Lindroos v Commissioner for Fair Trading

The licensing regime

1. I have set out the legislative and licencing regime in earlier decisions. In respect of matters determined by this Tribunal under this Act Senior Member Montgomery of this Tribunal has dealt with many decisions from the introduction of these provisions. He has repeatedly summarised the relevant provisions of the licensing regime in a line of decisions from Smith v Commissioner of Police NSW Police Force and Fair Trading [2014] NSWCATAD 187 through to Austin v Commissioner for Fair Trading and Commissioner of Police NSW Police Force [2015] NSWCATAD 244.
2. In Austin at [2] Senior Member Montgomery summarised the regime under the Act as follows at paragraphs 3 to 15 inclusive: 3.The Act introduced licensing requirements for operators of body art tattoo parlours and tattooists. The regime came into force in November 2013. The licensing regime imposes a test of whether the person is "fit and proper" and whether it would be "contrary to public interest" to grant the licence or allow it to continue in force. It is an offence to carry on a body art tattooing business without an operator licence: section 6 of the Act. 4.Pursuant to Part 2 of the Act, body art tattooing businesses, body art tattooists and employed body art tattooists are to be licenced. It is an offence for those businesses or individuals, as the case may be, to fail to have the requisite licence: sections 6 - 7 of the Act. Businesses that only undertake cosmetic and medical tattooing procedures do not need a licence. 5.Pursuant to section 9 of the Act, there are two kinds of licence that may be granted: an operator licence and a tattooist licence. Only an individual can apply for a licence, even where the individual is applying on behalf of an organisation. Sole operators only require an operator licence. 6.A person may apply to Fair Trading for a tattooist licence pursuant to section 11 of the Act. Sections 12 - 13 of the Act provide for an application to be accompanied by a written statement in respect of close associates of applicants and for the fingerprinting and palm printing of applicants. 7.Pursuant to section 14(b) of the Act, upon receiving an application for a licence, Fair Trading is to refer the application to the Commissioner, for an investigation and determination as to whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to be granted the licence, and whether it would be contrary to the public interest for the licence to be granted. 8.Section 19 provides that the Commissioner is to inquire into and determine, and report to Fair Trading on those issues. Subsection 19(3) provides that, for the purposes of making his determination, the Commissioner may have regard to criminal intelligence reports or other criminal information held in relation to an applicant. 9.In making a report under section 19(3) the Commissioner may have regard to any criminal intelligence report or other criminal information ("Criminal Information") held in relation to the applicant held in relation to the applicant or licensee (or a close associate of the applicant or licensee) that: (a) is relevant to the business or procedures proposed to be carried on or performed, or carried on or performed, under the licence, or (b) causes the Commissioner to conclude that improper conduct is likely to occur if the applicant were granted the licence or the licensee continued to hold the licence, or (c) causes the Commissioner not to have confidence that improper conduct will not occur if the applicant were granted the licence or the licensee continued to hold the licence. 10.Evidence of this kind is also admissible in this Tribunal. Section 27(4) of the Act provides that Criminal Information must not be disclosed without the agreement of the Commissioner. 11.Pursuant to section 49(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ("the NCAT Act") a confidential hearing may be conducted wholly or partly in private; and pursuant to section 64 of the NCAT Act and/or section 27(4)(b) of the Act, evidence of any Criminal Information and submissions may be heard in the absence of the of the public, the applicant and the applicant's representative. 12.To the extent that was necessary I made orders under these sections. 13.Pursuant to section 20, neither the Commissioner nor Fair Trading are required to give any reasons for the determination or for not granting the licence, if such reasons would disclose any criminal intelligence report or other criminal information. 14.In some circumstances Fair Trading has discretion as to whether to grant a licence. However, a licence must not be granted if the Commissioner makes an adverse security determination in relation to the applicant: section 16(3)(c). 15.The Tribunal's jurisdiction to review the decision is constrained by the terms of the Act. Pursuant to section 27(i)(a) of the Act, review may be sought of the refusal or failure by Fair Trading to grant a licence. The Act does not expressly confer jurisdiction on this Tribunal to review any report or determination made by the Commissioner.
