Julian Emmanuel Levy v Peter Bablis & Anor
[2011] NSWSC 461
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2009-07-31
Before
Slattery J, Ms P
Catchwords
- M.B. Holmes First Defendant- J. Simpkins SC
- M. Condon
- Ms P. McEniery Second Defendant- Mr A.W.Street SC
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (51 paragraphs)
Introduction 1Mr Peter Bablis practises as a chiropractor in Sydney's Central Business District ("CBD") and in Double Bay. From September 1999 until August 2006 Mr Julian Levy was one of his patients. Mr Bablis offered special therapies to patients such as Mr Levy, including Neuro Emotional Technique ("NET"), chiropractic adjustments, acupuncture and kinesiology. Mr Levy believed these therapies alleviated the effects of his chronic fatigue syndrome. 2But especially from mid 2004 Mr Bablis and Mr Levy were more than just health professional and patient. Attracted by mutual empathy, compatible personalities and a passionate common interest in commercial investing, they saw one another regularly during and outside chiropractic consultations. Mr Levy described Mr Bablis as his confidante by late 2004. Mr Bablis described them both as firm friends. 3For the first five years of their acquaintance they discussed investments but did not commit to any joint business endeavour. Their first mutual commercial transaction was in February 2005 when Mr Levy made a short-term loan of $175,000 to Mr Bablis. This sum was repaid within its terms. 4Shortly after the February 2005 loan Mr Levy entered two substantial transactions totalling $1,000,000. The first of these transactions was in June 2005 and the second in October the same year. In these proceedings Mr Levy seeks the recovery of this sum and what he claims was an agreed return upon it. A central issue in the proceedings is whether Mr Levy entered these two transactions solely with the corporate entity, United Producers and Associates Limited ("UPA"), or whether Mr Bablis was also a party to them. Mr Levy commenced these proceedings against Mr Bablis as first defendant and UPA as second defendant. 5Mr Levy says that in June 2005 he advanced $500,000 in an investment that he describes variously as a "private placement" or a "placement". A "private placement" is said to be a risk-free deposit with a reliable U.S. or European bank, which deposit could be used for the bank's purposes but which nevertheless could generate the startlingly attractive risk-free return of 100% per annum. For such a high rate of return the depositor was required to leave the private placement with the European or US bank for a full 12 months, at which time the principal and interest would be repayable. Other terms of private placements are described later in these reasons. 6In June 2005 Mr Levy deposited his first $500,000 directly into a UPA bank account. Despite this, Mr Levy says: that he made his private placement with Mr Bablis; and, that because of the arrangements made orally between them that UPA received it in the capacity either of Mr Bablis' agent or business partner. Mr Bablis says: that he never accepted Mr Levy's money; but, that Mr Levy deposited it with UPA, not as a private placement but for some form of currency trading. Whether the June 2005 transaction was a private placement effected by way of loan or was an investment for currency trading is another central issue in these proceedings. Because of this contest about its nature, this first transaction will be described neutrally throughout these reasons simply as either "the June 2005 transaction" or the "June 2005 advance". 7A few months later, in October 2005, Mr Levy made a second $500,000 advance ("the October 2005 transaction" or the "October 2005 advance"). This advance exhibited the same ambiguous features as the first advance. Mr Levy claims that it too was a private placement made by way of loan to Mr Bablis. But Mr Bablis contends that Mr Levy also entered the October 2005 transaction with UPA, not with him and that it too was a currency trading investment, and not one with a guaranteed 100% return. 8Neither of Mr Levy's $500,000 advances in June and October 2005 was repaid upon its respective 12 month anniversary in June and October 2006. Mr Levy did not gain a 100% return on his capital. Rather he lost the full $1,000,000 he had advanced. After pursuing Mr Bablis personally between July and September 2006 for the return of his funds, Mr Levy put his claim in the hands of solicitors. 9Mr Brendan O'Dowd is a controlling figure in UPA. He was described somewhat colourfully in the proceedings as an Irish "scientist, inventor and investor". Mr O'Dowd's UPA is undoubtedly responsible for the non-return of Mr Levy's $1 million investment. Mr O'Dowd admitted in oral evidence given by telephone early in the hearing and in writing that UPA owes Mr Levy $1,000,000. 