Jones v Metropolitan Meat Industry Board [1925] HCA 54

High Court of Australia|1925-07-01|Before: Tun Srarke J, Rich JJ, Starke JJ

H.C. or A. yegular and both parties are concluded by the award as to both

piel facts and law; and that ends the matter. Kipman Tun Srarke J. The appeal, I agree, must be dismissed. Common- WEALTH. apa Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitors for the appellants, A. J. McLachlan & Co. fm Solicitor for the respondent, Gordon H. Castle, Crown Solicitor for Marieke the Commonwealth. Board 'sei ieL

THE METROPOLITAN MEAT INDUSTRY ) BOARD . j : e ? F i) Derenvant,

Disposal of offal - Taking portions of slaughtered animals without paymer Meat Industry Act 1915 (N.S.W.) (No. 69 of 1915), secs. 6, 7, 11, 13, 4,21, 30.

By the Meat Industry Act 1915 (N.S,W.) a board was created to manage at maintain certain abattoirs and to do all things that might be expedient am

Isaacs, Higeins, accordance with the Act to prevent diseased or unwholesome meat f ee passing into consumption (sec. 13). By sub-sec. 1 of sec. 30 power was giv

to make by-laws providing (inter alia) for the management and control of

public abattoirs, and for regulating and controlling the use of the same, and H.C. or A.

for regulating the conduct of all persons resorting thereto or slaughtering therein. By sub-sec. 2 of sec. 30 it was provided that "Such by-laws shall be submitted to the Governor for his approval, and if by him approved, shall be published in the Gazette, and thereupon but not sooner nor otherwise, shall, subject to this Act, have the force of law. All such by-laws on being gazetted shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within fourteen days after the next meeting of Parliament. If either House of Parliament passes a resolution of which notice has been given at any time within fifteen sitting days after such by-laws have been laid before such House disallowing any by-law, such by-law shall thereupon cease to have effect."

Held, by Knox C.J., Isaacs and Rich JJ., that the validity of a by-law, which was confined to the subject matters stated in sub-sec. | and which under sub- sec. 2 had been approved by the Governor, gazetted and not disallowed by Parliament, could not be challenged in a Court of law on the ground of unreasonableness.

A by-law made by the board provided that portions of animals slaughtered at the abattoirs might be taken by the board, some without payment and others at a price fixed by the board.

Held, by Knox ©.5., Isaacs and Rich JJ. (Higgins and Starke JJ. dissenting), that the by-law was within the power conferred by see. 30 (1), and was valid.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Harvey C.J. in Eq.) : Jones v. Metropolitan Meat Industry Board, (1925) 25 $.R. (N.S.W.) 553, affirmed.

On 31st May 1916 the Metropolitan Meat Industry Board, appointed under the Meat Industry Act 1915 (N.S.W.), purporting to act in pursuance of the provisions of that Act, made certain by-laws which, having been approved by the Governor in Council, "were published in the Government Gazette on 23rd June 1916. One of the by-laws (No. 24), which was headed " Disposal of Offal,"? was as follows : -

_ "Cattle. - No offal shall be removed from the abattoir premises spt as permitted by this by-law. The Board will take all sets.

of heads and feet, also tail-tips, and will pay for the same at a price to be fixed by the Board. The Board will permit the owner to take 'and remove from the abattoir all tongues, tails, and hearts, also ivers, cheeks, palates, and scrag meat, sufficient for butchers' retail trade requirements, if desired. The Board will take all kidney-fat which has been removed from any carcase, caul, rough fat, and gut-fat.

