peal Panel
Date of Decision: 13 March 2024
Before: Member Marshal Douglas, Dr Ash Takyar, and Dr Graham Blom
File Number(s): M2-4209/20
[2]
JUDGMENT
On 13 June 2024, the plaintiff filed a summons for judicial review of a decision dated 13 March 2024, given by an Appeal Panel appointed under the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) (the 1998 Act).
The orders sought are pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).
The first defendant was the plaintiff's employer at the time she was injured. The second defendant is the President of the Personal Injury Commission of New South Wales. The third defendant is made up of the members of the Appeal Panel.
The second and third defendants have filed submitting appearances, save as to costs.
The summons is supported by an affidavit of Mr Grant Watson affirmed on 15 July 2024. He is the plaintiff's solicitor. His affidavit annexes the Statement of Reasons given by the Appeal Panel together with the material that was before the Appeal Panel.
The principles for judicial review were set out by the High Court in Plaintiff M64-2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173; [2015] HCA 50 at [23]-[25]:
"It is necessary to make some preliminary observations in relation to the constraints within which the plaintiff's challenge to the validity of the Delegate's decision falls to be determined. These constraints are aspects of the scope of judicial review of administrative action, which is confined to the legality of the Delegate's decision. In particular, judicial review is concerned with whether the Delegate's decision was one which he was authorised to make; it is not:
'an appellate procedure enabling either a general review of the … decision … or a substitution of the … decision which the … court thinks should have been made.'
First, the burden is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that the Delegate's decision was affected by jurisdictional error. The plaintiff must show that the approach adopted by the Delegate 'manifest[ed] a legally erroneous view as to what it was about which [he] needed to be satisfied,' so that the Delegate lacked legal authority to make the decision that was made.
It is well settled that in the context of administrative decision-making, the court is not astute to discern error in a statement by an administrative officer which was not, and was not intended to be, a statement of reasons for a decision that is a broad administrative evaluation rather than a judicial decision. It is possible that error of law on the part of the Delegate might be demonstrated by inference from what the Delegate said by way of explanation of his decision; but it must be borne in mind that the Delegate was not duty-bound to give reasons for his decision, and so it is difficult to draw an inference that the decision has been attended by an error of law from what has not been said by the Delegate. Further, 'jurisdictional error may include ignoring relevant material in a way that affects the exercise of a power;' but here the plaintiff does not show that relevant material was ignored simply by pointing out that it was not mentioned by the Delegate, who was not obliged to give comprehensive reasons for his decision. Further, the Delegate's letter is 'not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed'."
It is also important to bear in mind these comments by Basten AJA in Jarvis v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2022] NSWCA 232 at [41]:
"There is no appeal from the decision of the review panel, but judicial review is available in the Supreme Court pursuant to s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Such a review is limited to jurisdictional error and error of law on the face of the record. The record, it may be accepted, includes the reasons given by the review panel for its ultimate determination, in accordance with s 69(4). The Supreme Court has no power to intervene on any other basis; its views of the merits of the claim are irrelevant."
As to "the record", Basten AJ very recently stated in Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice v Virtue [2024] NSWSC 1380, at [41]:
"However, to address errors of law on the face of the record, it is necessary to identify the scope of the record. Under general law principles, the 'record' was constituted by any document initiating a process before a court or tribunal, together with the record of the decision. Unless incorporated by reference, the decision did not include the reasons given for the decision. However, pursuant to s 69(4) of the Supreme Court Act, the record now includes the reasons expressed by a court or tribunal for its ultimate determination."
Specifically in relation to medical panels, I was referred to this passage from the High Court decision in Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480; [2013] HCA 43, at [47]:
"The function of a Medical Panel is to form and to give its own opinion on the medical question referred for its opinion. In performing that function, the Medical Panel is doubtless obliged to observe procedural fairness, so as to give an opportunity for parties to the underlying question or matter who will be affected by the opinion to supply the Medical Panel with material which may be relevant to the formation of the opinion and to make submissions to the Medical Panel on the basis of that material. The material supplied may include the opinions of other medical practitioners, and submissions to the Medical Panel may seek to persuade the Medical Panel to adopt reasoning or conclusions expressed in those opinions. The Medical Panel may choose in a particular case to place weight on a medical opinion supplied to it in forming and giving its own opinion. It goes too far, however, to conceive of the function of the Panel as being either to decide a dispute or to make up its mind by reference to competing contentions or competing medical opinions. The function of a Medical Panel is neither arbitral nor adjudicative: it is neither to choose between competing arguments, nor to opine on the correctness of other opinions on that medical question. The function is in every case to form and to give its own opinion on the medical question referred to it by applying its own medical experience and its own medical expertise."