3. In respect of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, I note the observations from paragraph 15 of the decision in Austin. However it is well established practice that for practical purposes, in order to discharge the relevant function under the legislative regime, the Tribunal's jurisdiction must be sufficient to make a fresh decision.
4. In that regard the decision of Smith at [2] canvassed this issue in some detail. At paragraphs 13 to 37 of Smith the Tribunal embarks on a broad examination of the jurisdiction and powers of the Tribunal specifically in the context of administrative review under the Act. From paragraphs 26 to 36 inclusive the Tribunal indicates the basis for its view in respect of the jurisdiction. 26.While I agree that the Tribunal would only form a view after consideration of any material that the Commissioner put before it, I do not agree that the adverse security determination is a starting point or prima facie position. 27.In my view section 27(3) of the Act is to be construed as giving the Tribunal the jurisdiction to make a fresh determination on the basis of the material placed before it. The Tribunal is not confined to the grounds relied upon by the Commissioner in making the adverse security determination. 28.The Tribunal may make its decision on any other lawful, discretionary basis. In doing so there is no need to revisit the adverse security determination. Pursuant to section 27(3)(a) of the Act the Commissioner is a party to the proceedings. The Commissioner is able to present material and argument in relation to the matter to be determined. The Commissioner is able to present criminal intelligence reports or other criminal information to the Tribunal and subsections 27(4), (4A) and (4B) of the Act provide safeguards in relation to that material. 29.These safeguard provisions are comparable to those found in section 29 of the Security Industry Act 1997 and the approach taken by the Tribunal in determining applications under that Act. 30.To some extent, the scheme established by the Act is comparable to that under the Explosives Act 2003. That Act regulates the handling of explosives and explosives precursors, and makes provision in relation to the conveyance of explosives, their negligent handling, and the supply of explosives to minors. The WorkCover Authority is the regulatory authority but section 13 of the Explosives Act enables the regulatory authority to obtain reports from the Commissioner of Police in relation to a security clearance or licence. The impact of a report recommending "that the person should not be granted a security clearance or licence on the basis of criminal or security intelligence or other information available to the Commissioner" is a mandatory refusal of the security clearance. The security clearance is a prerequisite to obtaining licence. 31.Notwithstanding the nature of the scheme and the mandatory consequences of a negative report from the Commissioner, the Tribunal has construed that legislative scheme as providing jurisdiction to make a fresh determination on the basis of the material placed before it. For a discussion of the scheme established under the Explosives Act see YJ v Chief Executive Officer, WorkCover Authority [2006] NSWADT 264. 32.Section 63 of the ADR Act provides that in determining an application for review of an administratively reviewable decision the Tribunal is to make the correct and preferable decision having regard to the material before it, and any applicable written or unwritten law. While it is clear that the Director-General is the administrator for the purposes of section 63 of the ADR Act, and the administratively reviewable decision is that of the Director-General, in my view section 27(3)(c) of the Act is to be construed as giving the Tribunal the power to make a fresh determination, notwithstanding the wording of section 8 of the ADR Act. 33.It is also my view that in considering an application for review under the Act, the Tribunal is not constrained to have regard only to the material that was before the Director-General, but may have regard to any relevant material before it at the time of the review. 34.This is comparable to the approach taken by the Tribunal in determining applications under the Explosives Act.
5. In the absence of any submissions to the contrary, and consistent with my previous practice, my current position is that I agree with the approach previously taken by the Tribunal, as set out in the decision of Smith. The decision also addresses how the Tribunal might approach the issue of confidential evidence having regard to the provisions of the Act and the cases on the powers and duties to afford procedural fairness in the face of a confidentiality regime. In my view those provisions are now well established and understood by the parties and as they were not a live issue ventilated in these proceedings, I will not reproduce any of that commentary in these reasons.

