(iii) a notice dated 31 July 2002 detailing amounts of $29,427 for the October-December 2001 quarter and $18,124 for the January-March 2002 quarter.
15 On 6 August 2002 an order was made that Waste Recyclers Pty Ltd be wound up.
16 On 15 August 2002 the Commissioner commenced proceedings in the District Court, claiming from the Messrs Kolistasis $90,145.93, being the amounts of $31,308, $51,321 and $41,783 less $34,266.07 received from Waste Recyclers Pty Ltd.
17 The facts as to Gusdell Pty Ltd were materially the same. It was required to remit deductions monthly. Two notices were served detailing unpaid amounts. A third notice was served detailing further unpaid amounts. Gusdell Pty Ltd went into administration within 14 days of service of the last-mentioned notice. The Commissioner commenced proceedings claiming the amounts in the earlier notices less payment received from the company.
18 Hence the question for decision. Penalties were payable by the directors. They became liable, pursuant to s 222AOC, when the respective companies did not remit the PAYG deductions on or before the quarterly or monthly due dates and none of the events in s 222AOB(1)(b), (c) or (d) occurred. Section 222AOB was later complied with, in that Waste Recyclers Pty Ltd went into liquidation and Gusdell Pty Ltd went into administration. The Commissioner accepted that the penalties the amounts of which were detailed in the notices served within the preceding 14 days were remitted. The directors contended that the operation of s 222AOG was such that all penalties were remitted.
19 There is no doubt that there could be compliance with s 222AOB even after the due date. The directors submitted that, on the plain words of s 222AOG, compliance within fourteen days after service of the third notices remitted all penalties payable by them. They said that compliance with s 222AOB was not tied to any particular notice and that, the Act being relevantly taxing and penal, the plain words should be given effect. And they said that this operation of s 222AOG gave effect to the purpose of Division 9 as set out in s 222ANA, because the Commissioner should act promptly to recover the amount of unremitted deductions, could himself take action to wind up a defaulting company and by Division 8 of the Act had been given enhanced ability to initiate recovery action, and could not complain if he chose to give another notice and thereby brought a director's liability to an end. The purpose of the Division was given effect because the director remained under the incentive to bring about compliance with s 222AOB, so it was submitted, even if there was the prospect of remission pursuant to s 222AOG at a later time, in particular because the director could not be sure that a notice under s 222AOE would be served whereby the director could take advantage of the operation of s 222AOG by bringing about compliance with s 222AOB.
20 Although the directors shrank from it, it should be noted that giving entirely literal effect to s 222AOG would arguably mean that there was remission of a penalty even if the notice given by the Commissioner was unrelated to the company in question. I certainly do not rest my conclusion on this. Despite the attractive arguments presented by Mr Ogborne on behalf of the directors, I do not think that their submission should be accepted.
21 Section 222AOC gave rise to discrete penalties with respect to each of the quarters or months and its due date, see Forsyth v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2004] NSWCA 474 at [49] - [53]. In that case it was unsuccessfully argued that a notice under s222AOC was invalid because it detailed the unpaid amounts for two months and omitted the unpaid amounts for earlier months. Spigelman CJ, with whom Gzell J and I agreed, said at [49] -
"The statutory duty to pay arises anew each month with respect to the total of the deductions made in the previous month. Each such liability is discrete and can be the subject of a separate notice or, as in the present case, a notice for more than one month."
22 The notices have been described as notices before action, see Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Woodhams (2000) 199 CLR 370 at [16], [19], [34]; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v McArdle [2003] QCA 282 at [14] - [15]; Forsyth v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation at [41] - [42]). A notice not create or change a director's liability. As earlier noted, more than one quarter or month could be dealt with in the one notice, provided the discrete unpaid amounts were detailed, see Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Gruber (1998) 43 NSWLR 271 at 274. In Subdivision B a penalty was a liability for deductions which were not remitted on or before a particular due date, and in the present case there were a number of discrete penalties.
23 In my opinion, s 222AOG applied distributively, to each penalty and notice detailing the unpaid amount. Compliance with s 222AOB brought remittal of each penalty in respect of which notice had not been given and of any penalty in respect of which notice had been given in the preceding fourteen days. As applied to the directors' penalties, notices had been given in respect of the unpaid amounts claimed by the Commissioner in the proceedings, but more than fourteen days before liquidation or administration. Hence there was no remission of the penalties detailed in those earlier notices.
24 This seems to me to follow from the scheme of Division 9 with its provision for discrete liabilities. It is also, in my opinion, reflected in the notice for which s 222AOE provided. By s 222AOE, the notice had to state that the person was liable to pay to the Commissioner by way of penalty "an amount equal to that unpaid amount, but that the penalty will be remitted if … ". The unpaid amount was the unpaid amount of the particular penalty the subject of the notice or, if the notice covered more than one penalty, the penalties the subject of the notice. The notice referred to remission only of the particular penalty or penalties, not of other penalties which may have been the subject of earlier notices.
25 The operation of s 222AOG for which the directors contended did not to my mind give effect to the purposes of Division 9. There is no reason why service of a notice in respect of the amount of later unremitted deductions, and no more, should trigger irrecoverability of the amounts of earlier unremitted deductions. In saying this I stress the words "and no more", as the position could well be different if a notice were served which took up and repeated the unpaid amount or amounts of penalties the subject of earlier notices. If service of a notice had this operation, the Commissioner would be in a very difficult position. By giving notice before action to recover the amount of later unremitted deductions, he would enable a director to bring to an end liability for the amounts of earlier unremitted deductions. I do not think that is consistent with the scheme to be discerned in Subdivision B, by which a director incurs a discrete liability, cannot be sued without a statutory notice detailing the liability, and has a last chance to negate that discrete liability.
26 In this connection it could be said that, where under s 222AOG all penalties payable were remitted if there was compliance with s 222AOB at a time when the Commissioner had not given the director notices under s 222AOE in relation to those penalties, the provision should have a similar effect if there was timely compliance after a notice had been given following earlier notices. The answer to that, it seems to me, is that the purpose of a notice was to give the director the last chance to negate the discrete liability. If the director had been given that chance by earlier notices and had not taken it, it seems to me that the legislature intended that the director should remain liable, and that the penalty would not be remitted because the director took the last chance to negate the discrete liability in relation to the subsequent notice.
27 In my opinion, therefore, the directors' position cannot be accepted. In order that the question be authoritatively decided, I consider that there should be leave to appeal, but the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
28 I therefore propose the orders in each of the applications -
1. Grant leave to appeal;