Finally, in respect of governing principles, I was taken to Ballas v Department of Education (State of NSW) [2020] NSWCA 86, in particular at [93]-[94]:
"Whilst it is no doubt correct that an AMS must exercise a degree of clinical judgment in assigning a class of seriousness to each area which he or she is required to address in completing a medical assessment, the characterisation of conduct as going to 'social and recreational activities' on the one hand, as opposed to any of the other five scales on the other hand, is not a matter of discretion.
Even if there may, as a matter of English language, be some overlap between some of the scales or categories of functional impairment, for the purposes of the WPI assessment exercise, particular conduct will fit within one or other of the scales. This calls for the correct characterisation of the conduct, ie whether it goes to 'self care and personal hygiene', 'social and recreational activities', 'travel', 'social functioning (relationships)', 'concentration, persistence and pace' or 'employability'. This does not involve an exercise of discretion. If conduct is wrongly assigned to one scale, when it should have been assigned to another, this will result in the AMS taking into account an irrelevant consideration in the context of assigning a class to each of the distinct scales. This will inevitably bear upon the calculation of the WPI which is critical for an injured worker's entitlement to compensation."
[3]
Background
The plaintiff was born in 1959. She now lives in Queensland. Around 2014 she completed a certificate in real estate. In February 2018, after working in various real estate jobs, the plaintiff was employed as a holiday property manager for the first defendant. The reasons of the Appeal Panel described her as having been employed as a "hospitality manager". This is obviously wrong although the mistake is of little consequence.
In November 2018, the plaintiff was subjected to yelling and verbal abuse from her employer's sales manager. The incident seems to have arisen from the plaintiff apparently contradicting orders that had been given to a cleaner in respect of moving barbed wire and other material from a property. The plaintiff had told the cleaner not to move the material because she thought the task was more appropriate to a handyman than a cleaner.
According to the plaintiff the sales manager abused her "in an angry and dramatic fashion" in the office in front of other people. The plaintiff left the office and told her boss what had happened. Her boss responded with a message stating: "when you walked out was that your resignation?". The plaintiff replied "no, it was not".
After the incident the plaintiff felt that, in the office, "the tension was palpable". She felt ostracised by the sales manager and by her boss. They treated her "as a less than human". The plaintiff was subjected to unseemly conduct by the sales manager. She was not supported by the owner.
By February 2019, the plaintiff had been threatened "with the sack" for no given reason. The plaintiff consulted a lawyer and left work in February 2019. She began psychological treatment including antidepressant medication. She lost her appetite and consequently she lost weight. She became "depressed, hopeless, and socially withdrawn."
The plaintiff, through her lawyers, made a workers compensation claim arising from her asserted psychological injury. The claim was accepted by the relevant insurer. The plaintiff then made a claim for lump sum compensation under s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW).
In 2020 the plaintiff, and her husband, moved to Queensland, for a "fresh start". Unfortunately, the fresh start did not eventuate, and the plaintiff continued to suffer from a diminished mental health. She could not concentrate, was anxious in social settings and generally lost interest in normal activities.
The plaintiff's solicitors referred her to a consultant psychiatrist, Dr Allan, for a medico-legal opinion. Dr Allan saw the plaintiff on 11 March 2020 and produced a report dated 13 March 2020. Dr Allan diagnosed an "Adjustment Disorder with depressed and anxious mood as per the DSM 5." He thought that "Employment was the whole contributing factor to Ms Keelan's injury."
Dr Allan assessed the plaintiff's Whole Person Impairment (WPI), as dictated by the NSW workers compensation guidelines for the evaluation of permanent impairment (4th edition, reissued 1 March 2021), and arrived at a figure of 15%. The assessment involves the application of the Psychiatric Impairment Rating Scale (PIRS).