Background

1. The applicant is young man who has previously worked in the tattoo industry. The applicant currently lives in a regional centre in New South Wales. At the time of his application the applicant had been employed in the tattoo industry since early 2010. Following the introduction of the licencing regime under the Act the applicant applied for a Tattooist licence. In material before the Tribunal it was reported that in his early adult years his behaviour had brought him to police attention.
2. By the time of his application at the age of 21 he had accumulated a number of criminal antecedents being convictions on offences relating to drug possession and traffic matters. In earlier years the applicant had worked in retail / hospitality and building / construction areas. As will be set out later, the applicant now seeks to recommence his chosen career path in the tattoo industry (and it was submitted) was focused on a new aspect of his life with a stable home life in his new role as a parent.
3. On 2 October 2013 the applicant lodged an application for a tattooist licence with the first respondent (agency). Under the provisions and requirements of the Act the second respondent provided a Report of Security Determination to the first respondent in August 2015. That report deemed or determined that the applicant was not a fit and proper person to be granted a Tattooist licence due to his criminal history. In addition it determined that it would not be in the public interest for the licence to be granted due to the applicant's criminal history.
4. In the open evidence tended by the respondent was a print out of the applicant's criminal history. The offences include:

• Possess Prohibited Drug (2 Counts) (July 2010)
• Possess Prohibited Drug (April 2011)
• Drive with Middle Range PCA (November 2011)
• Never Licensed person Drive vehicle on Road (November 2011)
• Possess Prohibited Drug (March 2013) The earliest conviction arose from a charge in June 2010 and the last conviction arose from a charge in February 2013.

1. Outside of any criminal record the history indicates that the applicant was breached for Behave in offensive manner in / near public place / school. This matter was dealt with by a Criminal Infringement Notice (CIN) and remained outstanding at the time of the second respondent's accessing and providing the record to the Tribunal. There also appear to be three further traffic record matters in addition to the two traffic matters set out in the criminal history.

The Issue

1. The issue which the Tribunal must determine is whether the applicant is a fit and proper person to hold the Tattooist Licence that he is seeking.

The Hearing

1. The applicant's matter was heard by the Tribunal on 16 March 2016. The applicant acted for himself at the time of the hearing but had previously been represented by a legal practitioner. The applicant was supported at the hearing by a relative. When the applicant was asked about the status of his legal representation his relative advised that he had spoken to an employee of the lawyer. It appeared that the material served by the respondents had been served on the former lawyer and that the applicant's understanding was that the lawyer would not be appearing for him at the hearing. The applicant had not received that material from his lawyer at the time of the hearing.
2. The Tribunal ensured that sufficient time was given for the applicant to both obtain a copy of the material and have time to examine it prior to continuing with the hearing. After an adjournment the matter proceeded with the confidential session whilst the applicant examined the open material of the respondents. The respondents were represented by Counsel and instructing Solicitors.
3. It was apparent at the outset of the hearing (and noted at [14]) that due to the nature of some of the material filed by the respondent, that a portion of the hearing would be in confidential session (excluding the applicant and his representative) in accordance with the provisions of section 49 (2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.

CONFIDENTIAL PARAGRApHS (NOT FOR RELEASE TO APPLICANT, FIRST RESPONDENT OR PUBLIC)

1. [Not for publication].
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3. [Not for publication].
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5. [Not for publication].
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14. [Not for publication].
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18. [Not for publication].

Respondents Open Evidence

1. The respondent tendered two open Exhibits in the proceedings. Exhibit 'R-1' provided the source documents and administrative documents relating to the decision and the security determination leading to the decision to refuse the licence application and reasons.
2. Exhibit 'R-2' included the Report of Security Determination under section 19 (1) of the Act and the un-redacted Tabs A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, M, P, S, T and U of that Determination.

Applicant's Evidence

1. The applicant gave evidence at the hearing. The applicant sought to tender a newspaper article from Richmond New South Wales which identified a person which (it was submitted) had a significant adverse history, but was granted a licence.
2. In addition the applicant tendered a copy of the decision in the case of Deakin v Commissioner for Fair Trading & Commissioner of Police [2016] NSWCATAD 2 which it was submitted was based on significant criminal history but importantly (in the applicant's view) established that in that case the applicant claimed to have no links to outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCG's). It appears that the matters referred to in paragraph 36 (above) related to the evidence in Deakin.
3. It was submitted by the applicant that the references to OMCG's arose only in the Parliamentary reading speeches but were specifically absent from the actual terms of the legislation.
4. Exhibit 'A 1' a personal statement of the applicant prepared by his former lawyers was tendered. The applicant gave evidence at the hearing in support of that statement, and also provided a reference from a prospective employer. That evidence was clearly supportive of the applicant, but only provided a personal insight into the applicant's lawful conduct. Matters relating to the criminal history as set out in the respondent's open evidence were not addressed in totality. Consistent with the usual approach of Courts and Tribunals to such matters, these 'deficits' ultimately must affect what weight and meaning can be attributed to the reference.
5. The applicant was subject to cross-examination and was taken through matters in his criminal antecedents. In respect of the 2010 drug possession offence questions were put to the applicant. In respect of the possession of the illicit tablet the applicant stated that he 'did not buy the tablet for $30.00 but was given it'. His evidence was that he had 'put it in his wallet and forgotten about it'. Later the applicant 'found his wallet', but at another time in his evidence he said that it was a new wallet that he had with him. (Not a missing wallet containing a tablet which was subsequently located). The applicant did not adequately address or explain at hearing this inconsistency in his evidence given on oath.
6. In evidence the applicant stated that he pleaded guilty to the drug offence. When questioned further about the offence the applicant stated that he 'didn't think that he shouldn't have had the drugs, but' he 'regrets that he was caught'.
7. The applicant also gave evidence that he had smoked cannabis prior to 2010, which is in addition to the documentary evidence before the Tribunal. When question about the offence identified at Tab 'J' (the Penrith Court drug offence) for which he received a Bond, it was put to the applicant that he was selective with his evidence and at times untruthful in his answers. The Tribunal considered a warning under the Evidence Act 1995 however the witness was content to answer matters so as to bring the process to an end.
8. The applicant was asked about the tattoo business 'Macleay Valley Ink'. His evidence was that it was shut down 1 to 2 years prior and he knows this because he remembers packing up the shop after it was shut down. His evidence was that he had worked there with his brother for about two years. He does not recall any adverse matters arising or the names of anyone involved in illegal or drug related activity.
9. In evidence the applicant advised that he had school friends whose fathers were members of OMCG's. In addition he gave evidence under cross examination that he 'probably would have met bikies through tattooing.'

