HIS HONOUR: This is the 23rd year in which I shall have intoned the mantra that nothing excites the zeal, the ardour and the passion of the legal profession more than an argument about costs. The plaintiff is a solicitor. He previously acted for the defendant. He first appears to have acted for the defendant in February 2009. On 9 July 2010 the plaintiff rendered to the defendant a memorandum of costs and a tax invoice which he said was "interim". The short statement of work done at the commencement of the memorandum of costs is this.
"To our fees for acting for you in the above matter since about February 2009, including taking instructions, advising you and the strata managing agent (SMA) on many occasions, including particularly about the need to prepare your experts' report asap, preparation of your Application to the CTTT, and several appearances at the CTTT at Parramatta to adjourn the Application, recently having it transferred to the Sydney Supreme Court, attending meetings at the property, many letters and telephone attendances on you, the SMA, your expert Mr Dessaix, the respondents' prior and current solicitors and other, reporting to you, at related attendances, correspondence and work."
The total of the bill including GST was $23,256.82. A detailed breakdown of the work done is set out in an eight-page document which is conveniently annexed to the affidavit of Mr Adrian Batterby, affirmed on 30 March 2017, as annexure AB-5.
On the same day the plaintiff sent to the defendant a costs agreement and disclosure which comprise two documents, each having five pages. The costs agreement has not been executed by the defendant, but cl 7 of the agreement commences thus:
"This Agreement is an offer to you to enter into a costs agreement with us. You may accept this offer in writing or by conduct. If you accept this offer in writing, please sign in [scil. it] and complete the spaces provided at the end of the covering letter and return it to us. Please copy that letter for your records before you return it. Acceptance by conduct occurs by continuing to give us instructions and/or by paying us a retainer and/or by paying all or part of an interim Memorandum of Costs. We stress that we will begin or continue work on your matter either immediately or very soon. If you accept this offer by conduct then you will be liable to pay our costs even if you do not sign the covering letter and return it to us. Please advise us immediately if you do not want us to act."
There was no submission made that the costs agreement and disclosure did not regulate the conduct of the parties from 9 July 2010 into the future. The defendant determined the plaintiff's retainer as its solicitor on 2 November 2010. Mr Jones accepted that termination of the agreement.
On 7 October 2016 the plaintiff sent a further memorandum of costs and tax invoice to the defendant for work done from 9 July 2010 to 2 November 2010. The total of that memorandum of costs was $4,704.60. On 30 March 2017 the defendant paid to the plaintiff $4,769.11, representing the sum claimed plus $64.51 by way of interest.
In the meantime the plaintiff commenced proceedings in this Court on 2 November 2016. The plaintiff claimed a liquidated sum of $27,962.42, being the whole of the amount claimed by the plaintiff in the memorandum of costs of 9 July 2010 and also the memorandum of costs of 7 October 2016.
The defendant has moved the Court for an order dismissing the proceedings or, alternatively, dismissing the plaintiff's claim for the recovery of the moneys referred to in the memorandum of costs of 9 June 2010 and the plaintiff's alternative claim in respect of that, a claim on a quantum meruit or such other relief as the Court thinks fit. The defendant, inter alia, raised a defence under the Limitation Act which is of interest in itself. However, owing to the lack of time available to me, I do not intend to deal with that issue at the present time.
