_Lohe v Mansukhani_

Supreme Court of Queensland|2007-04-13|Before: Mackenzie J

[1] MACKENZIE J: This is an application by the Crown Solicitor to have the respondent declared a vexatious litigant under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld).

[2] The Crown Solicitor has standing to bring an application under s 5(1)(b). The Crown Solicitor relies on s 6(1)(a) which allows the court to make orders under s 6(2) including orders staying all or any part of any proceeding in Queensland already instituted by the person and an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings or proceedings of a particular type in Queensland, if the court is satisfied that the respondent has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia.

[3] The term "vexatious proceeding" is defined as follows in the Dictionary to the Act:

(a) a proceeding that is an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and

(b) a proceeding instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and

(c) a proceeding instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; and

(d) a proceeding conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose."

[4] Section 6(4) provides that the court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity to be heard. There is an affidavit of a clerk authorised by the Bombay High Court to serve persons, that he effected service of the application and the affidavits relied on by the Crown Solicitor on the respondent in Mumbai. There is also an affidavit from a partner in a firm of advocates, solicitors and notaries in Mumbai deposing that service was not contrary to the law of India and that the manner of service would have been effective to constitute service of an original proceeding of an Indian Court. He also deposes that there is no treaty in force between India and Australia with respect to service of documents in civil proceedings.

[5] Under UCPR 124(1), service of documents in these proceedings was permitted without the courts' leave (UCPR 124(1)(t)). The respondent did not appear to argue the matter in person or by a legal representative but it is clear beyond doubt that he was aware of the hearing date since an email was sent, under the respondent's name and addressed to a solicitor in Crown Law with the carriage of the matter, to her and to Senior Deputy Registrar McNamara who informed the court that he was, from time to time, the recipient of correspondence from Mr Mansukhani. The material includes an affidavit by him and a petition to the Attorney-General. There was no objection by the counsel representing the Crown Solicitor to my receiving and taking into account this material, which I have done. I am satisfied that the requirements of s 6(4) have been satisfied.

Disputes relating to establishment of internet kiosks

[6] This is a claim in the Magistrates Court filed by Mr Mansukhani in Southport on 15 April 2003 against a firm and two individuals in connection with an agreement to install internet terminals. It relates to a commercial dispute. There is no evidence what its outcome was.

[7] This was a claim in the Magistrates Court filed by Mr Mansukhani in Southport on 12 January 2004 against a company in connection with the supply of coin validating machines for his internet kiosk business. It is commercial dispute. There is no evidence of its outcome.

[8] This was a small claim filed by Mr Mansukhani against a real estate agency and its principal filed on 20 June 2005 at Southport over a tenancy agreement. While there is no evidence in a formal sense of its outcome, material filed by Mr Mansukhani in 7144/05 and the fact that the magistrate who dealt with the matter was named as a defendant in D585/05 makes it clear that he was ordered to vacate the premises in these proceedings.

[9] This was an application filed by Mr Mansukhani in the Supreme Court on 26 August 2005 to have the decision in 2757/05 reviewed. The application, which asked for suspension of the order terminating the tenancy, was dismissed by a judge of the Trial Division on 13 October 2005.

A claim against respondent which led to consequential litigation by him

[10] On 5 July 2004 proceeding D380 of 2004 was commenced against the respondent, his wife and a company Good Luck Holdings Pty Ltd by the purchaser of an internet café for fraudulent misrepresentations inducing him to buy the business. Good Luck Holdings Pty Ltd, of which the respondent's wife was sole director, secretary and shareholder, is described by Mr Mansukhani in his emailed affidavit as, amongst other things, the trustee of the Good Luck Trust of which Mrs Mansukhani was appointer. She, her children and grandchildren are beneficiaries of the trust.

[11] At the trial in the District Court at Southport, the respondent and his wife denied making the alleged representations and claimed to have disclosed fully the true takings of the business. The respondent made allegations that the plaintiff had an ulterior motive in entering into the transaction. After a six day trial, a District Court judge disbelieved the defence evidence and gave judgment for the plaintiff on 9 September 2005. The fate of the appeal against the decision will be referred to later. This decision and those in other litigation in which the respondent was involved have formed a series of other litigation. Each will be summarised below.

