Kealy v SHD Services Pty Limited as Trustee of the SHDS Unit Trust and Ors

Factual Matters 11The evidence reveals the following facts, which I find for the purpose of this application. 12The Plaintiff was an employee of the First Defendant, as its Chief Executive Officer, from about May to October 2009. 13When the Plaintiff commenced proceedings in December 2009, he was ordinarily resident in the State of New South Wales. The Plaintiff is now 41 years' old, and was born in Dublin in the Republic of Ireland. He is a citizen of Ireland and, since 30 June 2010, also a citizen of the Commonwealth of Australia. 14On about 7 August 2010, the Plaintiff left Australia and is now ordinarily resident in Dublin. He resides in a house in Malahide, County Dublin with his wife and two daughters. The Plaintiff returned to live in Ireland as his wife had secured employment there. 15Since his return to Ir eland, the Plaintiff has obtained employment, commencing in May 2011, as Corporate Finance and Lending Manager of the National Treasury Management Agency, an agency of the Government of Ireland, with annual remuneration of Euro 110,000.00 plus an annual bonus. 16Although the evidence on this application is somewhat imprecise, I accept that the Plaintiff has the following assets in Ireland and Australia: (a) both he and his wife have an interest in the property in Malahide, County Ireland subject to a mortgage; (b) in addition, the Plaintiff has cash of approximately Euro 50,000.00, investments in the sum of approximately Euro 50,000.00 and a motor vehicle worth about Euro 15,000.00 in Ireland; (c) the Plaintiff has approximately $AUAU50,000.00 in cash in Australia. 17For present purposes, I accept that the current exchange rate is about 74 Euro cents to an Australian dollar. 18The Plaintiff's wife is the owner of a property in Swords, County Dublin, subject to a charge to a building society. In an affidavit sworn 30 June 2011, the Plaintiff asserted that the Swords property was one of his assets, but a title search reveals that his wife is the registered owner of that property. Whether the Plaintiff has an interest in the Swords property, beyond the fact that it is owned by his wife, is not capable of determination in this application. 19The Plaintiff did not inform the Defendants in any correspondence that he had left New South Wales in August 2010 to reside in Ireland. However, the Plaintiff declared his Malahide, County Ireland address in an affidavit verifying the Plaintiff's List of Documents sworn by him on 7 October 2010, which was served on the Defendants on 12 October 2010. 20On 15 March 2011, the Plaintiff served an Amended Defence to the Defendants' Amended Cross-Claim which also contained the Malahide, County Ireland address. 21It does not seem that the Defendants' legal representatives became conscious of the Plaintiff's return to Ireland until about mid-March 2011. 22Pursuant to directions made by the Court on or about 4 August 2010, the Defendants were required to serve their evidence in the proceedings by 15 October 2010, with this order being varied subsequently to 17 January 2011. Accordingly, the Defendants served a substantial body of evidence before the Defendants' legal representatives became conscious of the Plaintiff's return to Ireland. 23Ireland is not a party to any reciprocal enforcement agreement with Australia for the purposes of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) .

Expert Evidence Concerning Cost of Enforcement in Ireland 24There is some evidence before the Court, tendered by both the Plaintiff and the Defendants, in the form of expert evidence from Irish solicitors concerning the cost of enforcement of a New South Wales judgment in Ireland. 25The Defendants' report provides a range of up to Euro 55,000.00 to Euro 80,000.00 for a plenary hearing, with a lesser figure if the matter were dealt with by way of summary hearing (Euro 10,000.00 to Euro 30,000.00 ) or a Judge's List hearing (Euro 30,000.00 to Euro 55,000.00). 26The Plaintiff's report suggests a range of Euro 10,000.00 to Euro 20,000.00. 27In my view, the Defendants' report contains a more detailed analysis and is to be preferred, although there is still much leeway and flexibility in the Defendants' report because of the possible different hearings, and the differen t cost ranges which would apply to those hearings.

Quantum of Defendants' Costs 28There is evidence concerning the past and future costs of the Defendants before the Court on this application. 29Past costs from 3 November 2009 to 17 June 2011 total $AU641,666.00, of which $AU525,529.00 is professional costs. 30Future costs are assessed as a total of $AU235,620.00 upon an assumption of a 10-day hearing in this Court. 31The total sum of past and future costs of the Defendants is $AU877,286.00. 32No submissions were made on this application touching on the quantum of the Defendants' costs. At some point in the litigation, issues may arise concerning the just, quick and cheap resolution of the proceedings (for the purposes of s.56 Civil Procedure Act 2005 ) and the need for proportionality of costs (in s.60 of that Act), in view of the size of the claim and Cross-Claim and the nature of the issues in the proceedings. However, no submission was made to the Court with respect to that issue. I say no more about it on this application.