The simple fact is that prior to 9 July 2010, the plaintiff had not complied with his statutory obligations under then applicable legislation, namely the Legal Profession Act 2004, and in particular his obligations under Ch 3 Pt 3.2 Div 3, which requires a costs disclosure. The applicable legislation is this:
"309 Disclosure of costs to clients
(1) A law practice must disclose to a client in accordance with this Division:
(a) the basis on which legal costs will be calculated, including whether a fixed costs provision applies to any of the legal costs, and
(b) the client's right to:
(i) negotiate a costs agreement with the law practice, and
(ii) receive a bill from the law practice, and
(iii) request an itemised bill after receipt of a lump sum bill, and
(iv) be notified under section 316 of any substantial change to the matters disclosed under this section, and
(c) an estimate of the total legal costs if reasonably practicable or, if that is not reasonably practicable, a range of estimates of the total legal costs and an explanation of the major variables that will affect the calculation of those costs, and
(d) details of the intervals (if any) at which the client will be billed, and
(e) the rate of interest (if any), whether a specific rate or a benchmark rate, that the law practice charges on overdue legal costs, whether that rate is a specific rate of interest or is a benchmark rate of interest (as referred to in subsection (1A)), and
(f) if the matter is a litigious matter, an estimate of:
(i) the range of costs that may be recovered if the client is successful in the litigation, and
(ii) the range of costs the client may be ordered to pay if the client is unsuccessful, and
(g) the client's right to progress reports in accordance with section 318, and
(h) details of the person whom the client may contact to discuss the legal costs, and
(i) the following avenues that are open to the client in the event of a dispute in relation to legal costs:
(i) costs assessment under Division 11,
(ii) the setting aside of a costs agreement or a provision of a costs agreement under section 328 (Setting aside costs agreements or provisions of costs agreements),
(iii) mediation under Division 8, and
(j) any time limits that apply to the taking of any action referred to in paragraph (i), and
(k) that the law of this jurisdiction applies to legal costs in relation to the matter, and
(l) information about the client's right:
(i) to accept under a corresponding law a written offer to enter into an agreement with the law practice that the corresponding provisions of the corresponding law apply to the matter, or
(ii) to notify under a corresponding law (and within the time allowed by the corresponding law) the law practice in writing that the client requires the corresponding provisions of the corresponding law to apply to the matter.
(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1) (e), a benchmark rate of interest is a rate of interest for the time being equal to or calculated by reference to a rate of interest that is specified or determined from time to time by an ADI or another body or organisation, or by or under other legislation, and that is publicly available.
(1B) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the use of benchmark rates of interest, and in particular for or with respect to permitting, regulating or preventing the use of particular benchmark rates or particular kinds of benchmark rates.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (f), the disclosure must include:
(a) a statement that an order by a court for the payment of costs in favour of the client will not necessarily cover the whole of the client's legal costs, and
(b) if applicable, a statement that disbursements may be payable by the client even if the client enters a conditional costs agreement.
(3) A law practice may disclose any or all of the details referred to in subsection (1) (b) (i)-(iii), (g), (i), (j) and (l) in or to the effect of a form prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this subsection, and if it does so at the time the other details are disclosed as required by this section the practice is taken to have complied with this section in relation to the details so disclosed.
310 Disclosure if another law practice is to be retained
(1) If a law practice intends to retain another law practice on behalf of the client, the first law practice must disclose to the client the details specified in section 309 (1) (a), (c) and (d) in relation to the other law practice, in addition to any information required to be disclosed to the client under section 309.
(2) A law practice retained or to be retained on behalf of a client by another law practice is not required to make disclosure to the client under section 309, but must disclose to the other law practice the information necessary for the other law practice to comply with subsection (1).
(3) This section does not apply if the first law practice ceases to act for the client in the matter when the other law practice is retained.
311 How and when must disclosure be made to a client?
(1) Disclosure under section 309 must be made in writing before, or as soon as practicable after, the law practice is retained in the matter.
(2) Disclosure under section 310 (1) must be made in writing before, or as soon as practicable after, the other law practice is retained.
(3) Disclosure made to a person before the law practice is retained in a matter is taken to be disclosure to the person as a client for the purposes of sections 309 and 310.
312 Exceptions to requirement for disclosure
(1) Disclosure under section 309 or 310 (1) is not required to be made in any of the following circumstances:
(a) if the total legal costs in the matter, excluding disbursements, are not likely to exceed $750 (exclusive of GST) or the amount prescribed by the regulations (whichever is higher),
(b) if:
(i) the client has received one or more disclosures under section 309 or 310 (1) from the law practice in the previous 12 months, and
(ii) the client has agreed in writing to waive the right to disclosure, and
(iii) a principal of the law practice decides on reasonable grounds that, having regard to the nature of the previous disclosures and the relevant circumstances, the further disclosure is not warranted,
(c) if the client is:
(i) a law practice or an Australian legal practitioner, or
(ii) a public company, a subsidiary of a public company, a large proprietary company, a foreign company, a subsidiary of a foreign company or a registered Australian body (each within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001 of the Commonwealth), or
(iii) a financial services licensee (within the meaning of that Act), or
(iv) a liquidator, administrator or receiver (as respectively referred to in that Act), or
(v) a partnership that carries on the business of providing professional services if the partnership consists of more than 20 members or if the partnership would be a large proprietary company (within the meaning of that Act) if it were a company, or
(vi) a proprietary company (within the meaning of that Act) formed for the purpose of carrying out a joint venture, if any shareholder of the company is a person to whom disclosure of costs is not required, or
(vii) an unincorporated group of participants in a joint venture, if one or more members of the group are persons to whom disclosure of costs is not required and one or more members of the group are not such persons and if all of the members of the group who are not such persons have indicated that they waive their right to disclosure, or
(viii) a Minister of the Crown in right of a jurisdiction or the Commonwealth acting in his or her capacity as such, or a government department or public authority of a jurisdiction or the Commonwealth,
(d) if the legal costs or the basis on which they will be calculated have or has been agreed as a result of a tender process,
(e) if the client will not be required to pay the legal costs or they will not otherwise be recovered by the law practice,
(f) in any circumstances prescribed by the regulations.
