It is contended that the learned Chief Justice should have directed the jury that a duty was cast upon the Commissioner to provide a safe route to and from the camp, and that if such a route was not provided the plaintiff should succeed. The contention was put to the Chief Justice before the jury and he thus dealt with it: - "That is merely putting it in a different way, that there was a duty to provide a reasonable means of access and that such means of access should be reasonably safe. That is undoubtedly so, and if the Commissioner negligently failed to provide a reasonably safe means of access that is negligence." In my opinion, the direction of the Chief Justice, whether the last observation be taken as part of the direction or not, was substantially correct. The employment of Jury by the Commissioner constituted a relationship of duty between them extending not only to his hours of duty but to his comings and goings from the camp as well on his own business as on that of his employer. The duty arises out of the relationship of the parties. The contract of employment involves the duty, but it is not founded upon any term express or implied in the contract. According to the common law, however, the workman takes upon himself the ordinary risks of his employment. Thus a person engaged to perform a dangerous operation takes upon himself the risks incident thereto. The work for which Jury was engaged was not intrinsically dangerous, though it had some risks peculiarly its own. But it is clear also at common law that the contract of employment involves a duty on the part of the employer to take reasonable care to provide proper appliances, to maintain them in a proper condition, and to see that the condition of the premises and ways where his workmen are engaged is reasonably suitable and safe for the purposes for which they are used, and so to carry on his operations as not to subject those employed by him to unnecessary risk (Smith v. Baker & Sons[12]; Williams v. Birmingham Battery and Metal Co.[13]). In the present case the Commissioner knows of and sanctions a camp of workmen alongside the railway. It is there that they live and have a temporary abode; they are on the railway premises with his leave and licence. They must go to and from the camp for the purposes of their work, and also for supplies of food and water and other purposes. In my opinion such a state of circumstances makes it incumbent upon the Commissioner and creates a duty in him towards the workmen to provide a reasonably safe approach or means of access to and from the camp. But it creates no higher or other duty in respect of that approach or means of access. It is in this sense that the learned Chief Justice directed the jury, and it was for the jury to say whether the railway track used by the men was, having regard to the nature and character of the camp, and of the employment, a reasonably safe approach or means of access thereto. The suggestion that the Chief Justice directed the jury only in relation to the arrangement and condition of the railway track and not to its safety as a means of approach to the camp, is quite untenable if the charge be read fairly and as a whole. It is not necessary to refer to the charge in relation to the condition of the track and the driving of the train, for it was not challenged in either aspect. Nor is it necessary to determine whether there was any evidence connecting the death of the deceased with negligence on the part of the Commissioner. As at present advised, I think the question was rightly left to the jury. The jury found a general verdict for the defendant, and that verdict should, in my opinion, be sustained and this appeal dismissed.