Submissions of Parties 33Mr Casselden, counsel for the Defendants, submits that an order should be made in the exercise of the Court's discretion as sought in the Notice of Motion, to protect the Defendants from unacceptable disadvantage flowing from the Plaintiff's foreign residence. 34He submits that an order should be made for sufficient security. 35Mr Casselden points to the lack of direct notification to the Defendants of the Plaintiff's return to Ireland, and the fact that substantial work was carried out by the Defendants between October 2010 and March 2011 to prepare and serve evidence. He submits that the Defendants made this application promptly once the Defendants' legal representatives detected, in March 2011, the Plaintiff's change of address. 36Mr Casselden submits that any order for security ought extend beyond the costs of enforcement of the judgment in Ireland. He submits that, in the interests of justice, an order ought to be made, to ensure that the Defendants are not subjected to unacceptable disadvantage. 37Mr Latham, counsel for the Plaintiff, emphasised the breadth of the discretion to be exercised on an application such as this. He submitted that an order should not be made to punish a litigant. 38He submitted that an offer was made by the Plaintiff on 27 May 2011 to provide security for the costs of enforcement in Ireland in an unspecified sum (the figure was contained in without-prejudice correspondence). 39During the course of the hearing (T21, 6 July 2011), Mr Latham submitted that he could not argue against the Plaintiff's Australian fund ($AU50,000.00) being used as security for enforcement costs, if the Court was otherwise satisfied that an order should be made. 40Mr Latham submitted that, in accordance with relevant principles, the Plaintiff's claim should be accepted as bona fide with reasonable prospects of success. He submitted that any substantial order would shut the Plaintiff out from pursuing his claim, and that an order for security of costs should not operate oppressively. 41It was submitted that the Plaintiff had assets in Ireland and held a responsible position with a Government agency, so it may be taken that the Plaintiff would not wish to put at risk his employment by the prospect of bankruptcy. 42Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff did not leave the jurisdiction of New South Wales to advance his position in the litigation. 43He submitted that no order should be made or, if an order was to be made, it should be confined to the enforcement element of a costs order in Ireland. In that case, he submitted that any order should not exceed the sum which the Plaintiff has within the jurisdiction of the State of New South Wales.

