "In some cases, proper effect may be able to be given to an individual's particular circumstances within the first two primary considerations, as Whitlam J suggests. But that will not always be the case. There may be cases in which evaluation of the circumstances relevant to the first two (or even to all three) primary considerations made, with varying degrees of cogency, favour visa cancellation, but one or more non-primary considerations may so strongly favour non-cancellation as properly to be regarded as requiring that result; yet the decision maker who is bound by, or who as minister voluntarily applies, the Direction would be prevented by the fetter on the statutory discretion contained in Part 2.2 of the policy from declining to cancel the visa." He found, in the case before him, that if the Minister had not accepted the constraint imposed by the Direction on how he evaluated the primary considerations and other considerations the outcome of the case could have been different. The decision was set aside and the matter referred back to the Minister. 102 In a supplementary submission filed on 19 April 2002 the Court was referred to the decision of the Full Court in Awa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 291. The Full Court was said not to have doubted the correctness of the earlier decisions in Aksu, Ruhl, Javillonar and Jahnke nor a like decision in Andarey v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1544. The Full Court referred to the different view expressed by Whitlam J in Turini and did not doubt its correctness either. In truth the Court expressed no view saying at [37]: "In our opinion the resolution of this appeal does not require any decision in relation to the validity of Direction No. 17 or conclusion of the issue whether the whole or part of the Direction fetters the discretion in s 501(1) of the Act, these being the two questions of law raised in the notice of appeal. . . . In our view a proper reading of the reasons of the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal did in fact engage in a balancing exercise." 103 In this case the Minister did likewise. He was entitled to take the approach he did. It was consistent with the proper exercise of his discretion under s 501A. The primary considerations are so broadly expressed as hardly to exclude the consideration of virtually all relevant factors. To the extent that matters personal to the applicant or other factors may be thought to have fallen outside the scope of these considerations, it is useful to return to the terms of par 2.17. In respect of matters other than "primary considerations" it is accepted that they may be relevant and that where relevant "… it is appropriate that these matters be taken into account but that they be given less individual weight than that given to the primary considerations". The term "appropriate" does not preclude a different relative weighting being given to those matters. Nor does it preclude their combined weight from overcoming the primary considerations. 104 It is worth recalling the principle at issue here. That is the "… general principle that a Tribunal which is called upon to exercise a discretion does not perform its duty if it acts in blind obedience to a rule or policy that it had previously adopted" - R v Moore; Ex parte Australian Telephone and Phonogram Officers' Association (1982) 148 CLR 600 at 612 (Gibbs CJ, Stephen J agreeing). As Hill J said in Surinakova v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1991) 33 FCR 87 at 98: "There can be no challenge to a decision merely because a decision was made in accordance with a policy. To ensure consistency of administrative decision-making, it will often be appropriate for a policy to be issued containing guidelines … However a decision-maker must take care to ensure that he does not slavishly follow a policy." 105 It has not been demonstrated on behalf of Mr Madafferi that the Minister's discretion was fettered by his use of General Direction No 17. This ground of appeal also fails.

The Fifth Ground - Failure to have regard to preliminary discretion 106 The substance of this ground is reflected in the contention that the Minister did not direct any separate consideration to the question whether he should exercise his powers under s 501A. He merely considered how they should be exercised. This omission, it is said, prevented him from having proper regard, as a preliminary jurisdictional matter to s 501A(6) and to the consideration of other relevant matters, such as the interests of Mr Madafferi and his wife and children as a family, or the absence of any relevant conviction by Mr Madafferi while in Australia. 107 Counsel for the respondent submits that the argument is at odds with the very provision on which it seeks to rely. Section 501A(6) provides that the Minister has no duty to consider whether to exercise his power under subs (2). It cannot be said in any case that the Minister erred in law by failing to consider whether to exercise the power. Subsection (6) does not give rise to any "preliminary jurisdictional matter". It ensures that the Minister is free to exercise the power or not as he choses. The submission by the Minister is accepted. Section 501A(6) is intended to exclude the very argument that is now advanced. There is no threshold jurisdictional requirement on the part of the Minister to consider whether or not to exercise his power. This ground of appeal also fails.

Conclusion 108 For the preceding reasons, each of the grounds of appeal fails and the appeal will be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and eight (108) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Court.

Counsel for the Appellant: Dr G Griffith QC and Mr T Hurley

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms H M Symon SC and Mr S McLeish

Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

Date of Hearing: 13 November 2001 Date of Reconstitution of Court 26 February 2002 Date of Last Submission 22 April 2002