Further proceedings relating to internet kiosk business

[12] This was commenced by Mr Mansukhani on 9 September 2005 against two people who alleged to be in partnership with him in an Internet kiosk business, and two solicitors. The claim and statement of claim are not easily understood but seem to raise allegations in connection with the conduct of the enterprise. A conditional defence was filed by all defendants, one ground being that the claim exceeds the jurisdiction of the District Court and others relating to the form of the statement of claim which, it was claimed, is liable to be struck out. There is no evidence that further steps have been taken by any party. While there are obvious difficulties with the form and contents of the statement of claim, this matter is different from those previously mentioned, in that correspondence written by the fourth defendant on behalf of the first and second defendants four days before the proceedings were issued allege breach of agreement by Mr Mansukhani. To that extent, if there were a statement of claim that pleaded Mr Mansukhani's case appropriately, there may be a genuine issue to be determined between them and Mr Mansukhani.

[13] It is unknown whether proceedings have been begun against him by the first and second defendants in respect of that allegation. This is a commercial case where there may be issues to be tried between Mr Mansukhani and the first and second defendants if there are viable pleadings, which, currently, there are not. With respect to the third and fourth defendants, it is not obvious that there is any cause of action against them. What seems to be suggested is that they are somehow involved in a conspiracy against Mr Mansukhani, or at least acting against his interests in relation to the business transactions between him and the first and second defendants. No more can be gleaned that this. The pleadings are vulnerable to an application to strike out by the defendants. There is no evidence that any application has been made in that regard.

Proceedings against tenants of Good Luck Holdings

[14] This was commenced by Mr Mansukhani and Good Luck Holdings on 12 September 2005 in the District Court at Southport. The defendants are a company and two individual defendants. The claim seeks a "quick eviction order" and loss on an indemnity basis for breach of lease. As far as intelligible, the claim seems to relate to allegations of a breach of a lease granted by Good Luck Holdings to the first defendant, and consequential relief. Correspondence exhibited to the material filed with the claim by Mr Mansukhani shows that the first defendant disputes the claims. In the statement of claim, Mr Mansukhani claims damages for torture and harassment. A defence has also been filed in which the defendants said they were unable to plead to the statement of claim because of numerous listed breaches of the rules of pleading. Then, an order dismissing the claim was made in their favour of 23 June 2006. The District Court judge at Southport who heard the application found that the claim did not seek relief the court could grant. The statement of claim was confused, misguided and contained scandalous and vexatious material. It failed to plead any rational or coherent cause of action.

[15] Taking the bare allegation of breach of lease into account, it might have been thought that the last resort of dismissing the action without giving Good Luck Holdings the right to re-plead might have been unusual. However, that is academic. The District Court judge said in his reasons that the proceedings were only actively defended by Mr Mansukhani since Good Luck Holdings was by then in liquidation and the liquidators did not adopt or continue the proceedings. This was not a case where Mr Mansukhani was without assistance. He was allowed the assistance of a person who indicated that he had legal qualifications in India to address the court on his behalf. Further, there was no appeal against the decision.

[16] This was filed in the District Court, Southport, on 12 September 2005 by Mr Mansukhani and Good Luck Holdings against a company and two individuals. It also claims a "quick eviction order" and losses on an indemnity basis for breach of lease. The statement of claim is more coherent than many of the others in setting out the basis of the claim but still lacks particularity. It also contains extraneous matters. It also includes a claim for damages for torture and harassment, with regard to which the pleading does not disclose any viable basis for the claim.

[17] The defence essentially denies breach of the agreement for a lease and alleges breaches by Mr Mansukhani of their right to quiet enjoyment, for reasons set out in the defence. The claim by Good Luck Holdings is academic now having regard to the decision of the liquidators. The form of the statement of claim and relief sought, insofar as it related to it concerned what may have been a commercial dispute. With regard to Mr Mansukhani's claim, the remarks of the District Court judge in 501/05 in relation to not pleading a rational or coherent cause of action would be equally pertinent. No further steps have been taken by any of the parties, as far as the evidence before me extends, to advance the matter.

[18] This is a claim by Good Luck Holdings and Mr Mansukhani for damages and "losses on an indemnity basis", commenced on 15 September 2005 in the District Court, Southport, against a company and three individuals. According to the defence filed by them the company is in liquidation. The defendants say they cannot plead because numerous specified defects exist in the statement of claim. The claim appears to be one for arrears of rent and repayment of a loan. The existing statement of claim insofar as it relates to Good Luck Holdings is clearly defective. Although it is now academic, it seems to be concerned with a commercial dispute. There is no evidence of any attempt to strike out the statement of claim or other step since the defence was filed. Mr Mansukhani claims damages for torture and harassment. There is nothing in the statement of claim that suggests that those claims are viable.