H.C. or A (except such caul-fat as the Board is satisfied the owner has sold for

butchers' retail trade requirements, or to margarine manufacturers for the purpose of conversion into oleo-margarine), and pay for same at the current market rate, to be fixed by the Board immediately before the end of each month, such price to hold good during the month then ensuing. All stomachs intended for the production of tripes shall be cleaned and cooked in the Board's tripery by or for the owner. Steam and water and the necessary conveniences will be supplied at a charge of 6d. per tripe. All stomachs not treated for production of tripes shall become the property of the Board without payment for same. The Board will take all other offal withou payment for same.

kidneys, and also any heads and frys required for trade purpi any surplus to become the property of the Board without payme forsame. The Board will take all kidney fat which has been remo from the carcase, caul, gut-fat, and rough fat, and pay for sam the current market rate to be fixed by the Board immediately before

then ensuing. The Board will take all other offal without payme for same.

" Pigs. - The Board will take first quality pig fat, and pay same at the current market rate, to be fixed by the Board immediately before the end of each month, such price to hold gi during the month then ensuing. The Board will take all other offa rough fat, pigs' hair, and trimmings without payment for same. '

"Calves. - The Board will permit the owner to take and remoy all heads and feet and frys, if required for trade purposes. surplus not so required, and all other offal, shall become the property of the Board without payment for same. The Board will take all caul fat and pay for same at the current market rate, to be fixed by the Board immediately before the end of each month, such to hold good during the month then ensuing.

" Casings - - The Board will permit the owner to sell all cai sheep, and pig casings to any person who shall have obtaii permission from the Board to treat such casings on the abat

premises; but will not, under any circumstances, permit their H.C. oF A.

: z 925.

removal from the abattoir premises prior to treatment. ive

"Meat condemned as unfit for human consumption. - The Board Jones

will purchase all meat condemned as unfit for human consumption =

Merro- at prices to be fixed by it." ee A suit was brought in the Supreme Court in its equitable juris- fodiens

diction by John Henry Jones against the Board, the plaintiff claiming

(so far as is material) a declaration that by-law No. 24 was ultra vires and was null and void and inoperative. The suit was heard by 7 larvey OJ. in Eq., who dismissed it with costs: Jones v. | Metropolitan Meat Industry Board (1) ).

From that decision the plaintiff now appealed to the High Court.

Brissenden K.C. (with him Weston), for the appellant. Notwith- "standing that the provisions of sec. 30 (2) of the Meat Industry Act 1915 have all been complied with and Parliament has not expressed its disapproval, the validity of a by-law may be inquired into by a Court (R. v. Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (2) ). _ [Knox C.J. referred to Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood (3). _ The decision in that case should be confined to cases where words are used which are similar to those in the section there under

consideration.

It was not intended by sec. 30 (2) to give by-laws any validity outside the Act, or to give validity to by-laws which are not in accordance with the Act, but to impose conditions which would allow of criticism and disapproval by Parliament. . [Counsel referred to Tait v. Pharmacy Board (4); Crick v. Harnett (5); Harnett v. rick (6).| A statute should not be so interpreted as to enable rivate property to be taken away without compensation unless the wer is explicitly given (Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v. Cannon Brewery Co. (7); Neweastle Breweries Ltd. v. The King (8) ; General v. De Keyser's Hotel (9); John Robinson & Co. v. The King (10)). 'The things which the by-law enables to be taken by (1) (1925) 25 S.R. (N.S.W.) 553. (6) (1908) A.C. 470, at p. 475.

(1899) 2 LR. 132, (7) (1919) A.C. 744, at p. 762.

~ (8) (1894) A.C. 347. (8) (1920) 1 KB. $54, at p. 865.

(4) (1902) 2 S.R. (N.S.W.) 168. (9) (1920) A.C. 508, at p. 529. (6) (1907) 78.8. (N.S.W.) 126, at p. 134, (10) (1921) 3 KB. 183, at p. 197.