(2) Despite subsection (1) (a), if a law practice becomes aware that the total legal costs are likely to exceed $750 (exclusive of GST) or the amount prescribed by the regulations (whichever is higher), the law practice must disclose the matters in section 309 or 310 (as the case requires) to the client as soon as practicable.
(3) A law practice must ensure that a written record of a principal's decision that further disclosure is not warranted as mentioned in subsection (1) (b) is made and kept with the files relating to the matter concerned.
(4) The reaching of a decision referred to in subsection (3) otherwise than on reasonable grounds is capable of being unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct on the part of the principal.
(5) Nothing in this section affects or takes away from any client's right:
(a) to progress reports in accordance with section 318, or
(b) to obtain reasonable information from the law practice in relation to any of the matters specified in section 309, or
(c) to negotiate a costs agreement with a law practice and to obtain a bill from the law practice.
313 Additional disclosure - settlement of litigious matters
(1) If a law practice negotiates the settlement of a litigious matter on behalf of a client, the law practice must disclose to the client, before the settlement is executed:
(a) a reasonable estimate of the amount of legal costs payable by the client if the matter is settled (including any legal costs of another party that the client is to pay), and
(b) a reasonable estimate of any contributions towards those costs likely to be received from another party.
(2) A law practice retained on behalf of a client by another law practice is not required to make a disclosure to the client under subsection (1), if the other law practice makes the disclosure to the client before the settlement is executed.
314 Additional disclosure - uplift fees
(1) If a costs agreement involves an uplift fee, the law practice must, before entering into the agreement, disclose to the client in writing:
(a) the law practice's legal costs, and
(b) the uplift fee (or the basis of calculation of the uplift fee), and
(c) the reasons why the uplift fee is warranted.
(2) A law practice is not required to make a disclosure under subsection (1) to a sophisticated client.
315 Form of disclosure
(1) Written disclosures to a client under this Division:
(a) must be expressed in clear plain language, and
(b) may be in a language other than English if the client is more familiar with that language.
(2) If the law practice is aware that the client is unable to read, the law practice must arrange for the information required to be given to a client under this Division to be conveyed orally to the client in addition to providing the written disclosure.
316 Ongoing obligation to disclose
A law practice must, in writing, disclose to a client any substantial change to anything included in a disclosure already made under this Division as soon as is reasonably practicable after the law practice becomes aware of that change.
317 Effect of failure to disclose
(1) Postponement of payment of legal costs until assessed
If a law practice does not disclose to a client or an associated third party payer anything required by this Division to be disclosed, the client or associated third party payer (as the case may be) need not pay the legal costs unless they have been assessed under Division 11.
(2) Bar on recovering proceedings until legal costs assessed
A law practice that does not disclose to a client or an associated third party payer anything required by this Division to be disclosed may not maintain proceedings against the client or associated third party payer (as the case may be) for the recovery of legal costs unless the costs have been assessed under Division 11.
(3) Setting costs agreement aside
If a law practice does not disclose to a client or an associated third party payer anything required by this Division to be disclosed and the client or associated third party payer has entered into a costs agreement with the law practice, the client or associated third party payer may also apply under section 328 for the costs agreement to be set aside.
(4) Reduction of legal costs on assessment
If a law practice does not disclose to a client or an associated third party payer anything required by this Division to be disclosed, then, on an assessment of the relevant legal costs, the amount of the costs may be reduced by an amount considered by the costs assessor to be proportionate to the seriousness of the failure to disclose.
