sevibers, who from 1884 to 1902 had taken no steps, and made
inquiries as to the disposition of the fund, claimed to be enti
to the whole amount of £438. Some of the persons who
subseribed for shares in the proposed company also laid claim
the fund, The plaintiffs then brought their action against
defendant Palmer, as representing the persons who had si
scribed for shares in the company, and the defendant Waite »
representing the Adelaide subscribers, praying a declaration as ty
the ownership of the fund, which, after the expenditure noy
alleged to be a breach of trust, amounted to £245 18s. 10d. The
defendant Palmer by his defence merely submitted that the fun
should be distributed amongst the persons who had agreed to
take shares in the company, or alternatively between them and
the Adelaide subscribers. The defendant Waite claimed the
whole fund for the Adelaide subscribers, and counterclaimed for
so much of it as had been already expended for the purposes whieh
he impeached. Holroyd J., before whom the action was trie,
was of opinion that the money was given in trust to be expended
for a special purpose which had been exhausted, and that ther
was a resulting trust for the donors of the fund as to all money
not expended for that special purpose. He held that the expendi
ture impeached by Waite was in breach of trust, and adjudged
the plaintiffs to replace the amount so expended and to bring into
Court the sum of £245, and to pay the costs of the action ani
counterclaim. The Full Court, on appeal, affirmed his decision
'The question, as stated at the outset of this judgment, isas to
the proper inference to be drawn from the facts. All the com
temporaneous facts must be taken into consideration. 'To what
rights then, if any, did the facts give rise in favour of the
subscribers as against the company when they had paid their
subscriptions, and what duties, if any, did the company ove
them in respect of those subscriptions? Mr. Higgins relied
mainly upon the terms of the memorandum to which the sub-
seribers affixed their names, which described the donations i-
vited as "subscriptions to further the objects of the company."
The term "subscription" primd facie suggests an absolute gift,
without any implied reservation of a right to an ultimate refunt
ment of the whole or part of the sum given. Again, the gift is