H.C. ov A. the Board have no relation to the services given by the Board, a

so cannot be regarded as payment for those services. The evider

Jordan (McTiernan, A.-G. for N.S.W., with him), for respondent. So far as the by-law deals with things which are offal within the definition of that word in sec. 7, the by-law | undoubtedly within the power, and there is no reason why, if th rest of the by-law is bad, that part which is good should not stand The case cannot be put so high as Institute of Patent Agents y Lockwood (1). The question is, is by-law No. 24 within the power conferred by sec. 30 (1) (1)? A statutory power to make by-1 for a purpose is only a particular instance of a statutory power of statutory body to do a particular thing for a particular purpos Whatever the thing to be done is, the test of whether it is valid! done is the same - whether the power is to resume land or to mak a by-law. In such cases the test of whether the thing has been don for the authorized purpose is whether it has been done with the rea intention of serving the statutory purpose, and whether it is capal of serving that purpose. If this by-law fulfils both those requisite it is valid (Marquess of Clanricarde v. Congested Districts Board fo Ireland (2); Hudson's Bay Co. v. Maclay (3)). The ambit of th power to manage and control public abattoirs is a matter of evideneé and the evidence shows that it is necessary for the Board to hay full control over offal in order to preserve sanitation and to prevel congestion. The presumption that private property will not b taken without compensation must yield to the nature of the pow and its subject matter (Slattery v. Naylor (4); Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood (5) ).

(1) (1894) A.C, 347. (4) (1888) 13 App. Cas. 446, at p (2) (1914) 79 J.P. 481; 31 T.L.R. 120, 449. ae (3) (1920) 36 T.L.R. 469, at pp. 475-477. (5) (1894) A.C., at p. 355.

_. The following written judgments were delivered : -

_ Kyox C.J. This appeal raises the question whether by-law No.

mM, made by the respondent Board in exercise of the power conferred 'on it by the Meat Industry Act 1915, is valid.

Thave had the advantage of reading the opinion which my brother Isaacs is about to deliver. I agree with him in thinking that the

by-law in question is valid for the reasons which he has expressed, and have nothing to add.

~ Isaacs J. In my opinion the judgment of Harvey C.J. in Eq. was right, and should be affirmed. _ The by-law (No. 24) which is attacked undoubtedly at first sight 'appears open to some of the formidable objections relied on by Dr. Brissenden. When, however, the provisions of the Act are considered this purpose in connection with the principles that appropriately "guide a Court in a matter of this nature, it seems to me impossible to regard the by-law as unlawful in any respect. The by-law was 'made under the Act No. 69 of 1915. That Act applies to what is led the Metropolitan Abattoir Area, comprising the County of Cumberland, and therefore extending to a vast population. By ¢. 8 Parliament created a Metropolitan Meat Industry Board of 'three members to be appointed by the Governor in Council. By 'sec. 11 there was vested in the Board, for the purposes of the Act, certain "land and buildings" mentioned in Schedule One. One of those buildings is the abattoir at Homebush Point. That abattoir completed about January or February 1916, at a cost of about £1,500,000. The Act, though passed on 31st December 1915, came ito force on Ist March 1916. The Legislature, therefore, it was that sted in and handed over to the Board the identical abattoir now existing. If it were necessary to consider the reasonableness of the »y-law, this would be a material element, because reasonableness must have relation to all the attendant circumstances, and, in the case supposed, the size, position, structure, capacity and conveniences of the place would have to come into the account. Tn the view of the law I take, this is not necessary. Sec. 11, as

Stated, vests the abattoir in the Board "for the purposes of this VOL, Xxxvit. 17

Act." In view of what I shall say later, it is necessary to obser that the phrase quoted is not a specific limitation on any poy expressed in the Act, but it indicates the character in which th stro. Board becomes the legal owner of the abattoir, namely, an offi pourraN character, that is, to enable it to discharge the public functio

dao C EERE which the Act directly creates or permits the Board to assume OARD.

