Consideration
23 In fixing the quantum and terms of security I must properly case manage these complex proceedings which are in the midst of a pre-trial timetable. I must balance the risk of injustice to the respondents in having no real capacity to recover from the applicants the cost of successfully defending the proceedings, against the risk or likelihood of stultification if security is set unfairly or too high.
24 As the order for security necessarily involves contributions from group members to a fund, it must be fixed in an overall amount which will require the group members to make a real but not oppressive contribution. My evaluation of the risk of stultification must be a broad one, and cannot descend to a detailed analysis of each group member's financial characteristics, but it nevertheless remains a difficult task. While there is evidence, as the Full Court found, that a not insignificant number of the known group members have the capacity to advance security, there remains a quite incomplete picture as to the ability and/or willingness of all group members to make the required contribution. The information deficit includes:
(a) gaps in the evidence as to the financial capacity of many the 409 known group members to contribute to security, and the fact that little is known as to their willingness to contribute;
(b) that the known group members make up a small proportion only of the total possible group members; and
(c) more significant gaps in the evidence as to the financial capacity of the unidentified group members to contribute to security; and the fact that nothing is known as to their willingness to contribute.
25 The respondents seek that I fix the total quantum of security in the sum of approximately $6.58 million, and order that approximately $4.83 million be payable within 14 to 30 days. They seek a stay if this first stage payment is not made.
26 As I indicated during the hearing, the Full Court has ordered that security be provided, and I consider that, given the costs involved in these cases, the security must be substantial. If the rateable contributions per known group member are, as the respondents state, in the range of $5,101 or $12,430 (depending on whether one uses the mode method or the average method), then it may be accepted that they are unlikely to be oppressive to most known group members. My starting point is that an order for $6.58 million should be made comprised of $4.83 million security for pre-trial costs and the balance of security for the trial costs.
27 However, the amount of the contribution required to meet the total security fixed will increase if a significant number of known group members indicate an inability or unwillingness to contribute. In my view it is likely that some known group members will be financially able and willing to make such a contribution, and others will be unable or unwilling. While the evidence to which the respondents refer provides some insight into the financial position of the known group members it does not assist in indicating how many are willing to make such a contribution. It is therefore impossible to know whether the rateable contributions from each known group member in the range stated will in fact meet the $6.58 million sought. It depends on how many of the known group members agree to contribute. That is, the respondents' contention that fixing security at $6.58 million will require contributions in the range stated is based on premise that all known group members will contribute, when it cannot be known how many will.
28 Further, I do not accept the respondents' contention that the question of quantum or stultification should be determined having regard only to the financial circumstances of the identified group members. There is sense to the applicants' submission that they should be allowed to seek rateable contributions to security from the unidentified group members. If some contributions to a fund for security can be obtained from the unidentified group members the rateable contribution required from each of the known group members will be lower and more likely to be made. The risk of stultification will be reduced.
29 I also consider that there may be some unfairness within the class if only the 409 known group members are called on to make contributions to security, and the other group members have a free ride. While this unfairness may eventuate in any event because the unidentified group members largely refuse to contribute, it is better that the risk of unfairness be addressed as far as possible.
30 However, as the Full Court decision indicates, if the unidentified group members largely refuse to contribute to security, then the quantum of security will fall to be determined by reference to the capacity and willingness to contribute of the known group members. The Full Court has already found that the financial capacity of the known group members justifies an order for some security.
31 Contrary to the respondents' submissions, I consider that evidence from both known and unidentified group members as to their willingness to make a contribution may be of assistance in deciding the application. In this regard the respondents point to the observations of Jessup J in Madgwick at [160] who held that the question of ability to provide security turns on an objective assessment of the group members' financial circumstances, rather than on a subjective assessment of what they say they can afford. They argue that the only evidence that could be of potential significance to my decision to fix security would be objective evidence of each group member's assets and liabilities, akin to a Statement of Financial Affairs.
32 However, the majority in Madgwick took a different view at [82]-[83]. Their Honours considered that a group member's unwillingness to contribute is a relevant factor in fixing security, although the reasonableness of such unwillingness must be considered in determining what is fair in resolving the competing interests. In fixing security I consider that there is some point to knowing whether group members are prepared to contribute, although an unreasonable refusal to contribute is likely to be given little weight in the balance.
33 In all the circumstances I consider it appropriate that the applicants seek rateable contributions from as many group members as are prepared to contribute, so as to minimise the risk of stultification of the proceedings.
