Lismore City Council v Richmond Valley Council & Anor
[2003] NSWLEC 295
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Land and Environment Court (NSW)
Decision date
2003-09-29
Before
Lloyd J, Mr J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (7 paragraphs)
Introduction 1 New South Wales Sugar Milling Co-operative Limited obtained development consent from the first respondent, Richmond Valley Council ("Richmond Valley"), for a co-generation plant at the Broadwater sugar mill. The plant will utilise cane waste, known as bagasse, and cane trash (which would otherwise be burned in the field) for combusting in a boiler to produce steam which will propel a turbine driven electricity generator. The electricity thereby generated will be used in the mill, with excess electricity returned to the grid. 2 In separate proceedings I dismissed an appeal against the grant of development consent. A fuller explanation of the proposal, providing the context of the matter, is found in three judgments in those proceedings (Broadwater Action Group Inc v Richmond Valley Council and Anor [2003] NSWLEC 202; Broadwater Action Group Inc v Richmond Valley Council and Anor [No. 2] [2003] NSWLEC 289; Broadwater Action Group Inc v Richmond Valley Council and Anor [No. 3] [2003] NSWLEC 290). In these proceedings the applicant, Lismore City Council ("Lismore"), appeals against the failure of the consent authority, Richmond Valley, to include a condition of consent requiring the proponent of the development to make a monetary contribution for the upgrading of portions of Broadwater Road, within the Lismore local government area (s 98 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 ("the EP&A Act")) 3 Broadwater Road is on the opposite side of the Richmond River to the sugar mill and is connected to the village of Broadwater by a bridge. Sugar cane and sugar cane trash will be transported to the mill along a number of roads within the Richmond Valley Council's area and along Broadwater Road, within the Lismore City Council's area. Lismore contends that in the event of development consent being granted a condition should be imposed requiring a monetary contribution for the upgrading of Broadwater Road. Alternatively, Lismore contends that if a monetary contribution is not imposed then the development application should be refused. 4 As to whether there is power under the EP&A Act to impose such a condition of consent in relation to roads in an adjoining local government area, the parties are in agreement. They agree that the power to do so lies under s 80A(1)(a) and (f) of the EP&A Act, rather than s 94, since the reference to the "area" in s 94 appears to be a reference to the area of the consent authority. The correct source of power is, however, of no relevance. It is a settled principle that if an act is done pursuant to a particular head of power which was unavailable, it may be supported by any other available head of power (R v Bevan; Ex parte Elias & Gordon (1942) 66 CLR 452 at 487; Lockwood v The Commonwealth (1954) 90 CLR 177; Brown v West (1990) 169 CLR 195 at 203; Johns v Australian Securities Commission & Ors (1993) 178 CLR 408; Mercantile Mutual Life Insurance Co Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 40 FCR 409 at 412; Darling Casino Ltd v The Minister for Planning & Anor (1995) 86 LGERA 186 at 209-210; and Holster v Director General of National Parks and Wildlife Service [1999] NSWLEC 102 at [87] to [112]). 5 Section 80A(1)(a) of the EP&A Act allows a consent authority to impose a condition of consent if it relates to any matter referred to in s 79C(1) of relevance to the development the subject of consent. Section 80A(1)(f) allows a consent authority to impose a condition of development consent if it requires the carrying out of works (whether or not being works on land to which the application relates) relating to any matter referred to in s 79C applicable to the development the subject of the consent. Section 79C(1)(b) refers to the likely impacts of the development on both the natural and built environments in the "locality" in which the development is to be situated (Parramatta City Council v Peterson (1987) 61 LGRA 286 at 293 per Stein J, Collin C Donges & Associates Pty Limited v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1989) 67 LGRA 370 per Stein J). 6 The parties agree that the existing condition of Broadwater Road is, apart from one section, sub-standard even for current traffic. It is not appropriate for additional traffic to use the road unless the road is improved or upgraded to accommodate the expected volume of traffic following completion of the development. There being no dispute between the parties about the power of the Court to impose a condition of consent requiring either the carrying out of the necessary road works or the payment of a monetary contribution therefor, the question becomes the reasonableness of the condition. The real issue is the question of the apportionment of the cost of the necessary road works: that is, the appropriate contribution by the proponent of the development towards the necessary road works. It would be clearly unreasonable for the proponent to meet the full costs of upgrading a road which is already substandard and inadequate to cater for existing traffic. It must be remembered that any condition of development consent must have a planning purpose, fairly and reasonably relate to a development and must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed it (see Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578; Pyx Granite Co Ltd v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1958] 1 QB 554 at 572 per Lord Denning; Parramatta City Council v Peterson (1987) 61 LGRA 286 at 293-294; and Lake Macquarie City Council v Hammersmith Management Pty Limited [2003] NSWCA 313 at [53]). It is to be observed that such requirements are cumulative (Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Limited v Waverley Council (2002) 123 LGERA 75 at 80 per Cowdroy J).