57 On both the recollection of the appellant and the recollection of Sergeant Taylor, the Justice drew particular attention to the seriousness of the offences in Australia as compared with the manner in which such offences are apparently treated in Holland. That factor seems to have been important in the decision-making of the Justice. It is unclear, on the basis of what the Justice decided, whether she properly considered each of the preconditions or criteria specified in s 45(1). For example, it is unclear whether the Justice considered whether the appellant is unlikely to commit such an offence again; or whether she was satisfied about that criterion, but did not regard the offences as "trivial". There is some reason to think, having regard to her references to the apparent seriousness of each of these offences in Australia, compared with Holland, that the Justice, in fact, considered that each offence was not trivial. If the Justice did so determine, and that was the purport of her sentencing comments, then there is no evidence to show that she went on to consider whether the previous good character of the offender was established. On the face of it, if the Justice did consider that the offender is unlikely to commit such offences again, but that the offences were not trivial, she would need to have further considered the previous good character of the offender. Given the evidence that the appellant was of previous good character, s 45(1)(b)(ii) would appear to have been satisfied in this case. That would then mean that the discretion as to whether or not the offender should be relieved immediately of the adverse effect that the conviction might have on the offender, should then have been addressed. There is, though, no evidence before me from the sentencing remarks of the Justice to suggest that she addressed these discretionary factors in the manner suggested by R v Tognini, or at all.