(5) Effect on legal costs where law practice retains another law practice that fails to disclose
If a law practice retains another law practice on behalf of a client and the first law practice fails to disclose something to the client solely because the retained law practice failed to disclose relevant information to the first law practice as required by section 310 (2), then subsections (1)-(4):
(a) do not apply to the legal costs owing to the first law practice on account of legal services provided by it, to the extent that the non-disclosure by the first law practice was caused by the failure of the retained law practice to disclose the relevant information, and
(b) do apply to the legal costs owing to the retained law practice.
(6) Circumstances where associated third party payer involved
In a matter involving both a client and an associated third party payer where disclosure has been made to one of them but not the other:
(a) subsection (1) does not affect the liability of the one to whom disclosure was made to pay the legal costs, and
(b) subsection (2) does not prevent proceedings being maintained against the one to whom the disclosure was made for the recovery of those legal costs.
(7) Non-disclosure capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct
Failure by a law practice to comply with this Division is capable of being unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct on the part of any Australian legal practitioner or Australian-registered foreign lawyer involved in the failure.
318 Progress reports
(1) A law practice must give a client, on reasonable request:
(a) a written report of the progress of the matter in which the law practice is retained, and
(b) a written report of the legal costs incurred by the client to date, or since the last bill (if any), in the matter.
(2) A law practice may charge a client a reasonable amount for a report under subsection (1) (a) but must not charge a client for a report under subsection (1) (b).
(3) A law practice retained on behalf of a client by another law practice is not required to give a report to the client under subsection (1), but must disclose to the other law practice any information necessary for the other law practice to comply with that subsection.
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if the other law practice ceases to act for the client in the matter when the law practice is retained."
It is fundamental to note that this legislation speaks of what is to happen in futuro. Section 309(1)(a) provides that a solicitor must disclose to a client the basis on which legal costs "will be" calculated. The same future tense is used in ss 309(1)(c) and 309(1)(d). Many other provisions of the legislation speak about future events; for example, s 309(1)(i) requires that the solicitor disclose avenues open to a client "in the event of a dispute in relation to legal costs". The words "in the event of" are apt to describe what will happen in the future, not what has happened in the past. Section 309(2)(a) also uses the future tense. Section 310 contains this heading:
"Disclosure if another law practice is to be retained."
That, again, is speaking of something that may happen in futuro. Section 313 concerns additional disclosures that are required to be made when it is sought to settle litigious matters. Section 313(1) requires a disclosure "before the settlement is executed". Similarly, s 314, which governs "uplift fees", uses the preposition "before". Section 316 provides that the obligation to disclose is ongoing and requires the solicitor to disclose to a client any substantial change to anything previously disclosed.
The plaintiff did not disclose any basis on which he was assessing costs prior to 9 July 2010. The plaintiff's argument is that the delivery of the costs agreement on 9 July 2010 should be seen as governing all of the time that the plaintiff was acting for the defendant, that is, it should be taken as extending back to February 2009. To do so would require me to construe, for example, s 309(1)(a) as meaning "the basis on which legal costs have been, are, or will be calculated". There is no authority whatever to support the argument proposed by the plaintiff.
Accordingly, the work done by the plaintiff prior to 9 July 2010 is governed by s 317 of the Legal Profession Act 2004. Subsection (1) provides that the client, being the plaintiff, need not pay the legal costs unless they have been assessed under Div 11 of the Act. If a cost "need not be paid", they are not payable, and therefore there is no cause of action for their recovery. Furthermore, s 317(2) says that a law practice that did not disclose to a client anything required by the Division to be disclosed "may not maintain proceedings".
Words to a similar effect were considered by Master Malpass in Baynes and Anor v Kalyk [2003] NSWSC 607. In that case, a solicitor sought to recover an amount of costs in respect of legal services provided to certain clients. He commenced proceedings in the Local Court. The statement of claim claimed fees for legal services, the particulars of which were set out by identifying certain invoices which had been delivered by the solicitor to his clients. Amongst other things, the defence pleaded a breach of the Legal Profession Act 1987. The proceedings in the Local Court were determined by Mr Cloran LCM. His Honour dismissed a notice of motion which sought to strike out the statement of claim. The costs were governed not by the Legal Profession Act 2004 but by the Legal Profession Act 1987. The Master said:
" 11. Section 182 is in the following terms:
"182. Effect of non-disclosure of matters related to basis of costs
(1) If a barrister or solicitor fails to make a disclosure to a client in accordance with this Division of the matters required to be disclosed by section 175 in relation to costs, the client need not pay the costs of the legal services unless the costs have been assessed under Division 6.
