The language in which these conditions are expressed is that of Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre [3] . For his statement of the first condition, his Lordship relied upon the decision in Liverpool, Brazil, and River Plate Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Benham ("The Halley") [4] , although (it may be remarked) in that case the Privy Council decided that the defendant was not liable in England for an act done abroad by another person, not because of the character of the act according to English law, but because the person who did it was not one for whose defaults the defendant was responsible according to English law. At least the first condition is free from ambiguity. The second is not. It was interpreted by a Court of Appeal consisting of Lopes and Rigby L.JJ. in Machado v. Fontes [5] as meaning that the act complained of must not have been "innocent" in the country where it was done. Their Lordships held that if the act was contrary in any respect to the law of that country, then, although it gave rise to no civil liability there, it was not "justifiable" there, and the second condition was therefore fulfilled. No previous decision had gone so far. The statement that the act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done was framed by Willes J. for the purposes of a judgment directed to the effect to be conceded in an action in England to a statute of indemnity, which had been passed in the country where the act was committed and which had the effect of curing retrospectively the wrongfulness of the act in that country. The statement of the condition does not in terms deny that the act complained of must be of a character which attracts civil liability in the country where it was done; and it would be difficult to reconcile such a denial with the principle which Willes J. had previously stated [1] , that "the civil liability arising out of a wrong derives its birth from the law of the place, and its character is determined by that law". The learned Lords Justices in Machado v. Fontes [2] relied also upon the judgments in "The M. Moxham" [3] , which was the converse of "The Halley" [4] , in the sense that the question was whether liability for an act of negligence in another country could be imposed in England upon a person who, according to the law of that other country, was not responsible for the fault of the person who did the act, and it was decided that it could not. The judgments fall short of supporting the doctrine of Machado v. Fontes [2] . That case has been dissented from in Naftalin v. London Midland and Scottish Railway Co. [5] , and has been much criticized by text writers. (See further, M'Elroy v. M'Allister [6] .) Its correctness was questioned and left undecided by the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Parent [7] . In the judgment of Cussen J. in Varawa v. Howard Smith Co. Ltd. [No. 2] [8] will be found a critical analysis of the case and of the authorities which it purported to apply. It seems clear that the last word has not been said on the subject, and it may be the true view that an act done in another country should be held to be an actionable wrong in Victoria if, first, it was of such a character that it would have been actionable if it had been committed in Victoria, and, secondly, it was such as to give rise to a civil liability by the law of the place where it was done. Such a rule would appear to be consonant with all the English decisions before Machado v. Fontes [2] and with the later Privy Council decisions. It may be added that, however the rule should be stated, courts applying the English rules of private international law do not accept the theory propounded by Holmes J. in Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co. [9] (see also New York Central Railroad Co. v. Chisholm [1] ), when he said: - "The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation, but equally determines its extent." English law as the lex fori enforces an obligation of its own creation in respect of an act done in another country which would be a tort if done in England, but refrains from doing so unless the act has a particular character according to the lex loci actus. Uncertainty exists only as to what that character must be.