The employer's insurer did not accept the 15% assessment and referred the plaintiff for an assessment by Dr Anand, also a psychiatrist, which occurred on 19 June 2020. In his report of 24 June 2020, Dr Anand concluded that the plaintiff had a WPI of 7%.
The contrast between the two medical opinions led to the referral of the plaintiff to a Medical Assessor, Prof Glozier. On 28 September 2020 Prof Glozier issued a Medical Assessment Certificate stating that the plaintiff's WPI was 7%.
On 6 October 2020, the plaintiff filed an Election to Discontinue Proceedings. This was a reaction to Prof Glozier's assessment.
The plaintiff however continued to suffer mental health problems and in fact her condition deteriorated. This led to her solicitors again referring her to Dr Allan whom she saw on 24 August 2022. In his report of the same date Dr Allan came to a WPI assessment of 19%.
Dr Allan's second assessment led the plaintiff to re-activate her claim for lump sum compensation. On 28 February 2023, the plaintiff appealed against the decision of the Medical Assessor (Prof Glozier) pursuant to s 327 of the 1998 Act. The matter was then referred back to Prof Glozier under s 327(6).
Prof Glozier examined the plaintiff remotely on 25 October 2023, and then, on 1 November 2023, issued another Medical Assessment Certificate stating the plaintiff had a WPI of 9%.
The 9% was arrived through the application of the above-mentioned guidelines, in particular Ch 11 which relates to "Psychiatric and psychological disorders".
In brief, the assessment requires the use of a psychiatric rating scale (Ch 11.11). The assessor decides on a score based on the tables (Tables 11.1 to 11.6), then totals the score. Next a median score is worked out (Ch 11.4) and then an aggregate score (Ch 11.17). Finally, the assessor applies a conversion table (Table 11.7) to reach the WPI percentage. Notably a half score in the median score calculation is rounded up. Thus, a median score of 2.5 becomes a score of 3.
I have mentioned the scoring method because one of the plaintiff's submissions is that if the assessor had not made an error in the psychiatric impairment rating (Table 11.1 to 11.6) then her aggregate score would have increased and her WPI percentage, after the application of the conversion table, would have been above 15%.
Following Prof Glozier's 9% assessment, the plaintiff then lodged an appeal from Prof Glozier's assessment. The appeal was made under ss 327(3)(c) and 327(3)(d) of the 1998 Act.
On 13 March 2024, the Appeal Panel rejected the appeal and confirmed the certificate that had been issued by Prof Glozier on 1 November 2023. The reasons given by the Appeal Panel are the subject of the application for judicial review.
[4]
The plaintiff's contentions about the Appeal Panel's reasons
The complaints fall into 2 categories:
1. The Appeal Panel did not give sufficient reasons for rejecting the plaintiff's submissions. The Appeal Panel's reliance on the "presumption of regularity", in particular as to its failure to properly deal with Prof Glozier not referring to a statement by the plaintiff dated 1 December 2022, was misplaced. In relying on the presumption, essentially to find the assessor had regard to the plaintiff's statement of the plaintiff the Appeal Panel ignored a number of important facts, for example about the plaintiff's difficulties with reading and watching television.
2. The Appeal Panel did not consider errors allegedly made by the assessor in performing the PIRS assessment. In particular the assessor 'double counted' a history relating to the plaintiff playing a computer game and ignored the effect of her condition on her capacity to read.
The first defendant responded that the plaintiff's complaints were "misconceived". The Appeal Panel did "meaningfully engage" with the plaintiff's appeal and the panel was correct to "endorse" the assessor's application of the PIRS. Further, if there was any error in the assessor's certificate, the Appeal Panel correctly found the error did not make a material difference.
[5]
The presumption of regularity
The Appeal Panel used the presumption to overcome the absence of any reference by the assessor to the plaintiff's statement of 1 December 2022. The panel, at [49] said:
"The assessment a Medical Assessor makes of a workers' permanent impairment is an administrative task. Consequently there is a presumption of regularity that the Medical Assessor has attended to all matters necessary to undertake the task of assessing a workers' permanent impairment."
Reference is then made to Bojko v ICM Property Service Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 175 at [36] and to Jones v The Registrar WCC [2010] NSWSC 481 at [50].