[19] This is a claim by Good Luck Holdings and Mr Mansukhani for a "quick eviction order, dues and damages" and losses on an indemnity basis for breach of a lease, commenced on 15 September 2005 in the District Court at Southport against a company, a business, and an individual described as "general manager". It is apparently a dispute over rent and breach of a lease in other respects. So far as Good Luck Holdings is concerned the matter appears to be a commercial dispute. Mr Mansukhani claims damages for torture and harassment. The defence refutes allegations made by the plaintiffs. There is no evidence that any steps have been taken since the defence was filed. With regard to Mr Mansukhani's, claim for damages for torture and harassment, there is nothing to suggest that those claims are viable.

[20] This was a claim filed on 26 September 2005 by Good Luck Holdings, Mr Mansukhani and his wife against a variety of companies, businesses and individuals, 14 in all, for "claims for business premises", "claims for my dues and damages" and "losses on indemnity basis for breach of real estate rule, property owners rule, neighbouring tenants-code of conduct, solicitors professional rule and doctors rule and code of conduct." Two are parties in other matters involving Mr Mansukhani. The proceedings relate to a disparate collection of complaints against defendants who have in some way been involved with Mr Mansukhani's business dealings.

[21] In their defence the third and fourth defendants, who were the plaintiff in D380/04 and the third defendant in D494/05 respectively, objected to plead to the statement of claim on the basis that they disclosed no reasonable cause of action, were scandalous, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court and that they were therefore liable to be struck out. Otherwise, they denied the allegations. There is no evidence that any further steps have since been taken.

[22] The seventh and eighth defendants, who are not parties in other relevant litigation, denied any identifiable substantive allegations against them and pleaded that the plaintiffs had not pleaded a sustainable cause of action. There is no evidence that any further steps have been taken since the defence was filed.

[23] The eleventh to fourteenth defendants, who are not parties in other relevant litigation, plead that the statement of claim was in breach of a variety of provisions of UCPR. That is beyond doubt. The applicant filed an application on 10 November 2005 to strike out the claimants' statement of claim. There is no evidence of the outcome of the application. There is no evidence whether any of the other defendants have taken any steps at all since the claim was filed.

[24] This was commenced on 6 October 2005 against the District Court judge involved in 380/04, a court official and an official of the Queensland Law Society who is seventh defendant in 603/05, the Director of Legal Services and an officer of the Office of Fair Trading. Applications were made by all defendants for summary judgment, which was granted on 18 December 2005 by a judge of the Trial Division who observed that the claim and statement of claim made no sense, contravened the rules of pleading and were frivolous and vexatious. It was also observed that it was not appropriate to substitute such proceedings for the proper process of appealing if aggrieved by a decision.

[25] The claim and statement of claim were filed on 18 October 2005 in the District Court, Southport, naming the real estate agency and its principal as first and second defendants with a Magistrate and a Supreme Court judge as third and fourth defendants. It appears that the dispute with the first and second defendants, who were defendants in 2757/05, and in the case of the first defendant, respondent in B57144/05, principally concerns issues about a lease of residential property. The third respondent was the Magistrate who in small claim 2757/05 at Southport ordered on 27 August 2005 that the respondent vacate the premises. The fourth respondent is a Trial Division judge who dismissed an application for judicial review of that decision in S7164/05 on 13 October 2005.

[26] The claim and statement of claim are essentially complaints about what the plaintiff perceived to be injustices done to him by all of the defendants. The relief claimed from the first and second defendants were damages for harassment and mental torture. No specific claim was made for relief against the third or fourth defendants who, in any event would have been entitled to immunity in respect of the conduct of the proceedings before them.

[27] The respondent began these proceedings on 21 October 2005 in the District Court, Southport. The real estate firm and its principal who were involved in 2757/05 and B57144/05 were the first and second defendants. The remaining defendants were three magistrates, including the third defendant in 585/05, the Supreme Court judge who was the fourth defendant in 585/05 and a court official. This was filed three days after 585/05. It makes a generalised claim of conspiracy involving all defendants, which is said to have caused him to lose a "multi-million project". Beyond that and reference, by number only, to a variety of other proceedings and documents as those upon which the trial and argument would be based, the statement of claim is uninformative as to the nature of the case to be put.

