PRINCIPLES
24 Fiduciary duties arise from either of two sources that frequently overlap, namely agency or a relationship of ascendency or influence by one party over another and dependence or trust on the part of that other; but whatever be the source of the duty, it is necessary to identify the subject matter over which the fiduciary obligations extend, and it is erroneous to regard the duty owed by a fiduciary to his beneficiary as attaching to every aspect of the fiduciary's conduct however irrelevant the conduct may be to the agency or relationship that is the source of the duty: Breen v Williams (1996) 186 CLR 71 at 82 per Brennan CJ.
25 In the same case at 92 Dawson and Toohey JJ observed that the law has not as yet been able to formulate any precise or comprehensive definition of the circumstances in which a person is constituted a fiduciary in his or her relations, with another, although there are accepted fiduciary relationships such as trustee and beneficiary, agent and principal, solicitor and client, etc which may be characterised as relations of trust and confidence. Their Honours quoted what Mason J (as he then was) said in Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 96 - 7:
"The critical feature of these relationships is that the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf or in the interest of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interest of that other person in a legal or practical sense. The relationship between the parties is therefore one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position. The expressions "for", "on behalf of", and "in the interests of" signify that the fiduciary act in a representative character in the exercise of his responsibility".
26 Gaudron and McHugh JJ in the same case at 107 identified various circumstances which point towards, but do not determine, the existence of a fiduciary relationship, including a relationship of confidence, inequality of bargaining power, an undertaking by one party of perform a task or fulfil a duty in the interests of another, the scope for one party to unilaterally exercise a discretion or power which may affect the rights or interests of another and a dependency or vulnerability on the part of one party that causes that party to rely upon the other.
27 Consequently, any gifts or transactions involving a person in a fiduciary position to another e.g. trustee and beneficiary, agent and principal, doctor and patient, solicitor and client, etc will be the subject of scrutiny to ensure that the fiduciary has not obtained a benefit as a result of the fiduciary relationship; and this is consistent with the manner in which fiduciary duties and their breach are dealt with in the standard equity textbooks such as Meagher, Gummow and Lehane: Equity Doctrines and Remedies, 3rd ed chapter 5 [501] - [555], Parkinson: Principles of Equity (2003) at 339-392. Jordan: Chapters in Equity at 112-129.
28 As Mason J pointed out in the passage quoted above from the Hospital Products case, the critical feature is, that the fiduciary act for, or on behalf of, or in the interests of, another person in the exercise of a power or discretion affecting the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense.
29 Although the relationship of guardian and ward is a fiduciary relationship: Clay v Clay [2001] HCA 9, 202 CLR 410, that does not define the extent of the fiduciary's duties. The authorities indicate that such duties are duties not to be in a position of conflict, and not to obtain any unauthorised benefit from the relationship, or from the dependence of one upon the other. A parent or guardian does not act on behalf of, or exercise a power or discretion affecting the interests of, a child or ward in a legal or practical sense, except when he or she deals with assets or property on behalf of such person, and in particular, he or she does not exercise a power or discretion affecting the interests of that other person when failing to provide proper care, nurture or supervision of the child or ward.
30 Moreover, the duties imposed on a fiduciary are proscriptive (ie negative - not to do certain things) and are not prescriptive (requiring positive action). As Gaudron and McHugh JJ said in Breen v Williams at 113:
"In this country, fiduciary obligations arise because the person has come under an obligation to act in another's interest. As a result, equity imposes on the fiduciary proscriptive obligations - not to obtain any unauthorised benefit from the relationship and not to be in a position of conflict. If these obligations are breached, the fiduciary must account for any profits and make good any loses arising from the breach. But the law of this country does not otherwise impose positive legal duties on the fiduciary to act in the interess of the person to whom the duty is owed".
31 The judgment of Dawson and Toohey JJ at 93 is to the same effect, although expressed in different terms.
32 In that case the Court rejected the Canadian decision in McInerney v MacDonald [1992] 2 SCR 138, 93 DLR (4th) 415 where it had been held that the relationship of doctor and patient was a fiduciary one which imposed on the doctor the positive duty of granting the patient access to the doctor's notes relating to the patient. This principle that fiduciary duties are proscriptive and not prescriptive was affirmed in Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in Liq) [2001] HCA 31, 207 CLR 165 at [74], [127], Kirby J conceding that his views to the contrary expressed when sitting on the Court of Appeal in Breen v Williams (1994) 35 NSWLR 522 had been effectively overruled by the High Court in that case.
33 In Pilmer's case the High Court also draw attention to the need to distinguish between contractual and tortious duties on the one hand, and liability as a fiduciary on the other hand; and held that liability under the former did not constitute liability as a fiduciary, the majority at [71] quoting what had been said by McLachlin J, (as she then was) and Sopinka J of the Supreme Court of Canada in Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226 at 272 and 312 respectively.