10 A more difficult question arises in respect of the question whether his failure to lodge the return prior to the commencement of the prosecution in July 1999 was the subject of a reasonable excuse. This question was not addressed by the learned magistrate. On several occasions during the course of the trial when ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the learned magistrate defined the issue as whether the appellant had lodged a report in the prescribed form within 14 days of the date of the winding up order and, if not, whether there was a reasonable excuse for his failure to do so. On one occasion he said "The situation is very plainly on the section, as it currently reads, an obligation that falls on both or all the directors, regardless of their actual knowledge". When asked by the appellant whether or not it was suggested a director must give a report even though he has no knowledge, the learned magistrate replied in the affirmative and when asked "How could that possibly be?", said "Because you are deemed to have knowledge and because the relevant section says that you must". In an affidavit filed on the hearing of the appeal, the appellant deposed to having provided to the administrator, Mr Green, a report in the prescribed form on 11 November 1998 which he had not answered specifically but in which he had asserted "I refer you to Mr I Tapping in respect of the matters required as I have no direct knowledge and to the extent of my knowledge I will accept the information he provides". The fact that such a form had been submitted to Mr Green was reported to Mr Woods by the appellant on 5 January 1999. These documents, together with numerous other documents, were, at the hearing of the complaint, in a file which the appellant sought to place before the learned magistrate but it is clear that the appellant's ignorance of court procedures and his bewilderment at the latter's adverse rulings militated against his using such material to his advantage. It is very unfortunate that the officers of the respondent Commission failed to meet with the appellant with a view to procuring a report in a form which Mr Garrison's letter of 10 May 1999 suggested would be acceptable to the respondent and which appears ultimately to have been accepted by the liquidator, a form which does not differ materially from that provided to the administrator, Mr Green, in November 1998. There appears to have been a breakdown in communication occasioned, perhaps, by the challenging if not intemperate tone of the appellant's correspondence with Mr Garrison. Had such a report been furnished at about that time, it seems unlikely that a prosecution would have ensued. Unfortunately, however, a complaint was laid and little purpose seems to have been served by it. What could constitute a reasonable excuse depended on all the circumstances of the case. The magistrate's rulings, in my view, too narrowly confined the material which was relevant to the issue. Because of them, the unrepresented appellant was unable to place before the Court evidence by which the reasonableness of his excuse could be evaluated and which was certainly relevant to the disposition of the case in the event that the complaint was found proved. In my view, the fact (if it be a fact) that the liquidator had as much information about the company's affairs as the appellant suggested in those questions he managed to put in cross-examination was not irrelevant to the reasonableness of his excuse for not lodging the requisite return and the fact that the books of which the appellant, on the evidence, had no intimate knowledge were already in the hands of either the liquidator or the respondent Commission should also have been taken into account in determining the reasonableness of the excuse. The apparent endeavours of the appellant, adverted to by the learned magistrate when finding the complaint proved, to talk to Mr Johnson and Mr Garrison "in order to get the information that he says he needed arising out of his ignorance of the material that the report required him to provide" were not taken into consideration but dismissed because the initial period of 14 days had expired. They, too, should have been taken into account in determining the reasonableness of the excuse thereafter. At the end of the day, I am left with the distinct impression that the trial miscarried because these factors were not allowed to be canvassed or assessed and that there was further material such as the lodgment of the report with Mr Green which the appellant was effectively prevented from putting before the Court. Accordingly, I propose to allow the appeal and to quash the conviction and sentence. I am unable to say that the appellant did or did not establish, nor could or could not have established, a reasonable excuse for his inaction and that only leaves open the course of remitting the matter for retrial before another magistrate. I invite the complainant to consider carefully the utility in proceeding further. It is unnecessary to deal with the numerous other grounds of appeal raised by the appellant as, even if successful, they would not produce a different result in terms of disposition.