Kwok v Mothersole

The reasons for the Magistrate's decision

1. Having referred to Judd v McKeon (1926) 38 CLR 38 and Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Eastern [2018] NSWSC 1516, the learned Magistrate gave the following reasons for dismissing the matter: Mr Mothersole's defence to these proceedings is that he was unaware that an election was to be held on that day. In support of the prosecution case and marked as exhibit 1 is a statement of Gillian Berry, an electoral officer, which relevantly attaches the records disclosing that Mr Mothersole did not vote in the council election and also attaching the various documentation that was sent to him following that election. Also part of exhibit 1 is a statement of Alex Chapman, who is also an electoral officer. This statement annexes a number of documents that establish that the Electoral Commission placed advertisements in the print and radio media that the election in which Mr Mothersole failed to vote was to be held on 9 September. What is clear from a reading of that material is that the media coverage that was provided by the Electoral Commission could not be described as exhaustive, nor would it reasonably lead to the conclusion that everyone in the community who was obliged to vote in the council election would necessarily have it brought to their attention through the media alone. Mr Mothersole says that he does read one of those publications although he points out that the advertisement that was placed in respect of it was well to the back of the paper and he does not ordinarily read that far. Mr Mothersole gave evidence about the day in question which was to the effect that he was working and he said that he did not pass by any polling place which would have brought to his notice the fact that an election was held that day. Furthermore, he said that he did not see any signage in the community, did not receive any pamphlets and was not approached by any candidate. There is no basis upon which I can conclude that evidence is other than honest, and [the prosecutor] properly concedes that the Commission does not contest the honesty of what [Mr Mothersole] has said. The question for determination in this case, of course, in the context of the principles to which I have already referred, is whether being unaware of an election is a sufficient reason for not having voted. The word, "sufficient" is not defined in the legislation and therefore is to be construed with its ordinary and natural meaning. HAVING REGARD TO THE MATTERS SET OUT ABOVE, IN MY VIEW, [MR MOTHERSOLE'S] EXPLANATION FOR HAVING FAILED TO VOTE IS A SUFFICIENT REASON FOR HAVING FAILED TO VOTE AND THE PROSECTION WILL BE DISMISSED.
2. With respect, his Honour does not seem to have directly addressed the two principal issues pressed by the Commission: whether the statute imposes an obligation on the elector to make inquiries to find out when an election is to be held; and the reasonableness of the explanation proffered. Nothing may turn on this, having regard to the ground of appeal propounded.

Submissions for the plaintiff

1. As this appeal was heard with the appeal in Kwok v Maresch, Ms Lewer of Counsel, appropriately, made the same submissions in each case. I have summarised her written and oral submissions at [20] - [26] of my judgment in Kwok v Maresch. Her primary argument was that the learned Magistrate's decision involved an error of law alone because ignorance of the date on which an election was to be held was necessarily outside the statutory description of "sufficient reason not to vote" as required by s 312 LGA. As summarised in the Kwok v Maresch judgment [25] - [26], counsel also relied upon the in pari materia principle to argue by reference to the provisions of ss 207 and 259(9) of the Electoral Act, that Parliament has declared that ignorance that an election is being conducted is not a sufficient reason for failing to vote.

Submissions of the defendant

1. Mr Mothersole is self-represented. In written submissions filed by him on 15 March 2019, he reaffirmed that: he strongly believed in the compulsory voting system; the Magistrate had accepted his explanation as honest; and his honesty was not questioned by the prosecutor at first instance. He submitted that Gannat v Becker (Supreme Court of South Australia unreported 30 July 1992 Olsson J) was distinguishable because the defendant's plea of ignorance there had not been believed. He otherwise relied upon the judgments of Isaac J and Higgins J from Judd v McKeon (1926) 38 CLR 380 at 387 and 390 respectively.
2. At the hearing he adopted the submissions of law advanced by Mr D McMahon of Counsel on behalf of Mr Maresch.

Legislative provisions

1. The relevant legislative provisions have been set out in my judgment in Kwok v Maresch, especially at [33] - [34]. As with the election for the City of Ryde Council, the 2017 election for the City of Parramatta Council was not held in accordance with the fixed statutory rotation established by s 287 LGA. Rather it was held 12 months later because of the abandonment of the State Government's policy of local government amalgamation.