Paragraph 36 in Bojko states:
"The worker has therefore failed to establish either ground of appeal. Both involved a hyper-critical approach to the reasons of the Panel which is contrary to authority and ignores the presumption of regularity which attends administrative action. The correct approach is that mandated by the joint judgment in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6, 185 CLR 259, 272 which approved the following statement of principle in a decision of the full Federal Court:
'… a court should not be concerned with looseness in the language nor with unhappy phrasing of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker. … the reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.'"
Paragraph 50 in Jones states:
"The second defendant clearly made a clinical examination of the plaintiff and he stated in his certificate his finding that 'the range of motion in the cervical spine was symmetrical'. There is a presumption of regularity that the AMS had performed such tests as might be required to determine whether the range of motion in the cervical spine was symmetrical or asymmetrical. The medical science the second defendant was applying was not controversial and his reasons were not required to be extensive or detailed."
I do not see any relevance of the passage from Jones to the present matter. In respect of Bojko, perhaps the Appeal Panel's reference to the plaintiff being described as a "hospitality manager" is an example of looseness of language, but that is very different to a complaint that the assessor has effectively ignored the plaintiff's updated statement. The Appeal Panel points out that an assessor "is not required to specify each individual item of the evidence on which the Medical Assessor has relied to compose the relevant history" and that the assessor refers to the documentation provided (which includes the statement). The Appeal Panel then says that it "infers that the Medical Assessor did have regard to the appellant's statement of 1 December 2022."
I have no difficulty with the Appeal Panel drawing an inference or relying on the presumption of regularity as described in Bojko. The difference here however is the nature of the task being undertaken by the Medical Assessor. He was specifically being asked to review a matter in which there had been a deterioration of the plaintiff's condition. The Medical Assessor actually found a deterioration, noting that his WPI assessment went from 7% to 9%.
A deterioration must be, if only in part, a product of an up-to-date history of the plaintiff. It is not "construing minutely" to point out that the fresh history should have been considered and analysed in examining the deterioration.
The Medical Assessor cut and pasted a good deal of the history that he had formulated in his first assessment in 2020. There may not be anything wrong in doing so, but it is the 'old' history, and the Medical Assessor was being asked to consider the 'new' history.
The vice manifests in the Medical Assessor's actual decision. For example, under 'History', the Medical Assessor states:
"In the evenings Alan will be on his tablet and phone, and she has a regular set of TV programmes she watches, starting with Bold and Beautiful, and then The Chaser. She prefers shows that she can be involved in and that challenge her, such as quiz shows, always follows the news and watches other shows that engage her cognitively."
Then under the heading 'The Facts on which the Assessment is Based', the Medical Assessor states:
"In terms of concentration, persistence and pace, she undertakes some hours of an engaging computer game, prefers to watch cognitively-demanding television shows and showed no objective cognitive difficulties or problems with the persistence and pace of the assessment today: a mild impairment."
In sharp contrast, her statement reads at [69]:
"I cannot focus properly or concentrate much on anything. I try and watch TV, but I cannot follow what is going on. I do not read much anymore. I get too distracted. I end up reading the same thing over and over."
In his first assessment the Medical Assessor records the plaintiff "has never been a reader, TV watcher, or interested in more 'cultural' activities as she is 'not a sitting around person' and 'enjoys meeting people'." "Never been a reader" is very different to "I do not read much anymore". The history given to Dr Anand on 14 April 2023 (report dated 24 April 2023) was that she had been an "avid reader". Dr Anand's report was one of the "attached documents" which, on the presumption of regularity, had been read by the Medical Assessor.
The Medical Assessor makes no mention of reading. At one level the lack of mention of reading is a minor matter because there were other indications relating to the plaintiff's ability to concentrate. But, on the other hand, submissions had been made about reading, Dr Anand referred to the plaintiff's reading, and the plaintiff's 1 December 2022 statement makes a specific point about her reading.
It might be argued that the absence of reference to the statement is of no consequence because Prof Glozier had updated the history, and also had access to, and referred to, the medical reports from Drs Allan and Anand. If the statement did not add any material fact, then the failure to refer to it might be ignored.