10Mr S.J. Stanton and Mr M.B. Holmes represented the plaintiff, Mr Levy. Mr J. Simpkins SC, Mr M. Condon and Ms P.M. McEniery appeared for the first defendant, Mr Bablis. Mr A. W. Street SC and Ms D. Hawkins represented UPA for a few days at the beginning of the hearing in July 2009. Later Mr Street SC and his junior no longer appeared at the hearing and UPA did not actively pursue any defence to the claim Mr Levy made against it in the alternative. The Court has received thorough assistance from all counsel and solicitors in these factually complex proceedings. 11The principal issues in contest between the parties are whether Mr Levy made a "private placement" at all or whether he entered some different transaction; whether the transaction he did enter was with Mr Bablis and UPA or was just a transaction with UPA; and, even if the transaction was with UPA, whether Mr Bablis accepted some form of legal responsibility for advising Mr Levy to enter the transactions or for the return to Mr Levy of the value of his investment. 12Mr Levy sues Mr Bablis in contract for breach of fiduciary duty; in tort for negligent misstatement; and, for various forms of statutory misleading and deceptive conduct. All these causes of action are considered in more detail at the end of these reasons. (a) Mr Levy's contract case is that on 17 June 2005 Mr Levy agreed to lend Mr Bablis $500,000 on or before 1 July 2005, which Mr Bablis agreed to repay by 30 June 2006 at an interest rate of 100 per cent. Mr Levy alleges a second loan agreement was made in similar terms in October 2005, and that neither of these loans were repaid. In the alternative to the loan contract allegations against Mr Bablis, Mr Levy pleads parallel loan agreements against UPA. (b) Mr Levy's breach of fiduciary duty case is that Mr Bablis owed fiduciary duties to Mr Levy in relation to the investment of the $1 million. The fiduciary duties are alleged to arise out of Mr Bablis' position of influence over Mr Levy and Mr Levy's vulnerability and dependence on Mr Bablis and trust in him. Mr Levy alleges that in breach of this fiduciary duty, Mr Bablis took a benefit directly or indirectly from the proceeds of the loan agreements and otherwise misused his position as Mr Levy's fiduciary. Mr Levy further alleges that UPA received the money through the June and October 2005 transactions knowing of Mr Bablis' breaches of fiduciary duty to Mr Levy. (c) Mr Levy's misrepresentation case is grounded either in negligent misstatement or in the statutory action for misleading and deceptive conduct provided under Fair Trading Act 1987 (Cth), s 41, Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act ("ASIC") 2001 (Cth), s 12BB and Corporations Act (Cth) 2001, s 769C. Mr Levy alleges Mr Bablis made representations as to the future security of the funds to be advanced, as to Mr Bablis' control over and experience with such advances, and as to the existence of binding and enforceable loan contracts. Mr Levy alleges that he advanced $1 million and suffered loss and damage when neither Mr Bablis nor UPA repaid that sum. 13In response Mr Bablis says: that none of these causes of action are made out; that there was no loan contract; that he owed Mr Levy no fiduciary duty, nor did he breach any such duty; that he owed Mr Levy no duty of care in making statements to him; that he did not engage in any relevant conduct in "trade or commerce" with Mr Levy; and, that he did not make the pleaded representations to Mr Levy. 14But first it is necessary to decide what actually happened in a case in which most facts were in contest. The circumstances of the June 2005 and October 2005 transactions are the principal points of factual contest between the parties. But many other lesser factual issues help determine which of Mr Levy's or Mr Bablis' very different versions of the June and October 2005 transactions are correct. The Court's approach to the fact-finding task is to consider a chronological account of the principal facts, recording relevant uncontested matters and deciding the important matters in contest through that account. It is neither possible nor useful, in a case of such dense factual conflict as this one, for the Court to decide every factual issue. 15These proceedings were originally set down for a five-day hearing. That time estimate was inadequate. After extensive cross-examination of the principals on both sides, the hearing occupied 16 days in blocks of reserved time from late July 2009 to late April 2010. The parties made oral submissions on the last hearing day, 30 April 2010. Even then, the parties were given an opportunity to put in short supplementary written submissions. When this process was complete judgment was finally reserved on 3 June 2010. The many contests about the extensive communications between Mr Levy and Mr Bablis over a four-year period between late 2002 and late 2006 has required the Court's consideration over an extended period. 16The story starts with some background about Mr Levy and Mr Bablis and their first meeting in September 1999.