Respondent's open submissions

1. The respondent submitted that the applicant was evasive in his answers and did not tell the truth. It was submitted that he was not a fit and proper person in respect of the meaning of the term in relation to the Act, and that it was not in the public interest to grant the applicant a licence. The respondent's written submissions set out the matters pertaining to the adverse security determination.

Consideration

1. The notion of fit and proper has regularly been considered by Courts and Tribunals especially when considering matters of an occupational nature. In respect of the regime covered under the Act, this Tribunal has previously set out the relevant considerations having regard to statutory interpretation and precedent.
2. A useful review of the authorities was provided in the case of AJO v Director-General Department of Transport [2012] NSWADT 101 (25 May 2012) at paragraphs 24 to 35: 24. Assessment of whether a person is fit and proper to be the holder of a licence is different from, but related to, an assessment of whether a person is of good character. 25. In Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321,Chief Justice Mason explained that, at 380: 'The question whether a person is fit and proper is one of value judgment. In that process the seriousness or otherwise of particular conduct is a matter for evaluation by the decision maker. So too is the weight, if any, to be given to matters favouring the person whose fitness and propriety are under consideration.' Toohey and Gaudron JJ said at 380: "The expression "fit and proper person", standing alone, carries no precise meaning. It takes its meaning from its context, from the activities in which the person is or will be engaged and the ends to be served by those activities. The concept of "fit and proper" cannot be entirely divorced from the conduct of the person who is or will be engaging in those activities. However, depending on the nature of the activities, the question may be whether improper conduct has occurred, whether it is likely to occur, whether it can be assumed that it will not occur, or whether the general community will have confidence that it will not occur. The list is not exhaustive but it does indicate that, in certain contexts, character (because it provides indication of likely future conduct) or reputation (because it provides indication of public perception as to likely future conduct) may be sufficient to ground a finding that a person is not fit and proper to undertake the activities in question." 26. A person's fitness is to be gauged in the light of the nature and purpose of the activities that the person will undertake. In Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No. 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127 the High Court said (at 156-7): "The expression 'fit and proper' is of course familiar enough as traditional words when used with reference to offices and perhaps vocation. But their very purpose is to give the widest scope for judgment and indeed for rejection. 'Fit' (or 'idoneus') with respect to an office is said to involve three things, honesty, knowledge and ability ... When the question was whether a man was a fit and proper person to hold a licence for the sale of liquor it was considered that it ought not to be confined to an inquiry into his character and that it would be unwise to attempt any definition of the matters which may legitimately be inquired into; each case must depend upon its own circumstances." 27. In Sobey v Commercial and Private Agents Board 20 SASR 70 Walters J said: "In my opinion what is meant by that expression is that the Applicant must show not only that he is possessed of a requisite knowledge of the duties and responsibilities evolving upon him as the holder of a particular licence ... but also that he is possessed of sufficient moral integrity and rectitude of character as to permit him to be safely accredited to the public ... as a person to be entrusted with the sort of work which the licence entails." 28. Fitness and propriety are flexible concepts. A consideration of whether a person is fit and proper involves an assessment of their knowledge, honesty and ability in the context of the role they are seeking to undertake. Thus in Obradovic -v- Commissioner for Fair Trading, Office of Fair Trading (GD) [2006] NSWADTAP 18 the Appeal Panel agreed that a formerly licenced building contractor should have his application for a new licence refused, despite there being no evidence that he was dishonest or of bad repute. Evidence that he had been extremely tardy and intransigent in dealing with customer complaints, and the regulator, when he held a licence, was sufficient to conclude that he was not fit and proper for the role. In that case the licensing scheme was among other things, designed to protect consumers and to provide them with adequate means of redress against licensed contractors. In Bond the assessment occurred in the context of whether the Applicant was a fit and proper person to hold a licence under the Broadcasting Act 1942 (Cth). 