Lindsey v Philip Morris Limited

THE COURT 1 The appellant, a smoker, commenced a proceeding in this Court on 26 May 2003 in which he sought, among other relief, damages against the respondent, a cigarette manufacturer, and a declaration requiring it to pay his medical expenses arising from conditions suffered by him as a result of smoking cigarettes manufactured by the respondent. The case comes into the Federal Court because the appellant based his claim upon s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the Act"). In substance, he alleged that the respondent failed to warn him of the risk of injury from smoking its cigarettes. He claims that he should have been given the warning in 1972 or 1973. 2 The respondent filed an application in which it sought, inter alia, that the proceeding be dismissed pursuant to O20 r2 of the rules of Court. It claimed that the proceeding did not disclose any cause of action under the Act and that it was frivolous and vexatious. 3 In a carefully considered judgment, the primary judge held that the proceeding was bound to fail. Her Honour specifically held at [29] that the claim of contravention of s52 "must be regarded as hopeless". The primary judge also observed at [35] that: "…the amended statement of claim failed to allege any causal link between the conduct complained of and the damage Mr Lindsey allegedly suffered." 4 Additionally, her Honour noted that the alleged acts and omissions of the respondent, the subject of the appellant's complaints, occurred prior to the commencement of the Act. Further, the primary judge considered that the appellant ought not be permitted to re-plead. Her Honour said at [40]: "…it seems to me that [the appellant's] claim is incapable of being turned into a tenable one." 5 Although the primary judge's judgment finally disposed of the proceeding, on the current state of authority it is to be regarded as an interlocutory one: see Re Luck (2003) 203 ALR 1. Consequently an appeal lies only by leave: see s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). 6 The primary judge published her reasons for judgment on 21 January 2004. Order 52 r10(1) of the rules of Court provides: "An application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Court may be made orally to the judge who has pronounced the judgment at the time of its pronouncement." 7 The appellant did not apply to the primary judge for leave to appeal from her interlocutory judgment at the time of its pronouncement. 8 Order 52 r10(2) provides: "(a) Where an application has not been made in accordance with sub-rule (1), an application may be made by motion on notice to a single Judge or to a Full Court, and the provisions of Order 19 shall apply. (b) The notice shall be filed and served within seven days from the pronouncement of the interlocutory judgment from which leave to appeal is sought or within such further time as the Court or a Judge may allow." 9 The time within which the appellant was required to apply for leave to appeal from the interlocutory judgment of the primary judge expired on 29 January 2004. 10 Without applying for leave to appeal, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on 22 January 2004. 11 On 5 February 2004, the respondent filed a motion seeking, pursuant to O52 r18(1), that the appeal be dismissed as incompetent on two grounds. First, the appellant had not obtained leave to appeal. Second, the notice of appeal disclosed no grounds of appeal. 12 Order 52 r18(1) provides: "A respondent may move on notice at any time for an order dismissing an appeal as incompetent." 13 Order 52 r18(2) provides: "Upon the hearing of the motion, the burden of establishing the competency of the appeal is on the appellant." 14 In accordance with the order of the Chief Justice, made on 10 February 2004, the appellant filed affidavits in opposition to the respondent's O52 r18(1) motion. Those affidavits were filed on 17 and 20 February 2004 respectively. 15 At paragraph 11 of his first affidavit the appellant stated that he did not apply to her Honour for leave to appeal as he considered doing so to be a "fruitless or a futile exercise". At paragraph 12 the appellant said: "No Judge or Justice likes there (sic) decisions being Appealed and scrutinised." 16 At paragraph 14, the appellant said that he was under the impression that he was entitled to appeal as of right. At paragraph 16, he said that he sought the leave of the Chief Justice to make an oral motion for leave to appeal on 10 February 2004. 17 A reading of the transcript of the callover hearing lends support to that claim, but the matter did not rise beyond being barely raised. 18 The second affidavit did not address the issue of leave to appeal. 19 The second ground relied upon by the respondent in its motion is supported by the proposition that the notice of appeal is "largely incomprehensible and is untenable."