not for any purpose incompatible with those functions. The A also empowers the Board to acquire or construct further works, but

until Parliament provides the necessary funds this power cannot constitutionally be eflectively exercised. Sec. 13 of the Act ena "Tt shall be the duty of the Board to manage and maintain a public abattoirs ; to manage and maintain all public sale-yards any meat-markets ; and also to do all such things as may be expe and in accordance with this Act to prevent diseased or unwhol meat from passing into consumption in the Metropolitan Abattoi Area." This is the central provision in the Act. But it marks out the absolute functions of the Board in broad outlines only. It is obviously necessary in order that the Board may peri those functions with efficiency that whatever regulations it shall have more than mere directory force. Sec. 30 the confers on the Board the power of making various by-laws. power includes, by sub-sec. 1, par. 1, " providing for the man ment and control of all public abattoirs . . . and for regulat and controlling the use of the same, and for regulating the conduct of all persons using the same or resorting thereto, or slaughtering therein." I attach no importance for present purposes to

sec. 14 (1), which was also relied on. That section, by its gover words, relates to discretionary matters, that is, matters which Board may if it thinks fit embark upon or refrain from touching atall Once an abattoir is established, however, the mandatory pro of sec. 13 and the legislative powers of sec. 30 come into play; these are what we are now concerned with. It is the duty of th

history of the legislation replaced by the Act, to manage and the Homebush Abattoir in the interest of the public health. ment has not attempted to lay down in detail the rules and regulati proper for adjusting the private interests of those engaged i

supplying the public with the general interests of the community. 'These it has left to the Board with certain reservations, to which I shall refer. But the main thing in this connection is to approach the consideration of the by-law now challenged with a proper understanding of what the Legislature expects of the Board when framing its by-laws. I apprehend this public body is expected to insist on slaughtering and its consequential operations being conducted with all precautions which the Board considers necessary to guard against danger to health arising in any way from those operations ; but, subject to that and subject also to any other power conferred by the Act, the natural expectation is that proprietary and trade interests of individuals wil] not be interfered with. But it is the Board's opinion of the proper method of adjusting public and private interests that, with certain limitations, is to govern. _ Sec. 30, sub-sec. 2, sets out the limitations in these words: "' Such by-laws shall be submitted to the Governor for his approval, and if by him approved, shall be published in the Gazette, and thereupon but not sooner nor otherwise, shall, subject to this Act, have the force of law." Then provision is made for the gazetted by-laws being laid before both Houses of Parliament, and that on a resolution of either House within the stated time disallowing any by-law, it shall thereupon cease to have effect. The words " subject to this Act" mean, in my opinion, if not inconsistent with or repugnant to any provision of the Act. Their force is that, while otherwise full freedom is given to the Board, conditionally on the Governoy's approval, to make any by-law it pleases to regulate the management and control of the abattoir, nothing must be provided that is contrary to any enactment of Parliament itself, including that as to disallow-

ance. The conditions of validity of a by-law therefore are: (1) the

_ by-law must be confined to the subject matters stated in sec. 30; (2) the Governor must approve ; (3) the by-law must be gazetted ; (4) Parliament must not have disallowed it. Provided those

conditions exist - conditions amounting practically, though not

strictly, to parliamentary legislation, because both Crown and Parliament acquiesce - is there not really an end of the matter ? Can a Court proceed to investigate the reasonableness of the by-law or the purpose of the Board in making it? If what is done were

clearly ex facie outside the legal limits of "" management and control "

of the abattoir, and outside "regulating and controlling its use," and outside "regulating the conduct " of persons using it, then I should agree the by-law was, at all events pro tanto, unauthorized, All these questions are of great importance to public bodies, and 1 shall deal with them separately. ,

Prima facie authority - The by-law is prima facie lawful if, when read and construed as it stands in the code of regulations, it falls within the words of the power to make by-laws. The Board, _ being the legal owner of the abattoir and being directed to manage and maintain it, would of course, in the absence of express or implied limitation, have the power of its "' management and control " and of - regulating and controlling its use. and to that extent of laying doy the conditions upon which persons desiring to slaughter animals there should be permitted to do so. Any doubt as to the power to charge fees for that permission is set at rest by sec. 15. When by-law No. 24 is read, there is nothing in it which as owner of the abattoir the Board could not stipulate as part of its '' management and control" "regulating and control ing

