Decision
44The sole leg of Rule 42.21(1) UCPR relied upon by the Defendants in this application, is subrule (a) - that the Plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside New South Wales.
45It was acknowledged at the hearing by counsel for the Defendants that, if the Plaintiff was still ordinarily resident in New South Wales, there would be no basis for the Defendants to make an application for security for costs (T11, 6 July 2011).
46In considering this application, the Court is exercising a wide discretion, to be exercised judicially and in accordance with the justice of the case.
47As McHugh J observed in PS Chellaram & Co v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 102 ALR 321 at 323, for over 200 years the fact that a party bringing proceedings is resident out of the jurisdiction, and has no assets within the jurisdiction, has been seen as a circumstance of great weight in determining whether an order for security for costs should be made.
48In Energy Drilling Inc v Petroz NL (1989) ATPR 40-954 (page 50418 at 50422), Gummow J observed that the purpose of ordering security for costs against a Plaintiff ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction is to ensure that a successful defendant will have a fund available within the jurisdiction of this Court, against which it can enforce a judgment for costs, so that the defendant does not bear the risk as to the certainty of enforcement in the foreign country, and as to the time and complexity of necessary action to effect enforcement. On the other hand, Gummow J observed that the mere circumstance that a plaintiff is resident outside the jurisdiction does not necessarily invite an exercise of discretion in favour of ordering security, the question being, how justice will best be served in the particular case.
49I bear those principles in mind in this case.
50The Court should approach the application on the basis that the Plaintiff's claim is bona fide with a reasonable prospect of success: Re Bryan Fencott v Eretta Pty Limited [1987] FCA 102 at [136].
51It is the case that the Plaintiff did not directly inform the Defendants of his move to Ireland. However, information was contained within documents served on the Defendants' legal representatives which so indicated, and which was not picked up by them until March 2011. I accept that work was undertaken by the Defendants' legal representatives in that period.
52In the end, I think these factors effectively cancel each other out. Even if the Defendants were notified immediately in October 2010, or had closely read the document which contained the relevant information with respect to the Plaintiff's move to Ireland, the application would still have been one where the primary focus would be on security for enforcement in Ireland of any costs order.
53I do not consider that the primary order sought by the Defendants, being security for costs in the sum of $AU430,000.00, ought be made. Such an order will not serve the interests of justice in this case. The focus of this application should be upon the enforcement of any costs order in Ireland, which is the factor arising directly from the Plaintiff's move back to Ireland.
54I am not persuaded that an order for security for costs should extend beyond the cost of enforcement in Ireland, in the circumstances of this case.
55I accept that the Plaintiff did not leave New South Wales to advance his interests, in some way, in this litigation. I accept that he moved back to Ireland because of employment reasons relating to his wife. He has ultimately obtained employment himself in Ireland. He, his wife and his daughters are living in Ireland, and they have assets there. The Plaintiff has ties in Ireland, including employment in a responsible Government position, and at least some assets.
56Although the Plaintiff does have assets and income, as disclosed by the evidence, I am satisfied that any substantial order would operate to stifle his ability to proceed with this litigation. I have this factor in mind, as well, in determining that any order should not go beyond enforcement costs.
57What does the justice of the case require in the exercise of discretion? I am satisfied that an order should be made. The Plaintiff is residing in Ireland, and there is no reciprocal arrangement with Ireland for the purpose of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) . As a result, there is a practical disadvantage affecting the Defendants with respect to enforcement of a costs order in Ireland, if that point was reached.
58The evidence concerning costs of enforcement in Ireland discloses a broad range, based upon differing assumptions. In my view, sufficient security in this case, by reference to the cost of enforcement only, would be constituted by the sum of $AU40,000.00. I have borne in mind the exchange rate between the Euro and the Australian dollar, and the Irish expert evidence in reaching this conclusion.
59An order in that amount will operate to protect the Defendants from the disadvantage flowing from the Plaintiff's move to Ireland. That is the extent of the protection to which the Defendants are entitled on this application.
60I will hear the parties on the form of the order and any further order which is sought.
[Counsel addressed on orders and costs]
61The Defendants seek an order that the Plaintiff pay the costs of the Notice of Motion. It is submitted that costs should follow the event as the Defendants have succeeded in obtaining an order for security for costs. The Plaintiff submits that the Court should not make that order, but order that costs be costs in the cause.
62There are a number of factors which, in my view, are relevant to the question of costs on this application. It is apparent that an offer was made by the Plaintiff to the Defendants in a sum not specified, but less than $AU40,000.00. The Defendants did not accept that offer.
63On the other hand, the Defendants' claim in the Notice of Motion, and as argued (albeit with a fall-back position) sought an order that exceeds, by nearly 11 times the order which I will make. The strength of the application lay in the area of the enforcement costs in Ireland. The primary claim sought a good deal more than that, and, in my view, was not a realistic position for the Defendants to take on this application.
64In the end, the Defendants have received a measure of protection - modest compared to what was sought - with respect to enforcement costs. That measure lies significantly below the top of the range of enforcement costs referred to by their Irish expert witness.
65Both sides have had a measure of success on this application. There is no clear winner or clear loser.
66In all the circumstances, I am not persuaded that an order should be made that the Plaintiff pay the Defendants' costs of the Notice of Motion. The order I will make, is that costs be costs in the cause.
67With respect to the Notice of Motion filed 29 April 2011, I make the following orders:
(a) Pursuant to Rule 42.21(1) (a) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 , the Plaintiff, within 14 days of today, is to provide security for the Defendants' costs of and incidental to these proceedings by paying into Court the sum of $AU40,000.00.
(b) Until such security is given, the proceedings are stayed.
(c) I grant the Defendants liberty to apply in the event of default in Order (a) by the Plaintiff, so that the Defendants can move the Court for an order that the proceedings be dismissed.
(d) Costs are to be costs in the cause.