Decision

1. As this appeal raises the same point of law, not materially distinct primary facts, and the same conclusion of ultimate fact as Kwok v Maresch, my reasoning at [35] and following in that judgment is equally applicable and I will merely summarise it here.
2. In accordance with the judgment of Glass JA In Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139, the ground raised by the plaintiff will involve a point of law alone if the primary facts of ignorance of the election as found by Shields LCM are "necessarily outside [the] statutory description and a contrary decision has been made": Azzopardi at p 156 - 157. Obviously, as I said in Kwok v Maresch, whether ignorance that the occasion for discharging the obligation to vote has arisen is necessarily outside the statutory description of "a sufficient reason not to vote" is a question of statutory construction.
3. In my judgment by reference to the reasoning in The Queen v Tolson (1889) 2 QBD 168 at 181; Thomas v The King (1937) 59 CLR 279 at 304 - 306; Harding v Price [1948] 1 KB 695 at 701; Belling v O'Sullivan [1950] SASR 43 at 46; and He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 157 CLR 523, I am satisfied that s 312 LGA does not involve an offence of absolute liability. And, even if guilty knowledge is not an element of the offence, an accused will not be guilty if he acted under an honest and reasonable mistake as to the existence of facts which, if true, would have made his act innocent: He Kaw Teh at p 553 by Gibbs CJ.
4. As I said (at Maresch [47]), "the legal meaning of legislation is normally determined by a consideration of the text of the provision, its legislative and broader context, and a consideration of the purpose of the Act". There is nothing in the language of s 312 LGA which excludes the availability of the "defence" of honest and reasonable mistake of fact. The express language creates the "sufficient reason" exception. Nor is there anything which excludes the principle in Harding v Price (at p. 701) which I adapted (at Maresch [48]) into the following formulation: Unless a person knows that an election is being held, how can he or she carry out the duty to vote imposed by s 312 LGA? There is nothing in the language of the provision excluding the rebuttable presumption of law that there is no crime without a guilty mind that underpins the criminal law, both common law and statute law: Thomas v the King (at 304-306).
5. For the reasons I explained at Maresch [49] - [50], there is nothing in the legislative context or the broader statutory purpose which would amount to a compelling necessary legislative intendment to exclude the rebuttable presumption to oust the availability of honest and reasonable mistake of fact as an exculpatory consideration.
6. My reasons for rejecting the argument that the enactment of the new provision at the foot of s 259(9) Electoral Act 2017 operate in pari materia as an aid to the interpretation or construction of the concluding clause of s 312 LGA, "unless the person has a sufficient reason not to vote", have been fully set out at [52] to [55] of my judgment in Kwok v Maresch. I will not repeat them here. In my view, that provision does not lead to the conclusion that honest and reasonable mistake of fact is excluded as a defence to a charge alleging a contravention of s 312 LGA. I repeat it does not lead me to conclude that ignorance of the date of the election, if honestly and reasonably based, is not a "sufficient reason not to vote".
7. As I tried to explain in Kwok v Maresch this conclusion ought to open no flood gate. The requirement is one of honest and reasonable mistake of fact involving both subjective and objective aspects. Even an honestly held belief may be completely unreasonable. Decisions about what is reasonable do not involve judges or magistrates engaging in value judgments at large. The primary task of the court is to apply the legislative norms to be found in Chapter 10 LGA (see Maresch at [63]). I repeat what I said in Maresch at [60]: In the case of a Federal, State or Local Government general election it would stretch credulity for an elector to plead ignorance of the date fixed for the election given the highly visible election campaigns conducted by the major political parties and the saturating coverage flooding, not only, the mainstream or established media, but also, social media.
8. I am not of the view that ignorance that the occasion has arisen to discharge the obligation to vote is necessarily outside the statutory description of "sufficient reasons". And I am not persuaded that the Commission has demonstrated that its sole ground of appeal involves the question of law alone. It follows from my reasoning that an elector is not obliged to make inquiries about the date fixed for an election (Harding v Price at 701; Belling v O'Sullivan at 46). Although knowledge that one is imminent may activity an onus at a factual level to make inquiries (Gannat v Becker).
9. As ignorance as an explanation is founded on honest and reasonable mistake of fact such an explanation will be insufficient unless it is both honest and reasonable. A standard of reasonableness is an objective yardstick.
10. My orders are: 1. The appeal is dismissed; 2. To the extent to which Mr Mothersole may be otherwise entitled as a self-represented litigant, the plaintiff is to pay the defendant's legal costs.

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