[28] The claim and statement of claim were filed on 26 October 2005, five days after 585/05. This names a variety of apparently disparate defendants, fifteen in all including the District Court judge who decided 380/04, a solicitor who was fourth defendant in 526/05, the same Law Society official who was the third defendant in BS8365/05, the plaintiff in 585/05, the same court official who was second defendant in BS8365/06 and others, including companies which included the three defendants in 501/05 and the first and third defendants in 502/05. The claim describes the case as an extraordinary case and concedes that it may not comply with UCPR. The statement of claim is very similar to that in 595/05.

[29] On 19 December 2005, a District Court judge heard applications from the Crown, representing the judges, magistrates and court officials named as defendants in these three matters, for judgment in their favour. The District Court judge described, accurately in my view, the statements of claim as containing statements that were irrelevant, incomprehensible and otherwise objectionable, discursive and failing to disclose any intelligible or reasonable cause of action and including scandalous allegations.

[30] He added that in 585/05 and 595/05 the claim and statement of claim did not seek relief that the District Court could grant and that even if there were comprehensible causes of action, they were not maintainable because the judges had judicial immunity. With respect to the court officials, they had no legal responsibility for the decisions of judicial officers. There were no facts and circumstances pleaded that could lead to a finding that any defendant had acted unlawfully. It was impossible to see any cause of action against any of the group of defendants represented by the Crown. He gave summary judgment with costs against the present respondent.

[31] With respect to the first and second defendants in 585/05 and 595/05 he was satisfied that there was nothing in the statement of claim that presented a cogent claim or cause of action that could be maintained against them and that the purported claim and statement of claim were not capable of proper comprehension and were, in certain respects, vexatious or scandalous. He struck out the claim and statement of claim and stayed the proceedings permanently.

[32] With respect to the Law Society official who was the seventh defendant in 603/05, he said that the statement of claim was unintelligible and offended the rules of pleading. The only reference to him was in the title of the proceedings and the pleadings disclosed no cause of action against him. Judgment was given for him.

[33] An application was made on 5 June 2006 in which Mr Mansukhani endeavoured to appear on behalf of Deena Mansukhani who wished to apply for a stay of the sale by the liquidator of the property owned by Good Luck Holdings. A Trial Division judge refused Mr Mansukhani's application, holding that he had no standing to appear for his daughter. The substantive application was also dismissed. As will be seen, these decisions were appealed unsuccessfully in CA4718/06.

[34] On 30 June 2006, Mr Mansukhani filed an originating application for judicial review following the CMC's refusal to entertain a complaint made by him against the liquidators. This application was dismissed by a Trial Division judge on 26 August 2006. It was held that the CMC had no jurisdiction to investigate the complaint.

[35] This was an application for leave to appeal filed on 20 March 2006 against an order made in 10989/05 on 13 January 2006 by a Trial Division judge appointing the liquidators of Good Luck Holdings as receivers and managers of Good Luck Trust.

[36] This was an application for leave to appeal made on 20 March 2006 against a winding up order made in 10989/05 on 18 November 2005 by a Trial Division judge in respect of Good Luck Holdings.

[37] On 18 November 2005 Mr Mansukhani, his wife and Good Luck Holdings filed appeals which were out of time against the decision of the District Court judge at Southport on 9 September 2005 in 380/04. An application for extension of time within which to appeal was made on 20 March 2006.

[38] An appeal was filed on 5 June 2006 against the refusal by a District Court judge at Southport on 1 June 2006 to reopen the proceedings in 380/04.

[39] An appeal was filed on 5 June 2006 against orders made in 10989/05 on the same day by a Trial Division judge refusing leave to Mr Mansukhani to appear on behalf of his daughter and refusing his daughter's application to stay the sale of the real property owned by Good Luck Holdings.

[40] On 27 July 2006 yet another judge of the Trial Division in 10989/05 ordered the removal of a mortgage lodged in respect of the land owned by Good Luck Holdings by a company controlled by Mr Mansukhani. The company appealed against that decision on 10 August 2006.

[41] The Court of Appeal dismissed all of the appeals just mentioned. By the time the appeals came on for hearing, the sale by the liquidator had been completed and the transfer registered, rendering, as the Court of Appeal said, the appeals in 2348/06, 2349/06, 4718/06 and 6614/06 of no utility. It was also said that the apparent motive for the litigation underlying them was a desire of the Mansukhani interests, principally Mr Mansukhani himself, to prevent realisation of an asset owned by Good Luck Holdings for the benefit of creditors. The attempts to achieve that objective are described in detail in the Court of Appeal's reasons ([2006] QCA 495).

