Sentencing principles
17The purpose for which a sentence is to be imposed is reflected in s 3A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (the CSP Act). It provides as follows:
"3A Purposes of sentencing
The purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows:
(a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence,
(b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences,
(c) to protect the community from the offender,
(d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender,
(e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions,
(f) to denounce the conduct of the offender,
(g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community."
As will become apparent, a number of those purposes are relevant in the present matter.
18The sentence of the Court is a public denunciation of the conduct of the offender. It must ensure that the offender is held accountable for his or her actions and is adequately punished. It should be sufficient to deter the offender from committing a similar offence in the future. The sentence needs to operate as a powerful factor in preventing the commission of similar offences in the future by persons who might be tempted to do so by the prospect that, if their unlawful conduct is detected, only light punishment will be imposed.
19It is also necessary to recognise a further essential principle of sentencing. That principle requires that the sentence imposed by the Court must both reflect and be proportionate to the objective circumstances of the offence and the personal or subjective circumstances of the defendant.
20The objective gravity or seriousness of the offence as charged is the primary factor to consider when determining an appropriate sentence. It fixes both the upper and lower limits of proportionate punishment. The upper limit fixes the sentence which must not be exceeded, in as much as it can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the offence, considered in light of its objective circumstances (Veen v The Queen (No 2) [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465). It also fixes the lower limit because subjective factors, while necessary to be considered, ought not produce a sentence that fails to reflect the objective gravity or seriousness of the offence.
21In determining the objective gravity of the offence, the matters to which regard may be had include the nature of the offence, the maximum penalty for the offence, the harm caused to the environment by commission of the offence, the state of mind of the offender in committing the offence, the offender's reasons for committing the offence, foreseeable risk of harm to the environment by commission of the offence and the practical measures to avoid the harm as well as the offender's control over those causes. These matters, as well as other considerations, are identified both in s 241 of the POEO Act and also by s 21A of the CSP Act. Indeed, s 241 of the POEO Act identifies those matters that must be considered when determining the penalty for an offence against that Act, at least those matters that are of relevance to the commission of the particular offence.
22The first of those matters is the extent of harm caused or likely to be caused to the environment by the commission of the offence (s 241(1)(a)). In the present case there is no evidence of actual harm. Nonetheless, the potential for harm for any offence against s 143 hardly calls for detailed exploration. The statutory controls directed to waste disposal are themselves a recognition of the potential for harm. So much more is that potential likely to be realised when the material in question, as in the present case, contains asbestos, notorious for its impacts or potential impacts on human health and the environment. That potential for harm must be recognised in any penalty imposed even if it be the case that the existence of asbestos in the material that the defendant placed around the streets in the Hurstville area was not appreciated by him.
23A further element that must be considered when determining penalty is the foreseeability of harm or likely harm by reason of the statutory breach (s 241(1)(c)). Depositing any waste in the manner planned and undertaken by the defendant carries with it a reasonable foreseeability of harm. That is, the transporting and depositing of material in the manner earlier described, involving placement of the material adjacent to a public road, carries with it the obvious foreseeability of potential harm by members of the public being exposed to that material. Further, leaving that waste where, apart from the Phillip Street location, there was no objective basis for the defendant to believe that the cartons left by him by the roadside would be collected, is a circumstance demonstrating that harm was reasonably foreseeable.
24As I have earlier noted, the state of mind of the defendant responsible for the commission of an offence of this kind is important to be considered. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the depositing of cartons containing the broken fibrous cement cladding was contrary to law. He knew that the material was not of a kind that would be collected by the prosecutor as part of its domestic waste clean-up service. So much is apparent from the internet interrogation that he had made of the prosecutor's website. His action in transporting the subject material and making selected deposits in different locations confirms that he knew his conduct was wrong. The submission made on his behalf by Mr Bouzanis accepted that this was so. At the very least, the only explanation for his actions is that they were undertaken to avoid the expense of disposing of the material in a proper manner.
25While an offence against s 143 of the POEO Act is a strict liability offence, thereby eliminating mens rea as a necessary element of that offence, the state of mind of an offender at the time of the offence can have the effect of increasing its seriousness. A strict liability offence that is committed intentionally will be objectively more serious than one not so committed. For reasons already articulated, the defendant's conduct in disposing of waste on each of the four occasions that are the subject of the charges against him was premeditated in the sense that he considered beforehand how he would package the waste, the means by which he would transport it and he determined that it would be deposited in a public place knowing that the location to which the waste was taken was neither suitable nor permitted for the depositing of that waste.
26The fact that the action of the defendant was deliberate and known to be wrong increases the seriousness of the offence. In assessing his state of mind however, I accept that the defendant was not aware that the material contained asbestos.
27Taking account all of these matters, I consider that the offence was at the upper end of the lower range of objective seriousness. In making this assessment, I also take into account the fact that the total volume of the material transported and deposited by the roadside at the sites earlier identified was relatively small.