Decision 44The sole leg of Rule 42.21(1) UCPR relied upon by the Defendants in this application, is subrule (a) - that the Plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside New South Wales. 45It was acknowledged at the hearing by counsel for the Defendants that, if the Plaintiff was still ordinarily resident in New South Wales, there would be no basis for the Defendants to make an application for security for costs (T11, 6 July 2011). 46In considering this application, the Court is exercising a wide discretion, to be exercised judicially and in accordance with the justice of the case. 47As McHugh J observed in PS Chellaram & Co v China Ocean Shipping Co (1991) 102 ALR 321 at 323, for over 200 years the fact that a party bringing proceedings is resident out of the jurisdiction, and has no assets within the jurisdiction, has been seen as a circumstance of great weight in determining whether an order for security for costs should be made. 48In Energy Drilling Inc v Petroz NL (1989) ATPR 40-954 (page 50418 at 50422), Gummow J observed that the purpose of ordering security for costs against a Plaintiff ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction is to ensure that a successful defendant will have a fund available within the jurisdiction of this Court, against which it can enforce a judgment for costs, so that the defendant does not bear the risk as to the certainty of enforcement in the foreign country, and as to the time and complexity of necessary action to effect enforcement. On the other hand, Gummow J observed that the mere circumstance that a plaintiff is resident outside the jurisdiction does not necessarily invite an exercise of discretion in favour of ordering security, the question being, how justice will best be served in the particular case. 49I bear those principles in mind in this case. 50The Court should approach the application on the basis that the Plaintiff's claim is bona fide with a reasonable prospect of success: Re Bryan Fencott v Eretta Pty Limited [1987] FCA 102 at [136]. 51It is the case that the Plaintiff did not directly inform the Defendants of his move to Ireland. However, information was contained within documents served on the Defendants' legal representatives which so indicated, and which was not picked up by them until March 2011. I accept that work was undertaken by the Defendants' legal representatives in that period. 52In the end, I think these factors effectively cancel each other out. Even if the Defendants were notified immediately in October 2010, or had closely read the document which contained the relevant information with respect to the Plaintiff's move to Ireland, the application would still have been one where the primary focus would be on security for enforcement in Ireland of any costs order. 53I do not consider that the primary order sought by the Defendants, being security for costs in the sum of $AU430,000.00, ought be made. Such an order will not serve the interests of justice in this case. The focus of this application should be upon the enforcement of any costs order in Ireland, which is the factor arising directly from the Plaintiff's move back to Ireland. 54I am not persuaded that an order for security for costs should extend beyond the cost of enforcement in Ireland, in the circumstances of this case. 55I accept that the Plaintiff did not leave New South Wales to advance his interests, in some way, in this litigation. I accept that he moved back to Ireland because of employment reasons relating to his wife. He has ultimately obtained employment himself in Ireland. He, his wife and his daughters are living in Ireland, and they have assets there. The Plaintiff has ties in Ireland, including employment in a responsible Government position, and at least some assets. 56Although the Plaintiff does have assets and income, as disclosed by the evidence, I am satisfied that any substantial order would operate to stifle his ability to proceed with this litigation. I have this factor in mind, as well, in determining that any order should not go beyond enforcement costs. 57What does the justice of the case require in the exercise of discretion? I am satisfied that an order should be made. The Plaintiff is residing in Ireland, and there is no reciprocal arrangement with Ireland for the purpose of the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) . As a result, there is a practical disadvantage affecting the Defendants with respect to enforcement of a costs order in Ireland, if that point was reached. 58The evidence concerning costs of enforcement in Ireland discloses a broad range, based upon differing assumptions. In my view, sufficient security in this case, by reference to the cost of enforcement only, would be constituted by the sum of $AU40,000.00. I have borne in mind the exchange rate between the Euro and the Australian dollar, and the Irish expert evidence in reaching this conclusion. 59An order in that amount will operate to protect the Defendants from the disadvantage flowing from the Plaintiff's move to Ireland. That is the extent of the protection to which the Defendants are entitled on this application. 60I will hear the parties on the form of the order and any further order which is sought. [Counsel addressed on orders and costs] 61The Defendants seek an order that the Plaintiff pay the costs of the Notice of Motion. It is submitted that costs should follow the event as the Defendants have succeeded in obtaining an order for security for costs. The Plaintiff submits that the Court should not make that order, but order that costs be costs in the cause. 62There are a number of factors which, in my view, are relevant to the question of costs on this application. It is apparent that an offer was made by the Plaintiff to the Defendants in a sum not specified, but less than $AU40,000.00. The Defendants did not accept that offer. 63On the other hand, the Defendants' claim in the Notice of Motion, and as argued (albeit with a fall-back position) sought an order that exceeds, by nearly 11 times the order which I will make. The strength of the application lay in the area of the enforcement costs in Ireland. The primary claim sought a good deal more than that, and, in my view, was not a realistic position for the Defendants to take on this application. 64In the end, the Defendants have received a measure of protection - modest compared to what was sought - with respect to enforcement costs. That measure lies significantly below the top of the range of enforcement costs referred to by their Irish expert witness. 65Both sides have had a measure of success on this application. There is no clear winner or clear loser. 66In all the circumstances, I am not persuaded that an order should be made that the Plaintiff pay the Defendants' costs of the Notice of Motion. The order I will make, is that costs be costs in the cause. 67With respect to the Notice of Motion filed 29 April 2011, I make the following orders: (a) Pursuant to Rule 42.21(1) (a) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 , the Plaintiff, within 14 days of today, is to provide security for the Defendants' costs of and incidental to these proceedings by paying into Court the sum of $AU40,000.00. (b) Until such security is given, the proceedings are stayed. (c) I grant the Defendants liberty to apply in the event of default in Order (a) by the Plaintiff, so that the Defendants can move the Court for an order that the proceedings be dismissed. (d) Costs are to be costs in the cause.

Amendments 26 July 2011 - Defect in Caselaw - doesn't recognise Euro symbol. Manually had to enter the word "Euro" in lieu of symbol. Amended paragraphs: Throughout Judgment 26 July 2011 - Defect in Caselaw - doesn't recognise Euro symbol. Manually added the word "Euro" in lieu of the symbol where it appears throughout the judgment. Amended paragraphs: All throughout judgment DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 26 July 2011