very comprehensive words - and as the use" of it, and as regulating the conduct of persons who voluntarily come there to slaughter cattle. It may be the terms ar severe ; at first sight they might seem harsh ; some persons even think them unduly stringent, having regard to facilities for removing and dealing with offal. But that is nothing to the point. As a bare matter of law, and strict construction, they are within the literal terms of the power contained in the first aie oT sec. 30 (1). The provision for fixing the Board's monthly " curre market rate" does not detract from this, because on the aa of the by-law that is so much to the good of the person concerned. If the Board can, within the literal terms of the power, refuse to allow the meat and fat and stomachs " taken" by the Board to be removed at all, the fact of allowing a stated price is not a vitiating factor. Prima facie therefore the by-law is not invalid.

Unreasonableness. - Vhe first reason pressed by Dr. Brissender for regarding the by-law as invalid, even supposing the leg frontiers of the power were not ex facie passed, was unreasonablent 8. It was, so it was urged, so unreasonable to insist on taking privat

property by compulsion and at a price arbitrarily fixed by the Board, that such a power could not properly be held to be within the power relied on. The unreasonableness of a by-law as a ground of invalidity is well known with respect to common law corporations and some statutory corporations. But with respect to the latter the terms of the Act have to be regarded in each case. When these are borne in mind the test is settled. As Lord Sumner said in R. v. Broad (1), " the rule is well established that if by-laws ' involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reason- able men, the Court might well say - '* Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules '': per Lord Russell of Killowen ©.J. in Kruse v. Johnson (2)." Court to reach such a conclusion by such a test when Parliament

itself by its silence negatives it and the Governor in Council affirm- atively repels it. As I have stated, at first sight this appears a formidable objection. But I have already mentioned one answer, a literal answer, to it. There is also a very substantial and practical answer, which I stated during the argument, and will repeat. A butcher is undoubtedly the owner of the beast he designs to slaughter for food. But, if for the purposes of his business he comes to the Board's abattoir to slaughter the beast for food, there is nothing which shocks the conscience in the Board's insisting on two conditions. First, that whatever meat then fit for human consumption he cannot satisfy the Board is needed for butchers' retail require- ments, and whatever fat has not been already sold, and such stomachs as are not intended for the production of tripe, must be left behind. Climatic conditions and the possibility of the butcher waiting an indefinite period to pass on those articles - perhaps in some flavoured and unexaminable form - may well in the opinion of the Board make it undesirable to allow them to leave the abattoir. Evidently, from the history of the legislation. some better public control of such matters than previously existed was thought necessary. The Board, however, while not leaving the public at the merey of the butcher in this respect, may well utilize the products to general advantage and without general danger. The provision for payment, (1) (1915) A.C. 1110, at p. 1122. (2) (1898) 2 QB. 91, at p. 99.

if fairly carried out - and there is nothing to show it is not fairly carried out - is an indication to me of a genuine desire to press on private interests no more severely than the public safety, in the opinion of the Board, demands. The case, consequently, is very far removed from any such extreme instance as might conceivably warrant a Court in intervening notwithstanding the combined opinion of the Board, the Crown and the two Houses of Parliament

Pwrpose- - Apart from inherent unreasonableness, said learned counsel, the facts showed an illegitimate purpose. Sec. 14, sub-see,
enables the Board to " make such arrangements as it thinks fit with regard to the purchase, collection, and disposal of offal or other matter. and apply any manufacturing process thereto, and convertit into a merchantable article and sell the same." It was earnestly suggested that the real purpose behind the provision for taking and. paying for offal was to pursue the power set out in sec. 14 (8) mor cheaply than if done directly by voluntary bargaining. Both sides thought that the purpose of the Board was a fit subject for o} consideration. Dr. Brissenden urged the ulterior purpose referred to as destructive of the by-law. Mr. Jordan, while denying the purpose so attributed to the Board and maintaining the propriety of its actual purpose, contended that such propriety was in itself the really decisive test of validity. He relied on Marquess of Clanricarde v. Congested Districts Board for Ireland (1) as establishing that test. Tam unable to think that we have any right to consider the Board's purpose in this case. There are forms of legislative authority, such as in Clanricarde's Case and in Municipal Couneil Sydney v. Campbell (2), where a given " purpose " is made an express condition of exercising the power. If that "purpose" is not pursued, the power is not exerciseable, and therefore the facts are examinable in order to ascertain what purpose was in view. But no such condition is inserted in the Act now under consideration. The power is to make by-laws of the stated character, namely, providing for the management and control of the public abattoir, &c. The particular statutory purpose the Board had in mind in making that provision is immaterial; the specific use to which it intended to put the by-law after it was made is not a relevant

