214 In addition it was noted in Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 that for the purposes of s 9 of the RDA 'human rights' may include those included in other international instruments to which Australia is a party. One such other instrument is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (as provided in Schedule 2 to the HREOC Act) which is relied upon by Ms Obieta.
215 To succeed in establishing a claim under s 9(1A) of the RDA that there was an act involving a distinction based on, or done by reason of, her race, colour, decent or national or ethnic origin, Ms Obieta must establish that a term, condition or requirement that was not reasonable in the circumstances was imposed upon her (see s 9(1A)(a)). As was held by McHugh J in Waters and Others v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 406 in reference to a similar provision in Victorian anti-discrimination legislation (see s 17(5)(a) Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (Vic)), such term, condition or requirement would need to be identified with precision.
216 Further, under s 9(1A)(b) Ms Obieta must established that she does not or cannot comply with the term, condition or requirement and under s 9(1A)(c), that the requirement has the purpose or effect of interfering with the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, by persons of the same race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin as Ms Obieta, of any relevant human right or fundamental freedom.
217 Section 10 of the RDA relevantly provides for a right of equality before the law and that the laws of the Commonwealth, States and Territories are to apply generally to all people regardless of their race, colour, national or ethnic origin. Ms Obieta must show that under a particular law, she does not enjoy a right that is enjoyed by persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic origin, or that she enjoys that right to a more limited extent. Once this has been established then notwithstanding the particular law in question, by force of this section, she is entitled to enjoy the right to the same extent as persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic origin.
218 Section 13 of the RDA specifically deals with the provision of goods and services to the public and makes it unlawful for a person to refuse or fail to supply goods or services to another person or to do so on less favourable terms because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origins of that other person. To establish a claim under this section, Ms Obieta must establish that by reason of her race, colour or national or ethnic origin or that of any of her relatives or associates, the supply of goods or services was refused to her or that there was a failure on her demand to supply such goods or services (s 13(a)). Such claim could be established if such goods or services were supplied to Ms Obieta on terms or conditions less favourable than such goods and services would otherwise be supplied by reason of Ms Obieta's race, colour or national or ethnic origin or that of her relatives or associates (s 13(b)).
219 Section 18 of the RDA is a deeming provision which provides that if an act is done for two or more reasons and one of the reasons is because of the race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin of a person, then for the purposes of Part II of the RDA, the act is taken to have been done for that reason. Under s 18(b) there is no requirement that the reason for the act being the race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin of the person be the dominant reason or a substantial reason for doing the act.
220 Section 18A of the RDA provides that employers or principals are vicariously liable for the acts of their employees or agents in circumstances that if the act was done by the employer or principal it would be unlawful under Part II of the RDA. Section 18A(2) provides that vicarious liability does not apply to an employee or agent of a person if it is established that the person took all reasonable steps to prevent the employee or agent from doing the act. For Ms Obieta to establish a claim under this section she must establish that there was an act; that the act was done by an employee or agent of a person; that the act was done in connection with his or her duties as an employee or agent (s 18A(1)(a)); and that the act would be unlawful under Part II of the RDA if it were done by that person (s 18A(1)(b)).
221 Section 18C of the RDA makes it unlawful for a person to do any act (otherwise than in private) if the act is reasonably likely, in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or group of people (see s 18C(1)(a)). Pursuant to s 18C(1)(b), the act must have been done because of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the other person or all of the people in the group. Thus the first inquiry of s 18C is whether the act in question, can in the circumstances be regarded as reasonably likely to offend or humiliate a person in Ms Obieta's position.
222 In Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and Another (2004) 135 FCR 105, French J observed at, [69] that the words 'offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate' are to be considered according to 'their ordinary meaning, in their context, acknowledging their somewhat elastic content and having regard to the objectives of the legislation…' . These objectives, it was noted, are to be gleaned not only from the words of the legislation but also from extraneous material such as, inter alia, the Second Reading Speech of the Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth) ('Second Reading Speech'). The Second Reading Speech provides that the Act was intended to 'close a gap in the legal protection available to the victims of extreme racist behaviour': see Bropho 135FCR at [70]. In Creek v Cairns Post Pty Ltd (2001) 112 FCR 352 at 356-357 Kiefel J said that the conduct which is encompassed by s 18C of the RDA is that which has, 'profound and serious effects not to be likened to mere slights'.
223 Section 18C of the RDA requires the satisfaction of an objective test of the likelihood that the act complained of will have the prohibited effect: see Hagan v Trustees of the Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust [2000] FCA 1615 at [15]. The objective nature of the test was also considered in Bropho 135 FCR where French J at [66] citing the Second Reading Speech said:
'Community standards of behaviour rather than the subjective views of the complainant are taken into account' (Australia, House of Representatives Debates (1994), p334).