Unreasonableness
24 The first argument relied on Mr Bhatta was that the Tribunal acted unreasonably in dismissing the reinstatement application. Before the primary judge Mr Bhatta had submitted that a "reasonable Tribunal would prefer to do what is best for the applicant … rather than just what is legally correct". His Honour rejected that submission, holding that the Tribunal was not bound to grant the reinstatement application in this case and that there was nothing legally unreasonable in the Tribunal's decision.
25 Mr Bhatta made clear in his oral submissions that he was not suggesting that the decision made by the Tribunal was a decision that no reasonable Tribunal could make. Rather, he submitted that the decision was not "reasonable and just" because it was open to the Tribunal to take a number of other courses of action apart from dismissing the reinstatement application which it should have taken. In support this submission he referred to the decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [63], [65] and [68].
26 The Tribunal in its reasons drew attention to what it regarded as the inadequacy of the medical certificate relied on in support of the reinstatement application. The medical certificate merely asserted that Mr Kumar was "unfit for work" for the day and said nothing about his ability to participate in a hearing before the Tribunal. The medical certificate does not indicate what the nature of Mr Kumar's condition was or how it might have interfered with his presentation of arguments and evidence to the Tribunal.
27 Mr Kumar's statutory declaration suggests he was "physically weak and barely able to walk" and that he was told by the doctor to rest and take medication. However, as the Tribunal noted, Mr Kumar's condition did not prevent him from attending the doctor's surgery on the day of the hearing (it is not apparent from the evidence at what time of day he did so) or contacting the Tribunal at or prior to the appointed time for the purpose of making an application to have the review adjourned to some future date. Neither the statutory declaration nor the medical certificate indicate what medication Mr Kumar was advised by the doctor to take (indeed the medical certificate makes no reference to any medication prescribed by the doctor).
28 Mr Bhatta submitted that the Tribunal's decision to refuse the reinstatement application was unreasonable because it constituted an exercise of power in a manner that was inconsistent with the purpose for which the power to dismiss for non-attendance was conferred. He referred to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Bill 2014 (Cth) which was said to show that the purpose of s 362B is to deter unmeritorious applicants who were not actively pursuing their applications and thereby delaying their removal from Australia. He submitted that it was Parliament's intention that the power to dismiss for failure to appear be exercised only in such cases.
29 The relevant statements that appear in the Explanatory Memorandum upon which Mr Bhatta relied are preceded by other statements that reflect a broader purpose. According to the Explanatory Memorandum, s 362B:
… is intended to increase Tribunal efficiency by providing for a quick resolution of a case where, despite the accordance of procedural fairness, the applicant for review has not attended the hearing …
…
The MRT is required to afford procedural fairness in accordance with the Migration Act. The measure does not limit the right set out in the Migration Act to a hearing by the MRT, rather it provides for a new consequence if the person does not exercise that right.
30 Moreover, the language of s 362B does not confine the circumstances in which the power to dismiss may be exercised to those cases where the application for review may be described as unmeritorious or where the application for review is not being actively pursued.
31 The Full Court in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 266 FCR 459 considered s 362B of the Act in the context of a challenge to the decision of the Tribunal not to reinstate an application for review on various grounds including that the Tribunal had failed to consider matters relevant to its decision that were relied upon by the applicant and which were not addressed in the Tribunal's reasons. In that case Colvin J (with whom Kenny and Bromberg JJ agreed) said at [29]-[30]:
[29] When s 362B(1C) says that on an application for reinstatement the Tribunal must, if it considers it appropriate to do so reinstate the application, it imposes a statutory responsibility on the Tribunal to form an opinion or make an assessment as to whether reinstatement is "appropriate" having regard to all of the circumstances advanced to support reinstatement. In such a context, the word "appropriate" connotes two aspects: fitness and propriety. That is, in order to be "appropriate", something must be both suited to the particular circumstances as well as sensible, right and proper. In Mitchell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 333 at 346, it was said by Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ that:
The phrase "considers … appropriate" indicates the striking of a balance between relevant considerations so as to provide the outcome which is fit and proper.
[30] Relevantly for present purposes, the use of the word "appropriate" requires the Tribunal to make an assessment of all of the matters that are advanced to support reinstatement. If more is raised on an application to reinstate than the single issue as to whether the applicant was notified of the scheduled hearing, then the Tribunal could not properly form a view as to whether reinstatement was appropriate by confining consideration to the facts concerning notification.
32 I do not accept the appellant's submission that the operation of s 362B should be understood to be limited to circumstances in which the application may be described as unmeritorious or where the applicant is no longer actively pursuing his or her application. Under s 362B(1C), the Tribunal may only reinstate the application if it considers it appropriate to do so. If the Tribunal does not consider it appropriate to reinstate the application, then it is required to confirm the decision to dismiss the application.
33 In the present case the Tribunal considered the applicant's statutory declaration and medical certificate. Its reasons for decision show that it engaged in an active intellectual process in deciding whether, in light of that material, it was appropriate to reinstate the application for review. The Tribunal placed some weight on the deficiencies in the medical certificate which indicated that the applicant was unfit to attend work but not that he was unfit to attend his hearing before the Tribunal. Reasonable minds might differ as to whether those deficiencies warranted a dismissal of the reinstatement application. But that does not make the Tribunal's decision unreasonable in the relevant sense.
34 In my opinion the Tribunal's decision to confirm the dismissal of the application cannot be characterised as arbitrary, capricious, plainly unjust, or as lacking in any evident or intelligible justification. Nor can the Tribunal's decision be said to involve an exercise of the relevant power for reasons that are inconsistent with the purpose for which the power was conferred.
35 In my opinion the primary judge was correct to reject Mr Kumar's contention that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable.