First, it is abundantly clear from the Panel's reasons that it understood its task - to determine whether Ms Karabinis' left shoulder injury was compensable - in the sense that it was an injury within the meaning of s 3 of the Act that gave rise to compensation or whether it arose from constitutional factors unrelated to work. That choice was stark and is demonstrated by the conflict in the medical opinions provided to the Panel which it identified in its reasons.
Second, the reasons explain in considerable detail the work performed by Ms Karabinis, the diagnostic imaging examined by the Panel, the opinions of the various medical professionals who had provided reports considered by the Panel and its conclusion that Ms Karabinis did not suffer a compensable injury as her condition was constitutional and not work related. It said, consistent with the requirements of the Act, that her employment was not a significant contributing factor. That path of reasoning is clearly exposed and, in my opinion, enables the Court readily to determine whether the Panel properly considered the issues as required by the Act.
Third, I do not accept, as was contended by senior counsel for Ms Karabinis, that it was necessary for the Panel to explore why it rejected work as a cause or contributing factor to the left shoulder injury, or, as counsel put it, why it preferred the constitutional explanation over that of compensable injury. Simply put, that is not the purpose of the provision of reasons in a case such as this. The statements of principle of the High Court in Wingfoot makes that clear. It is clear from the Panel's reasons that it undertook its task as it was required to - that is, to determine (on the history provided by Ms Karabinis, the medical material available to it, on its own examination and then applying its expertise to that body of evidence) whether Ms Karabinis had suffered a compensable injury. The Panel correctly set out the provisions of the Act that it was required to consider and ultimately concluded that there was no compensable injury. It was not required to do any more than that. The Panel clearly demonstrated that it had given appropriate consideration to the issues referred to it and applied the provisions of the Act.
Whilst it may have been preferable for the Panel to explain why it rejected Ms Karabinis' work as a contributing factor to the injury it was unnecessary for the purpose of complying with its obligations to provide adequate reasons. I accept that in the context of the review of a judicial decision, as opposed to that of an administrative decision maker, such an explanation, even if perfunctory, may have been necessary. But that would be to apply the wrong test, as Wingfoot makes clear. Simply put, it was not necessary for the Panel to go into any further detail as to why it did not accept that there was a compensable injury of the left shoulder. Indeed, the reasoning of the Panel in this case, when compared to that in Wingfoot, does not need resort to implication. The Panel made it abundantly clear that it considered the alternative diagnoses and rejected that of compensable injury.
Finally, the argument of Ms Karabinis raises a vice which courts are regularly warned by appellate courts (including the High Court) to avoid: the overzealous examination of the reasons for the decision of an expert body which has, it is clear, considered the two alternative hypotheses as to the cause of Ms Karabinis' left shoulder injury condition.[8]