29. InSaadieh v Director General, Department of Transport [1999] NSWADT 68, Hennessey DP set out the factors to be taken into account in determining a person's suitability and fitness to obtain a taxi authority. They are: the nature, seriousness and frequency of any criminal offences for which the Applicant has been arrested or convicted; the Applicant's reputation in the community; and the likelihood that the Applicant will re-offend, be the subject of further complaints or commit further traffic offences. 30. In Director General, Transport NSW v AIC (GD) [2011] NSWADTAP 65 the Appeal Panel, at [37] the Appeal Panel drew attention to the role public interest considerations play in the assessment of fitness and propriety. The courts have emphasised the connection that assessment of repute, fitness and propriety have in a regulated context with public interest considerations. Repute, fitness and propriety involve concepts that should not be 'narrowly construed or confined' and may extend to 'any aspect of fitness and propriety that is relevant to the public interest' (Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321 (26 July 1990) at [64] per Mason CJ. .... The comments of Kirby P in Pillai v Messiter [No.2], quoted above, are an example of this. 31. The discretion vested in a decision maker in determining whether a person is fit and proper, in any given context, was said by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 589 at 389, per Northrop, Miles and French JJ, to "give wide scope for judgement and allow broad bases for rejection." 32. As was made clear by Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Bond, issues of character and reputation may play a determinative role in deciding whether a person is fit and proper. Their Honours also clearly highlighted that there is a difference between the two. They explained that an assessment of character is relevant because it is an indicator of a person's likely future conduct when considering how a person might act in the context of the role they are seeking to undertake. Reputation on the other hand, provides an indication of the public perception of future conduct in that role. In Re T and the Director of Youth and Community Services [1980] 1 NSWLR 392, Waddell J explained, at 393: 'A distinction must be drawn between "repute" or "reputation" and "character" or "disposition". The word "character" is sometimes used as meaning a person's reputation, but "reputation" is not ordinarily used to mean character. The distinction has been referred to in many decisions of the courts." In Melbourne v The Queen [1999] HCA 32; [1999] 198 CLR 1 at 15 McHugh J explained: "... character refers to the inherent moral qualities of a person or what the New Zealand Law Commission has called "disposition - which is something more intrinsic to the individual in question". It is to be contrasted with reputation, which refers to the public estimation or repute of a person, irrespective of the inherent moral qualities of that person." 33.In Ex Parte Tziniolis; Re Medical Practitioners Act (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448 Walsh JA, at 450, said that in determining questions of character: "... the court is required to consider matters affecting the moral standards, attitudes and qualities of the Applicant and not merely to consider what is his general reputation." That case was concerned with an application for registration of a medical practitioner. His Honour went onto explain that the Court was entitled to inquire into personal misconduct, as well as professional misconduct, in considering whether the Applicant was a man of good character: "... whilst recognizing that there may be some kinds of conduct deserving of disapproval which have little or no bearing on whether or not it shows the Applicant for registration as a medical practitioner is a person of good character. In this respect, I think, that some assistance can properly be obtained as to the mode of approach to be made from the observations made in cases where the was whether or not that a person was fit and proper to be a barrister, such as those in Ziems v Prothonatory of the Supreme Court of NSW [1957] HCA 46; (1957) 97 CLR 279." Thus, as with fitness and propriety, assessment of character is to be made in the context of the nature and purpose of the activities that the person is seeking to undertake. In Director General, Department of Transport v Z (No.2) (GD) [2002] NSWADTAP 37 the Appeal Panel explained: 'Good repute' refers to the way reasonably-minded people assess an individual's current reputation, with reasonably precise knowledge of those matters that put the person's reputation in doubt. The fact that the person produces evidence from witnesses who vouch in general terms for the person's reputation cannot be conclusive. Equally, care must be taken, as we see it, not to use the 'good repute' requirement as a way of bringing into consideration stereotypes or assumptions which offend, for example, against human rights or anti-discrimination standards.
3. Many of these considerations were raised by the respondents in their written submissions. The Act also makes provision for the granting of a licence to be in the public interest. The respondent referred to the case of Smith at [2] in considering the Tribunal's position on how such a concept should be considered under the Act.