(2) A barrister or solicitor who fails to make a disclosure in accordance with this Division of the matters required to be disclosed by section 175 or 176 in relation to costs may not maintain proceedings for the recovery of the costs unless the costs have been assessed under Division 6.
(3) The costs of any assessment referred to in this section (including the costs of the costs assessor) are payable by the barrister or solicitor seeking to recover costs.
(4) Any failure referred to in this section does not of itself amount to a breach of this Act. However, the failure is capable of being unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct."
12. The object of the disclosure provisions contained in Division 2 has been said to require an assessment of costs (where there has been a failure to make the requisite disclosure) at the practitioner's expense, before the solicitor from the client can recover the costs.
13. In essence, s 182 provides that if there is a failure to make a disclosure the client need not pay the costs of the legal services unless the costs have been assessed under Division 6 and that the solicitor may not maintain proceedings for the recovery of the costs unless that assessment has taken place.
14. Section 182 makes it clear that there is no obligation to pay the costs and that the solicitor cannot maintain proceedings for their recovery unless the assessment of costs has taken place.
15. It was not in dispute that there had been a failure to make the requisite disclosure and that there had not been an assessment of costs. It was not in dispute that a solicitor may still recover costs even though there was either no costs agreement or any costs agreement was void.
16. The learned Magistrate appears to have had regard to what was said by Levine J in Ipper v Myer Solomon Associates & Ors [2002] NSWSC 1141 and what was said by Barrett J in Wentworth v Rogers [2002] NSWSC 709. In the latter case, it had been observed that where there is no costs agreement or any such agreement is void, a solicitor may still recover costs for legal services and that quantum meruit was a means of recovery available where the agreement was void.
17. He appears to have come to the view that "maintaining" as used in s 182 did not disentitle the solicitor from commencing an action for recovery of costs where there has been a failure to make the requisite disclosure, but that he may not continue, persevere, carry on, keep up, prosecute the proceedings unless the costs have been assessed. He took the view that the defendants were entitled to a stay of proceedings until the statutory obligations imposed by s 182 had been complied with.
18. In my view, the reasoning abounds with misconception. It is difficult to see what assistance was gleaned from Ipper, and it appears that Wentworth has been misunderstood. Further, I consider that there has been a failure to properly construe s 182. The end result saw a vital question of whether s 182 applies to non-contractual claims being at least not fully addressed.
19. Section 182 does not disentitle a solicitor from recovering costs for legal services performed by him, but what he may recover as costs will be determined by assessment under the Act. It takes away both the obligation to pay and the entitlement to maintain proceedings for the recovery of the costs until there has been an assessment of costs. Until that has been done, there is no obligation to pay and consequently no actionable debt upon which proceedings can be maintained.
20. At the time of the commencement of the proceedings in the Local Court, the defendant was not entitled to be paid for the legal services or to maintain the proceedings to recover costs (Hereward v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1989) 17 NSWLR 260).
21. The Act makes a distinction between a contract for the provision of legal services and an agreement as to the costs of the provision of legal services (which s 184 says is to be called a costs agreement). The latter may form part of the former. Section 182 may have application to the enforcement of rights under inter alia the latter (see s 208C). It may have application where the latter is void. It also may have application where there is no costs agreement.
22. It is the failure to make the requisite disclosure that gives it application to the recovery of costs of legal services by a barrister or solicitor (whether the claim be founded on quantum meruit or otherwise)"
I should point out that s 182(1) of the 1987 Act is in similar terms to s 317(1) of the 2004 Act. Similarly, s 182(2) is in similar language to s 317(2) of the 2004 Act. The Master went on to strike out the proceedings that had been commenced in the Local Court. The reasoning of the Master, with which I agree and which I ought follow, decides the first part of the notice of motion that is currently before me. The plaintiff has not sought an assessment of the relevant legal costs, that is, for the work done prior to 9 July 2014 to be assessed by a costs assessor. The proceedings, therefore, in respect of that work are not maintainable.