(1) (1914) 31 TLR. 120; 79 J.P. 481. (2) (1925) A.C. 338.

consideration. This, which is a point sometimes overlooked, was 1: ©: oF 4.

-very fully dealt with recently (in 1918) by Lord Sumner in Narma v. Bombay Municipal Commissioner (1). There a Municipal Commis- Pie had power under an Act to prescribe the regular line of a street. In form he purported to do so, and in fact actually did so.

His object in doing so was to acquire land under the Municipal Act instead of having to acquire it under the Land Acquisition Act. It was held that the ulterior purpose was immaterial. Lord Sumner

said (2) : - * Even if it were proved, as it is not, that the creation and preservation of a regular line on the north side of the road was no part of the Commissioner's object, though it certainly was an incidental result of his scheme, their Lordships can find nothing in the Act which either entitles the appellants to investigate his motives or has the effect of invalidating his action on account of the purpose, 'with which in fact he prescribed the regular line of the street." Then Lord Swnner pointed the distinction between the two classes 'of cases in these words : - * Cases in which it has been held that powers conferred only for a statutory purpose cannot be validly

xercised for a different purpose are not in point. Such an exercise

f the powers is outside the Act which confers them. Here the exercise of the powers was within the Act, for it was in strict conformity with the terms of the Act." That the Board's powers "must be exercised in good faith, that is, honestly, is inherent in the "matter. That has nothing to do with fraud, in the extended equity _sense of a fraud on a power where there is no moral turpitude (see -Vateher v. Paull (3) ). The two conceptions, however, intermingled so much during the argument that I think it very desirable to

distinguish between them.

Good faith - The good faith, which is the antithesis of fraud in this connection, is that which is required, in the common law sense

relation to the legal exercise of statutory powers, and is not pendent on any doctrine of equity. It is wholly distinct from the

notion of mistakenly pursuing a by-purpose. Such a pursuit may in this connection be honest or dishonest. The body pursuing it may genuinely avow it, thinking it permissible. There the action

(1) (1918) LAR. 45 Ind, App. 125. (2) LR. 45 Ind. App., at p. 129. (3) (1915) A.C. 372, at p. 378.

adopted may be ultra vires, but not mala fide. On the other hand, there may be a pretended pursuit of a legitimate purpose that , mala fide. In the Bombay Case (1), Lord Sumner said of the Comm sioner it was " quite clear that he acted in good faith, for the benefit, as he supposed, of the corporation which he represented, and, as he conceived, in the discharge of his duty.'' He said that for the Boa consisting of Lord Lorebwrn, Lord Dunedin and himself. Two o those learned Lords had only three years before definitely settled that question in Clanricarde's Case, as appears very clearly from fuller report in the Local Government Reports (2). It apy (3) that counsel argued, that "while not acting bona fide," respondent Board "were not acting dishonestly, but merely from a by-motive which rendered the proceedings wltra vires."