[42] Appeal 2350/06 was dismissed because no satisfactory explanation had been given for failure to appeal within time and because, in any event, it had no real prospects of success, being an appeal against findings based on credibility. Appeal 4624/06 was held to be without substance and also dismissed.

[43] The Court of Appeal went on to say that there was a "broader reason on which these proceedings should be dealt with." It was said:

"The Court has ample inherent power to prevent the abuse of its processes. It is impossible to regard the high handed conduct of the Mansukhani interests to which reference has been made as other than an attempt to abuse the processes of the Court and unduly to vex the respondents to these proceedings by stringing out the proceedings for as long as possible."

[44] These proceedings were brought in the District Court, Southport, by two solicitors for defamation allegedly occurring in publications on a website, against Good Luck Holdings, as trustee of the Good Luck Trust, Mr Mansukhani and Mrs Mansukhani. On 28 June 2006, an application was made by Deena Mansukhani, the daughter of the respondent, to be joined as fourth defendant allegedly to protect her interest and the interests of other beneficiaries of Good Luck Trust which she claimed was without a trustee since Good Luck Holdings was in liquidation.

[45] The plaintiff is the person who was the plaintiff in 380/04. The action is also for defamation in respect of publication on a website. Deena Mansukhani made a similar application to that in 82/05.

[46] In this matter, the cause of action and the application by Deena Mansukhani follow the same pattern as those in 82/05 and 115/05. The plaintiffs are a company and two individuals associated with it who were both defendants in 501/05.

Outcome of applications in D82/05, 115/05 and 134/05

[47] A District Court judge dismissed each of the applications by Deena Mansukhami pointing out that she was not a necessary party and had no other right to become involved in the proceedings. He observed that one could be forgiven for suspecting that the application was part of a gambit by one or more of the existing defendants to frustrate the plaintiffs, if possible.

[48] The application by the Crown Solicitor seeks a declaration under s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act that Mr Mansukhani is a person who has frequently instituted and conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia within the meaning of the Act. It also seeks that itemised proceedings which were then unresolved be stayed. By the end of these proceedings, some of those had been concluded, rendering it unnecessary to decide whether they should be stayed. Exhibit 2 lists those in respect of which stays were sought.

[49] The test which must be satisfied to enable orders under s 6 to be made is that the person in respect of whom an order is to be made has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia. The characteristics of proceedings that are vexatious proceedings are listed in the definition in the schedule to the Act, reproduced in [3] above.

[50] Section 10 sets out the consequences of a vexatious proceedings order. The order prohibits a person from instituting proceedings without the leave of the court and prohibits another, acting in concert with the person prohibited, from instituting proceedings without leave of this court Because proceedings may be instituted with leave of the court, a vexatious proceedings order is not an absolute bar to proceedings being instituted. A person subject to a vexatious proceedings order who could persuade the court that there is a legitimate cause of action, properly pleaded, would ordinarily obtain the necessary leave. On the other hand, an application for leave having the characteristics of further vexatious proceedings would be doomed to fail.

[51] There is plainly no "grave injustice", as the respondent claims in the written material which he asked to have taken into account, if a person who has frequently engaged in litigation which has the characteristics of vexatious proceedings is required to establish, on any subsequent occasion he wishes to litigate, that the proposed litigation is not just more of the same. Nor, contrary to his allegation in the written material, does a declaration deprive him of the chance to seek legitimate remedies to which he may be entitled. All he has to do is make out a case for leave to proceed sufficient to persuade a judge that leave should be given.

[52] Notwithstanding the District Court judge's observations in his reasons for judgments delivered in relation to 82/05, 115/05 and 134/05 about his suspicions concerning the motivation for those applications, I will leave them out of consideration since the application for joinder of a further defendant began as a request for an application on the papers in which the respondent plaintiffs duly demanded an oral hearing. There was no appearance by anyone on behalf of the applicant; there is therefore no direct evidence that Mr Mansukhani was intermeddling.

[53] I also leave out of consideration the group of cases relating to internet kiosks, except 494/05 because it involves an allegation of conspiracy against parties who were subsequently involved in other proceedings. The "residential tenancy disputes" group of cases are similarly not clearly vexatious as commenced. The two groups, however, are background to subsequent litigation where the underlying theme of a general conspiracy, or a series of conspiracies against Mr Mansukhani, is the apparent foundation of the litigation.

[54] With respect to the group of cases described as "proceedings against tenants of Good Luck Holdings", Mr Mansukhani's personal claims are ones which on the face of the statement of claim were instituted without reasonable grounds.