However, the statement does include the plaintiff's observations about her reading. In addition, the plaintiff's solicitors made specific submissions about the statement and about reading. The plaintiff had stated:
"I cannot focus properly or concentrate much on anything. I try and watch TV, but I cannot follow what is going on. I do not read much anymore. I get too easily distracted. I end up reading the same thing over and over."
The solicitors pointed out that the certificate was "silent on the topic of reading". The Appeal Panel, other than reciting the submissions about reading, simply does not deal with them.
In addition, reading is specifically mentioned as an example in the PIRS assessment guideline. In my view, the Appeal Panel's treatment of the 1 December 2022 statement is wrongly and inappropriately dealt with as an inference, or an assumption covered by the presumption of regularity.
I will put my conclusion in a different way: if the statement had contained no important information, or perhaps was no more than a written expression of the history given to Prof Glozier on 25 October 2023, then reliance on the presumption of regularity may have been adequate. However, the updated statement did contain significant extra information, especially about reading and concentration, and specific submissions had been made about the statement. The Medical Assessor should have commented on the statement. The Appeal Panel should not have ignored the assessor's error by simply placing it under the presumption of regularity.
Accordingly, I think there is an error on the face of the record. This might also be described as denial of procedural fairness to the plaintiff whose statement and written submissions have not received appropriate, if any, consideration.
I add here that the first defendant's support of the inference that the Appeal Panel draws in [50] of its reasons is an inference that must be regarded with some scepticism. The inference is said to arise from the fact that Prof Glozier had "updated the history" that he had previously obtained. But equally, it might be said, an inference could be drawn that he had not read the plaintiff's statement because in updating the history one could infer that he would have made reference to the statement.
As already noted, Prof Glozier 'cuts and pastes' large parts of the reasons behind his first certificate. His original reasons stated: "Ms Keelan's history she gave today was markedly different to that in her statement." There is no corresponding observation in relation to the latest statement. Thus, again, an inference could equally be drawn to the opposite effect to that drawn by the Appeal Panel.
Therefore, the inference drawn by the Appeal Panel is not the only reasonable inference that might be drawn from Prof Glozier's certificate.
As I have said above, I am satisfied that there are demonstrable errors in both Prof Glozier's second certificate and in the Appeal Panel's reasons. The Appeal Panel pointed out the asserted errors made by Prof Glozier, but did not deal with them. In addition to an error on the face of the record, I think my conclusions also establish jurisdictional error.
[6]
Double counting
It is now not necessary to deal with the plaintiff's submission about the completion of the PIRS process, but I will make the following comments.
The plaintiff submitted that the score given for Concentration, Persistence and Pace should have been '3', the same score as that assessed by Drs Allan and Anand.
The plaintiff submitted that watching TV should not have been included in the Concentration, Persistence and Pace category as well as in the Social and Recreational Activities category. This was a product of Ballas, in particular as seen in [93] and [94], quoted above. The plaintiff referred to the placing of computer games in two separate categories as double counting.
The defendant accepted that Ballas required a correct classification and that failure to do so was jurisdictional error. But, the defendant submitted, there was no reason why particular conduct could not correctly fall within more than one category. Thus, in this case, playing a computer game was social activity because it was played with other persons (therefore correctly in category 11.2), and it also evidenced concentration and so also fell into category 11.5.
The defendant gave the example of a person going to a knitting group. The person would be engaging in a social activity and also demonstrating concentration in performing the knitting. The difficulty with this example is that it assumes a degree of skill in knitting. The same point may be made in respect of other assumptions made by the assessor:
1. Winning a computer game was a measure of Concentration, Persistence and Pace. The assessor stated: "she undertakes some hours of an engaging computer game ..." The history was: "When she gets up, she spends a couple of hours doing a house design game. This involves decorating homes using in-game money and rewards and has a multi-player aspect to it where everyone votes on each other's decorations and decides who wins. She has occasionally won these."
2. The computer game may well be engaging. However, to assume it is engaging and that the plaintiff has described a strength by occasionally winning ignores the fact that winning is not a technical achievement, but rather a peer review with an unknown number of fellow players.