The plaintiff's argument is essentially this: the retainer of the plaintiff, for whatever reason he was retained by the defendant, was an entire contract; the entire contract was only terminated on 2 November 2010; and therefore he can recover the whole of the costs that he rendered, because, on the authorities, if the contract be entire, then the costs recoverable only became payable on the day after the work was completed, or perhaps even on the day the work was completed. Therefore, the cause of action accrued on or about 2 November 2010, and these proceedings were commenced in time when one has regard to s 36(1) of the Interpretation Act 1987.
There has been much argument before me as to whether a solicitor's retainer constitutes an entire contract or not. The plaintiff relied on the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Coburn v Colledge [1897] 1 QB 702. The authority does not tell me what work the original plaintiff had done for the defendant. However, the plaintiff was a solicitor and did work at the request of the defendant. The plaintiff completed his work on 30 May 1889. On 7 June 1889 the defendant left England and ended up in Australia. The plaintiff sent a bill of costs to the plaintiff at an address that had been provided to him by the defendant, the defendant's father in law's house, on the Isle of Guernsey. The defendant returned to England from Australia in 1896, and on 12 July 1896 the action was commenced. The action was found to be statute barred in the Queen's Bench Division. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. The Master of the Rolls, Lord Esher, said this:
"It is admitted that, if the cause of action in this case must be considered to have arisen when the work was completed, the defendant must succeed; but, if it must be considered as having arisen only at the expiration of the period of one months from the delivery of the signed bill of costs, the plaintiff must succeed... In the case of a person who is not a solicitor, and who does work for another person at his request on terms that he is to be paid for it, unless there is some special term of the agreement to the contrary, his right to payment arises as soon as the work is done; and thereupon he can at once bring his action.
Before any enactment existed with regard to the actions by solicitors for their costs, as solicitors stood in the same position as any other person who has done work for another at his request, and could sue as soon as the work which he was retained to do was finished, without having delivered any signed bill of costs or waiting for any time after delivery of such a bill. Then to what extent does the statute alter the right of the solicitor in such a case, and does the alteration made by it affect or alter the cause of action? It takes away, no doubt, the right of the solicitor to bring an action directly the work is done, but it does not take away his right to payment for it, which is the cause of action. The Statute of Limitations itself does not affect the right to payment, but only affects the procedure for enforcing it in the event of a dispute or refusal to pay. Similarly, I think section 37 of the Solicitors Act, 1843, deals, not with the right of the solicitor but with the procedure to enforce that right."
Lopes and Chitt LJJ agreed.
The problem with this argument is that it would enable the plaintiff to overcome the clear and unambiguous requirements imposed upon him by Parliament, by the Legal Profession Act 2004. The Act itself requires me to make the very discrimen that the plaintiff himself did, to render a bill for one set of work which he did, and then to start a further period of work which was governed by a costs agreement, when the earlier work had not been covered by a costs agreement. That the plaintiff himself made that discrimen is, in my view, telling. As I said earlier, there is absolutely no authority to support the proposition that the fee agreement when delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant could somehow govern what had passed between those parties prior to the delivery of the fee agreement.
The only remaining issue concerns the form of the orders sought. Clearly, the claim in respect of the first memorandum of costs is not maintainable, because the defendant has no obligation to pay the fees in question until they have been assessed by a costs assessor. If the plaintiff wish to recover the costs, the onus is on him to make the defendant liable for those costs, and the only way such liability could occur is by his taking that matter to a costs assessor. Whether it would still be statute-barred is a matter that can be decided on another occasion, perhaps. In respect of the second part of the claim, the claim has been paid. But the order which the court makes should acknowledge the fact that the defendant admitted that part of the claim in the defence and has paid it.
For those reasons I strike out so much of the plaintiff's claim as relates to the sum of $23,256.82 for work done prior to 9 July 2010. I give verdict and judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for $4769.11, a sum paid by the defendant to the plaintiff on 30 March 2017. I order the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of the notice of motion and of the proceedings. Any other orders sought?
PLAINTIFF: No, your Honour, thank you.
BATTERBY: No, your Honour, thank you.
[2]
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Decision last updated: 26 March 2018