[55] The group of cases analysed under the heading "vexatious proceedings?" includes cases where claims are made against groups of defendants who are alleged in various ways to have caused damage to Mr Mansukhani, in some cases by conspiring against him. 526/05, BS8365/05, 585/05, 595/05 and 603/05 are in that category. In a number of instances, defendants in earlier cases are proceeded against again for reasons that often appear to be similar or related. Examples are 603/05 in which the successful plaintiff in 380/04 is defendant, having also been a defendant in 526/05. Mr Hammideh is defendant in 494/05, 526/05 and 603/05. Mr Ledger is a defendant in 494/05 and 603/05. Molectra Technologies and Mr Neil are defendants in 502/05 and 603/05. SAT Technologies, Mr Weinert and Ms Cooper are defendants in both 501/05 and 603/05. The District Court judge who originally found against Mr Mansukhani in 380/04, Mr McLeod and Mr Smiley are defendants in 8365/05 and 603/05. Most notably, Silver Point Realty and Mr Merker are defendants in 1582/04, BS7144/05, 585/05 and 595/05. The Magistrate and the Trial Division judge involved in the proceedings concerning those matters are defendants in 585/05 and 595/05.

[56] In some cases, proceedings were commenced within days of one another. In some cases they were commenced when there was a fundamental difficulty which meant that they could not succeed, as in the case of judges and magistrates who have judicial immunity. As previously noted, there were other cases where there were fundamental difficulties of other kinds and a pattern of pleading in a manner that led to judges at first instance striking them out or dismissing them on a variety of grounds.

[57] Then, there is the perception expressed by the Court of Appeal in the group of appeals dismissed on 27 November 2007, that Mr Mansukhani's litigation was attempting to abuse the processes of the court and unduly vex respondents by protracting the proceedings for as long as possible. Having read all the material in detail, I agree with that conclusion.

[58] Finally, the process of litigation began, at the latest, soon after the decision of the District Court judge at Southport on 9 September 2005 in 380/04, and extended, at the earliest, to the institution of the last appeal on 10 August 2006. There were eighteen separate proceedings, including appeals, all without merit, in that period. The Crown Solicitor's proceedings had actually been commenced on 8 June 2006 which was timely. For reasons explained in the affidavit material, a further application had to be filed. The delay was to some extent occasioned by the need to file one with a new return date, related to the need to serve in India. I am satisfied that the criteria for finding that Mr Mansukhani's proceedings were vexatious proceedings is amply made out, and that the institution of vexatious proceedings was frequent for reasons alluded to above.

[59] There are two issues that need consideration in this regard. The first relates to the form of order 2(f). The form of order proposed by counsel for the Crown Solicitor was somewhat complicated and difficult to understand. The form in which the order is made in my view achieves the objective of staying the proceedings against the remaining parties in respect of which the proceedings have not been finalised. As I understood the argument, the intention was to preserve the right of the seventh and thirteenth to fifteenth defendants with regard to costs. The form of order incorporated should not affect any remaining rights in that regard since it does not impinge on rights of those defendants.

[60] The remaining matter is concerned with the restraint upon the respondent in a capacity or purported capacity as Attorney for any person or entity. The reason why that was proposed is that it was suggested on at least one occasion that Mr Mansukhani was instituting a proceeding on behalf of another party or parties. In the context of the kind of order being made it is undesirable that that kind of situation be allowed to occur. There is power in s 6(2)(c) to make any other order the court considers appropriate in relation to the person who is found to have frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings. In the circumstances it is considered appropriate to make the order in the form in which it appears.

1. It is declared that Dayal Hassaram Mansukhani is a person who has frequently instituted and conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia within the meaning of those terms in s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld).

2. It is ordered that the following proceedings already instituted by the respondent be stayed pursuant to s 6(2) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld):

District Court of Queensland

(a) D494 of 2005

(b) D502 of 2005

(c) D507 of 2005

(d) D508 of 2005

(e) D526 of 2005

(f) That part of D603 of 2005 that relates to the first, second, fifth, sixth, and eighth to twelfth defendants

3. It is ordered that the respondent, by himself and in a capacity or purported capacity as Attorney for any person or entity, be restrained from instituting any proceedings in any Queensland Court (apart from any appeal in this proceeding) without prior leave of a judge of the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Queensland.

Proceedings Act 2005

Civil Procedure Rules 1999

At a glance

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