hemselves whether they would elect to affirm or to disaffirm the
ontract ; in other words, whether they would sue for damages
on the basis of transferring the process, or would sue for rescission
on the basis of keeping it. The position, however, though somewhat
novel, seems clear in principle. If A and B jointly agree with C,
and if C announces, before the normal moment of performance
arrives, that he renounces the contract, it is competent for A and
B jointly to accept that renunciation, and to terminate the contract.
But that is a new agreement, and requires the assent of all. A may
refuse, and, if so, B and C must abide by the bargain until the time
for actual performance arrives. The contract may or may not
then be normally performed. But once that time has arrived, if C
commits an actual breach going to the root of the bargain, A has a
right, by virtue of the contract already made, to say he will not
proceed further, and he may refuse notwithstanding B's desire to
waive his rights and proceed. The same necessity of a new bargain
which in the case first put prevents A from altering the existing
position prevents B in the second case from affecting A's acerued
tights. It is the second case that arises here. The time for per-
_ formance having arrived and an actual fundamental breach having
occurred, Rogers is entitled to say "I will not proceed further.
There is nothing to compel me." Bowen cannot affect Rogers's
rights in that regard, and Bowen has no right to compel Rogers to
agree to what Blackman may desire. Blackman, who is a director
of the appellant Company and who as such director agreed to adopt
Bowen's sale to the Company, and who is interested in sharing
_ whatever Rogers might be paid for transferring his process, naturally
does not join Rogers in this action. But his wish is immaterial
unless Rogers concurs. Rogers, having joined all parties interested in
the suit, had a right to ask a Court of equity to declare, in the