4. In Smith v Commissioner of Police NSW Police Force and Fair Trading NSW [2014] NSWCATAD 184 Senior Member Montgomery observed the following at paragraphs 42- 47: The concept of the 'public interest' 42. The Courts and the Tribunal have held that the concept of the 'public interest' is designed to give the broader interests of the community priority over private interests. In Comalco Aluminium (Bell Bay) Ltd v O'Connor and Others (1995) 131 ALR 657 at 681 the Wilcox CJ and Keely J said: The purpose of the reference to public interest is to ensure that private interests are not the only matters taken into account: to make clear that the interests of the whole community are matters for the Commissioner's consideration. The effect of the reference is to amplify the 'scope and purpose' of the legislation. 43. Discretion to make a decision "in the public interest" is not confined except by the scope and purpose of the legislation itself: O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210 at 216 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson Gaudron JJ. Applying a public interest test is a question of fact and degree: Re Queensland Electricity Commission and Ors; Ex parte Electrical Trades Union of Australia [1987] HCA 27; (1987) 72 ALR 1 at 5. 44. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] VicRp 6; (1991) 1 VR 63 the Court held: "The public interest is a term embracing matters, among others, of standards of human conduct and of the functioning of government and government instrumentalities tacitly accepted and acknowledged to be for the good order of society and for the well-being of its members. The interest is therefore the interest of the public as distinct from the interest of an individual or individuals" 45. In Commissioner of Police v Toleafoa [1999] NSWADTAP 9 at paragraph [25] the Tribunal's Appeal Panel said: The "public interest" is an inherently broad concept giving the appellant the ability to have regard to a wide range of factors in choosing whether to exercise a discretion adversely to an individual" 46. The Tribunal has also found that an Applicant's personal interest in retaining his licence cannot outweigh the public interest in having full confidence in the professionalism of people involved in the security industry: Blissett v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police; Webb Protection Australia Ply Ltd v Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police [2006] NSWADT 114 at paragraph [32]. 47. In Constantin v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (GD) [2013] NSWADTAP 16 at paragraph [33] the Appeal Panel held: The ' public interest ' allows, we consider, for issues going beyond the character of the applicant to be taken into account. These may include concerns in relation to public protection, public safety and public confidence in the administration of the licensing system.
5. I have carefully considered all of the evidence submissions and material put forth by the parties in these proceedings. I have taken all of it into account even if I have not referred to all matters specifically in these written reasons.
6. Having considered all of the matters tendered and submitted in these proceedings, in my view the applicant presents as a person who is not fit and proper to hold a Tattooist licence under the Act. The applicant's evidence was at times contradictory under cross-examination, and as a result there are concerns as to the veracity of his answers.
7. Having regard to the agreed circumstances (Facts) of the criminal matters, including the nature of those offences, the veracity of the applicant's evidence given at the hearing, the submissions of the respondent, and the matters set out in the authorities referred to and extracted above, I make a finding that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to hold a Tattoo licence in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
8. In my view having specific regard to the material referred to in confidential session, the agreed circumstances of the criminal matters, including the nature of those offences, and my observations in my consideration of that material in the confidential paragraphs, there is significant risk to the public should the licence be granted, consistent with the matters that the legislation seeks to protect the public from. I therefore make a finding that it is not in the public interest to grant the licence to the applicant.

Conclusion

1. I have made the above findings having regard to the objects of the Act. Having made a finding that the applicant is not a fit and proper person, and that it is not in the public interest for the licence to be granted, I make the following orders:

Orders 1. The decision of the First Respondent to refuse to grant the licence is affirmed. 2. Pursuant to Section 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 the publication of paragraphs 16-33 (inclusive) of this decision (except to the second respondent) is prohibited I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 12 June 2018