34 If the applicants are to request group members to make rateable contributions to security it is important they do so at a point when security has either been fixed or otherwise indicated by the Court. To maximise the prospect that the group members understand the significance of the applicants' request, they should be informed of the quantum of security ordered (or to be ordered), its staging, and the likelihood that the proceedings will be stayed if security is not met. The applicants submit, and I accept, that if the quantum of security is fixed at present this should be subject to liberty to apply for variation of the amount. This is so because it may eventuate that the Court is asked to consider reducing security to a lesser amount because a large number of group members have refused to contribute and the required contribution of the remaining group members would otherwise be oppressive.
35 I accept that the respondents have raised some legitimate concerns regarding the expense, delay, and inconvenience suffered because of the applicants' failures to put on the evidence of stultification in a timely manner. The applicants put on no evidence of stultification until I invited such evidence on the first day of the initial hearing, and then put on sample evidence that the Full Court held was insufficient. The respondents now criticise the applicants' failure to take steps to gather evidence of the capacity and willingness of the known group members between the date of the Full Court decision and the hearing before me. They argue that this is another reason to reject the approach for which the applicants contend.
36 While this submission has some merit, I take into account that the applicants' representatives were in somewhat uncharted waters as to the evidence that should be adduced in relation to the group members' capacity and willingness to contribute in an application for security in class actions like these. As I said in my earlier judgement, the parties were unable to take me to any reported decision in which security for costs has been ordered in comparable circumstances. Given the undeveloped state of the authorities regarding security for costs from group members in open class actions the applicants' difficulty is more understandable.
37 Now that the Full Court has given some guidance on this question, I consider that the applicants should be given the opportunity to adduce appropriate evidence. In reaching this view I am partly informed by the representative nature of the proceedings. The unidentified group members stand to benefit from the class actions, but they have no control over the conduct of the proceedings or over the applicants' legal representatives. Even if it was established that there was a significant failure on the part of the applicants' representatives, I should be careful about whether that failure has the effect of stultifying the unidentified group members' claims.
38 I am concerned about further delay in resolving the application for security and the orders I propose should not lead to lengthy delay in the scheme of things. In fact, the most recent cause of delay arises from the Willmott Respondents refusal to allow the applicants access to the grower registers and information they requested in their letter dated 8 July 2013.
39 I presently intend to make orders in the form set out below. However, as these have not been the subject of discussion with the parties I will hear from the parties as to the form of the orders in a case management conference. The orders I propose are as follows:
1. I direct that the solicitors for the applicants write to each of the unidentified group members by [insert date] informing them that:
(a) the Court has directed that the solicitors advise each such group member that the Court intends to fix security for costs to be paid by the applicants and group members in the sum of $6.58 million;
(b) the Court intends to order that the security be paid in three stages, namely $2.83 million by 30 September 2013, $2 million by 27 January 2014, with the remaining $1.75 million paid 14 days before trial (presently fixed for 2 June 2014).
(c) the $6.58 million security the Court intends to order has been set by reference to the likely financial capacity of the group members who stand to benefit from the proceedings if successful;
(d) the Court has directed that the solicitors be permitted to contact each such group member to:
(i) request their response by [say 14 days after letter] as to whether they are prepared to make a specified contribution to a fund for security for costs, such contribution to be calculated rateably by reference to their investment in the relevant managed investment schemes; and
(ii) request that any group member who refuses to make a contribution to a fund for security for costs advise the reason for that refusal and, if the refusal is based on an asserted inability to make the contribution, to request that they provide some evidence of that inability.
(e) the solicitors inform the group member that if the security for costs ordered is not paid, it is likely that the Court will stay the proceedings.
2. Upon receipt and collation of the responses of the unidentified group members by the solicitors for the applicant, I direct the solicitors to write to each of the known group members by [say 10 days after the date for receipt of responses from the unidentified group members] informing them of the same matters as set out in order 1(a)-(e) and requiring their response in 14 days.
3. That the application for security be listed for directions approximately 14 days after the date set for the receipt of responses from the known group members.
4. Liberty to apply.
40 It may be appropriate for the applicants, in setting out the rateable contribution to be sought from each group member, to approach that task with an acceptance that some percentage of those group members will be unable or unwilling to contribute to security. In taking account of that likelihood they may choose to increase the rateable contribution to be sought from the other group members.