Consideration
11 It is unfortunate that a further amendment should be proposed at the commencement of a four day trial, where the trial already involves detailed and complex issues and where a great deal of material has already been filed. This amendment is not trifling - all parties acknowledge that the proposed amendment alleges a separate and distinct issue to those issues already pleaded in the 2nd FASOC. I accept the submission of Mr Barlow SC for APS that APS and its witnesses (including expert witnesses) will need to consider this new claim. Delay in the progress of the trial is inevitable.
12 I note the principles explained by the High Court in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175, in particular that:
An award of costs to compensate the other party for the inconvenience of the trial dates being vacated as a consequence of the amendment to the pleadings is not a panacea.
The Court should recognise any ill-effects of resultant delay upon the parties to the proceedings and the effects on other litigants who are also seeking a resolution to their proceedings.
The nature and importance of the amendment to the party applying for the amendment cannot be overlooked.
The exercise of the discretion requires an explanation to be given where there is delay in applying for amendment.
There may be cases where it may properly be concluded that a party has had sufficient opportunity to plead their case and that it is too late for a further amendment, having regard to the other party and other litigants awaiting trial dates.
The timing of the application for amendment is a salient issue.
An application for leave to amend a pleading should not be approached on the basis that a party is entitled to raise an arguable claim, subject to payment of costs by way of compensation. There is no such entitlement.
13 However, as the Full Court of the Federal Court observed in Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261 at [51]:
Aon Risk is not a one size fits all case. Whilst various factors are identified in the judgment as relevant to the exercise of discretion, the weight to be given to these factors, individually and in combination, and the outcome of that balancing process, may vary depending on the facts in the individual case. As the plurality in Aon Risk observed at [75], statements made in cases concerning amendment of pleadings are best understood by reference to the circumstances of those cases, even if they are stated in terms of general application.
(cf Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118).
14 In this case, while some disruption to the progress of the trial would result from allowing the applicants to amend the 2nd FASOC, I am satisfied that leave should be granted. I so find for the following reasons.
15 First, it does not appear to be in dispute that the additional claim sought to be pleaded by the applicants raises serious and important issues in relation to their case. The evidence to which Mr Franklin SC referred in his submissions appears relevant to a claim that a separate act of reproduction of the jmineops_acd.bak file took place on 27 January 2012, and to this extent explains the proposed amendment to para 22 of the 2nd FASOC.
16 Second, notwithstanding that evidence appears to have subsisted for some time supporting the claim now formulated by the applicants in relation to Mr Koudstaal having separately copied the jmineops_acd.bak file on 27 January 2012, I am satisfied that the applicants only became aware that this was a potential issue following the filing of the affidavits of Mr Koudstaal and Mr Inglis within the last three weeks (and where Mr Inglis' evidence only became available last Wednesday). To that extent it is clear that there has been no improper delay by the applicants in seeking to amend the 2nd FASOC.
17 Third, while I accept that the respondents require time to respond to this new aspect of the applicants' case, including the possibility of adducing further evidence, the issue of timing can properly and realistically be addressed by the trial in this case being adjourned after the applicants both open their case this week and call witnesses whose evidence is not relevant to the amendment to para 22 of the 2nd FASOC. It is now clear that, in light of the volume of material before the Court and the potential complexity of issues to be addressed, four days is insufficient for the hearing of this proceeding. To that extent, and in any event, the resultant splitting of this trial appears inevitable. Any matters relevant to the amended case of the applicants can properly, and efficiently, be addressed by the respondents once the trial resumes at a future date. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the respondents are to any significant degree prejudiced by the amendment to the 2nd FASOC sought by the applicants. I am also satisfied that this approach satisfies the spirit of s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
18 Fourth, this case is not comparable with, for example, the adjournment of a four week trial which was sought in Aon Risk Services. Case management issues relevant to the conduct of Court business are unlikely to be significantly affected by the resumption of a hearing over several days at a future date.
19 Fifth, in this case I consider that costs are adequate compensation to the respondents for any ill-effects they may experience as a result of the amendment to the 2nd FASOC, including any need to recall expert witnesses at a future date or a truncation of listed hearing dates this week.
20 Finally, it appears that the applicants placed the respondents on notice on 19 July 2013 that they intended to seek leave to amend the 2nd FASOC in the terms the subject of today's submissions. While not conclusive, in my view the fact that the interlocutory application to amend the 2nd FASOC was not a surprise to the respondents yesterday is relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion to grant leave.
21 It follows that the applicants should have leave to amend the 2nd FASOC in the terms produced to the Court.
I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Collier.