3. Under category 11.5 the assessor concluded that the plaintiff "prefers to watch cognitively-demanding television shows." The history was: "She prefers shows that she can be involved in and that challenge her, such as quiz shows, always follows the news and watches other shows that engage her cognitively." I think it falls within judicial notice to observe that the range of quiz shows on television is vast, including those that are basic or humour based to those reserved for the very intelligent. I do not think that watching and playing an unidentified quiz show is enough to elevate a cognitive ranking. I should add here that I have also made an assumption; namely that "The Chaser" referred to by the plaintiff is the ABC political satire and not The Chase quiz game show.
I do however accept that a particular activity might fall into more than one category. I agree with the defendant that Ballas is stating that the categorization must be correct, but not that a particular activity cannot fit into more than one category. As pointed out by Basten AJ in Lancaster v Foxtel Management Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 929, at [72]:
"The plaintiff's reading of Ballas would have surprising consequences. It would mean that every time a medical specialist considered under one scale an activity which a court determined properly fell under another scale, he or she committed jurisdictional error which could be the subject of review in the Supreme Court. The proposition that gambling (or running) may fall within the descriptor 'social and recreational activities' if carried out in company (whatever that might imply) but not if carried out alone, and the assessment by a medical specialist whom a court determined had failed to apply that distinction so as to render his or her determination a nullity would be a surprising consequence. It would involve reading down the term 'recreational' by reference to the generic and imprecise exemplars in the class descriptions, so as to impose a legal constraint on the valid exercise of power by the medical specialist. A similar exercise would potentially be available for each of the other scale descriptors."
However, the point being made here is more akin to that made in Quintiliani-Johns v Secretary Department of Education [2024] NSWSC 1200 where Mitchelmore J dealt with a similar circumstance in this way at [53]-[55]:
"I have set out the submissions the plaintiff advanced to the Appeal Panel about self care and personal hygiene at [38]-[39] above. Her central point was that in concluding that her impairment on this scale was properly assessed as within class 2, the medical assessor had not brought to account what she said in her August 2022 statement on that subject, or pertinent statements in her history as he had recorded it (that inference being available from the absence of any reference to those matters in his reasons in the PIRS table). The plaintiff submitted to the Appeal Panel that on all of the material before the medical assessor that was relevant to this category, she would properly be assessed as class 3.
The Appeal Panel did not engage with that submission. It emphasised that it was 'the task of the Medical Assessor to determine in which category the behavioural consequences of psychological injury best fit', when the point the plaintiff was making was that the medical assessor had undertaken that task in relation to self care and personal hygiene without considering all of the material that was relevant to that scale. The Appeal Panel's statement that where the facts fit 'is a matter of opinion on which reasonable minds might differ' might be relevant when considering whether demonstrable error has been shown (see Vannini v Worldwide Demolitions Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 324 at [87] (Gleeson JA, Macfarlan JA and Barrett AJA agreeing) ("Vannini")), but it was not an answer to the plaintiff's point, that the medical assessor had omitted relevant material from his assessment. It was not a case, as the Appeal Panel sought to characterise it, of the medical assessor having 'not quoted' some of the history in is reasons in the PIRS table.
Although the Secretary contended that there was no failure on the part of the Appeal Panel to engage with the plaintiff's submissions, the Secretary's written and oral submissions sought to defend the ground on the basis of the merits of the decisions of the medical assessor and the Appeal Panel on this scale. Those submissions did not answer the ground the plaintiff advanced. It follows that ground 1 is made out."
In the present case, although referring to the plaintiff's submissions, both the assessor and the Appeal Panel simply did not deal with the submissions concerning the plaintiff's statement.
Finally, the defendant submitted that any error on the part of the assessor could be overlooked because the Appeal Panel correctly found that the error was not material.
I think this point is effectively subsumed within my above conclusions. Had the assessor and the Appeal Panel given due consideration to the plaintiff's statement, and in particular to the evidence concerning reading, then a different result may have been reached, in turn producing a higher score on the PIRS assessment.
I make the following orders:
1. An order under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), setting aside the certificate and reasons dated 13 March 2024 given by an Appeal Panel appointed under the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW).
2. An order in the nature of Mandamus remitting the matter to the Second Defendant for redetermination according to law.
3. The first defendant is to pay the plaintiff's costs of the Summons.
4. No order is made as to costs in respect of the second and third defendants.
[7]
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Decision last updated: 11 November 2024