29 In imperative terms ("it must"), s1093 required the company, if it refused to register the transfers, to send to the transferee notice of the refusal within two months after the date on which the transfers were lodged with it. Counsel for the applicants relied upon the application of a similar statutory provision in re Swaledale Cleaners, Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 1132 and on appeal [1968] 3 All ER 619. In that case, transfers were lodged with a company on or before 3 August 1967. There were insufficient directors to formally deal with them. On 18 December 1967 an additional director was appointed to regularise the position and on a later date the board refused to register the transfers. The Companies Act 1948 (UK), s78(1), contained a provision almost identical to that of s1093. However, there was no equivalent of s1094. Pennycuick J, at first instance and on appeal from him, the Court of Appeal, considered a motion for an order pursuant to a statutory provision permitting rectification of the register of members of a company. Cf Corporations Law, s175(1) and Corporations Act 2001, s175(1). The Court of Appeal, and the learned judge at first instance, referred to the prima facie right of a shareholder to transfer his shares, (see re Bede Steam Shipping Company Ltd [1917] 1 Ch 123 and Wood v W & G Dean Pty Ltd [1929] HCA 44; (1929) 43 CLR 77) but noted cl 8 of the company's articles of association which empowered the directors "at any time in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion" to refuse to register a transfer of shares. Danckwerts LJ, at 623 referred to the clause as being harsh and expressed the view that "it seems to me that such an arbitrary and harsh right must be exercised within a reasonable time" and "the corollary that follows is that, if it is not exercised within a reasonable time, that right is gone". The learned judge at first instance at 1136, had expressed the view that the period of two months mentioned in s78(1) could "safely be taken as the outside limit after which there is unnecessary delay". Although that view was expressed in somewhat absolute terms, it was a decision made on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. A consideration of the judgments of the members of the Court of Appeal makes it clear that the Lords Justices regarded the limitation period of two months as indicating what was a reasonable time in the factual circumstances of the case they were considering. For example, Harman LJ at 622, said that the statutory provision of two months "quite clearly indicates that a reasonable time, other things being equal" [my emphasis] was that period of two months.