Findings
47 The Court's determination must consider s 79(C) of the Act. With respect to s79(C)(1)(a)(i),(ii) and (iii), I was not taken to any controls in the Camden Local Environmental Plan No 47 or the imminent 2010 LEP regarding time-limited controls. It is agreed by the parties that the proposed development is a compliant and appropriate use and meets the objectives of the LEPs. I concur with their findings. There are no specific relevant controls in the Camden Development Control Plan 2006.
48 I was taken to a number of authorities where trial periods have been in contention. In Zhang v Canterbury City Council [2001] NSWCA 167 one of the issues was whether or not a time limit period was permissible in the circumstances of that matter. Section 80 A(1)(d) of the Act enables a consent authority to impose such a condition. In doing so, the matters under s 79(C) must be considered, as must the merits of doing so.
49 Consideration of the DCP is relevant, not only in regard to the findings in Zhang regarding DCPs in general, but with respect to the extent to which a council has considered the need to include the provision for a trial period in its DCP. In Reserve Hotels Pty Limited v Council of the City of Sydney [2010] NSWLEC 1135, Puruse Pty Ltd and Joao Pty Ltd trading as Coopers Hotel, Newtown v Sydney City Council [2009] NSWLEC 1095 and Fiorenza v Waverley Council [2009] NSWLEC 1269, the evidence went to specific provisions in the City of Sydney Late Night Trading Premises Development Control Plan 2007 and the relevant Waverley DCP. These councils have detailed controls specifying requirements for trial periods. As stated above, there are no such controls in the Camden DCP.
50 Clearly under s 80A(1)(d), such a condition can be imposed by a consent authority, the council in the first instance, or by the Court in exercising its powers under s 39 of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979.
51 In regards to the appeal before the Court, I find that the imposition of a trial period is unreasonable and unnecessary for the following reasons.
52 The condition is drafted in a form that is counterproductive to its intent, that is, the trial period is to start from the date of the determination rather from a point at which the business is operational. Mr Ison was adamant that the condition remains as drafted. As discussed previously in this judgment, in order to assess the impact of the liquor store on the community, the liquor store must be in operation. Zhang at para 85 states in part The focus is then on "likely impact" during the probationary period. At para 93 There was a considerable body of evidence before the Commissioner as to the actual effect that the operation of the brothel had on the locality over a period of time prior to the trial….
53 There is no evidence before me of a trial on the impact of the operation of a liquor store in a comparable location. I have no evidence before me to lead me to conclude that the condition should be redrafted for a trial period to commence from the issue of an occupation certificate. If the council were determined to assess the impact of the operation of the liquor store on public amenity, then it would seem that would have been a more appropriate starting point.
54 Mr Ison's evidence was such that there could be no certainty that the trial period, if ordered, would not be extended indefinitely. There is no explanation in the council report as to how any impacts would be evaluated. There are no criteria in the CDCP relating to trial periods against which compliance could be tested.
55 The council relies heavily on a generalised list of offences recorded by police. No evidence has been produced to prove the nexus between the offence and the existence of premises such as the one subject to this appeal. No trial period has been imposed on any similar premises.
56 Similarly, the council has placed considerable importance of the submissions of 5 residents. There is no doubt that those that made submissions have strongly held opinions, however the facts of this matter are that the use is permitted within the zone and it is consistent with the land use objectives for neighbourhood centres given in Part G, Chapter 3 of the CDCP - Currans Hill. However, this is not to say that the concerns of residents should not be taken seriously. It is noted that there were no objections from the principal of the primary school or the coordinator of the childcare centre.
57 The appeal before the Court is for the fit-out of a liquor store and not for a liquor licence. Should a licence be approved, there are provisions under the Liquor Act 2007 that enable the community, the council and the police to make disturbance complaints to the Director-General, Communities NSW.