38. In light of my decision not to order costs on an indemnity basis in respect of the whole of the proceeding, it is not necessary to address in detail ACT's submission made by reference to Quzag (as to which, see [25] above). However, I do wish to make a few brief observations about that submission. First, all of the reasoning of Refshauge J in Quzag concerned the consequences of the grant of bail pending appeal. Section 37Q of the Supreme Court Act is engaged only when a convicted person appeals to the ACT Court of Appeal. The remarks made by Refshauge J at [5]-[16] of his Reasons in Quzag were plainly confined to circumstances where an appeal was on foot. His statement at [10] to the effect that Whan was no longer applicable in the ACT was confined to circumstances where s 37Q was engaged. Here, of course, no attempt to appeal against his sentence was made by the plaintiff until after judgment was delivered in Lewis v Chief Executive. By that time, the plaintiff's sentence had already expired. Second, at [16]-[23] of his Reasons, his Honour held that, by operation of s 37Q, time spent on bail did not count as part of the offender's term of imprisonment, including any period to be served by periodic detention. His Honour held that a periodic detention order under s 11 of the Sentencing Act is a sentence of imprisonment for the purposes of s 37Q. Third, at [30]-[36], his Honour held that s 58 of the Administration Act was apt to deal with any extension of a sentence after an unsuccessful appeal. His Honour held that the grant of bail is not approval to an offender not to attend to serve periods of periodic detention within the meaning of s 55 of the Administration Act.