proceedings were regular, but in substance, so the appella

contended, they were proceeding ultra vires. At first there

honesty or good faith, but merely that there was some by-motive. think it would be better to select some happier expression. I do not understand an honest dishonesty.' Lord Dunedin concurred with Lord Loreburn. Lord Atkinson spoke of evidence (5), "that pretended belief is not a real and bona fide one." Lord Pa said as to bona fides (6): "I should prefer to limit this expression to a case in which dishonesty is directly charged, and to differentiate a case of ultra vires, but so long as the distinction between dishonesty

and ultra vires based on other grounds is sufficiently maintained,

(1) (1918) L.R. 45 Ind. App., at p. 128, (4) (1914) 13 L.G.R., at p. 418. (2) (1914) 1 R. 415. (5) (1914) 13 L.G.R., at p. 420. (3) (1914) 13 L.G.R., at p. 417. (6) (1914) 13 L.G.R., at p. 421.

actual words used are of less moment." It is not contested here H.C. oF A.

that in making the by-law the Board was acting in good faith for the corporation and for its benefit, and in order to facilitate functions which the Board was empowered to perform under the Act. If for the Land Acquisition Act in the Bombay Case (1) we substitute sec, 14 (8) of the Meat Industry Act, the judgment of Lord Sumner is a very direct authority on this branch of the case.

Hieerns J. This is a suit for a declaration that a by-law made by the Board, and numbered 24, is void as being beyond the Board's powers ; and for an injunction restraining the Board from acting in pursuance of the by-law. The plaintiff is a carcase butcher in Sydney who has his beasts killed in the public abattoir at Homebush Point, which is managed and maintained by the Board - the " Metropolitan Meat Industry Board " - under the Meat Industry Act 1915. No objection is raised by the Board to the form of the proceeding.

By sec. 13 it is the duty of the Board to manage and maintain all public abattoirs - that is to say, the abattoir at Homebush Point or any other abattoirs purchased, &c., by the Board; to manage and maintain all public sale-yards and meat markets ; and also to do all such things as may be expedient "and in accordance with this Act" to prevent diseased or unwholesome meat from passing into consumption in the Metropolitan Abattoirs Area. By sec. 14 the Board has power to establish, maintain and conduct abattoirs, &c.,

in any part of that area; to establish, &c., works for canning, preserving, chilling or freezing meat ; to take delivery of cattle and slaughter the same on behalf of the Board or of any person: to purchase cattle (including sheep, &c.); to sell cattle or meat; to export meat and sell the same and enter into contracts for exporting _ or selling ; to deliver or contract to deliver to any person any meat ; _ to make such arrangements as it thinks fit with regard to the purchase collection and disposal of offal or other matter, and apply any manufacturing process thereto, and convert it into a merchant- able article and sell the same. By sec. 7 " meat"? means the whole or any part of an animal such as is used for human consumption ;

and " offal" includes blood, refuse portions of meat, hides, skins, hair, hoofs, and horns, or other portions of any animal which are' not ordinarily used for the food of man. By sec. 21 the carcases or meat of all animals destroyed after being condemned by an inspector as being diseased become the absolute property of the Board, and the Board must pay to the owner such reasonable compensation as the Board may determine. By sec. 28 meat seized which is not marked as prescribed becomes after forty-eight hours the property of the Board. It will be noticed, under secs. 21 and 28, that there are certain defined cases in which meat and animals become the property of the Board; and that under sec. 14 the Board may purchase them - not appropriate them without payment or with such payment as the Board may fix.

But by sec. 30 the Board has power to make by-laws ; that is to say, (sub-sec. 1) (1) by-laws providing for the management and control of all public abattoirs. &c., and for regulating and controlling the use of the same, and for regulating the conduct of all persons using the same or resorting thereto, or slaughtering. buying, selling or dealing therein ; and, generally, (11) for carrying into effect the purposes an : provisions of the Act. Then (sub-sec. 2) "such by-laws shall be submitted to the Governor for his approval, and if by him approved, shall be published in the Gazette, and thereupon but not sooner nor otherwise, shall, subject to this Act, have the force of law. All such by-laws on being gazetted shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within fourteen days after the next meeting of Parliament. Tf either House of Parliament passes a resolution of which notice has been given at any time within fifteen sitting days after such by-laws have been laid before such House disallowing any by-law, such by-law shall thereupon cease to have efiect."

The first question is, is by-law No. 24 within the powers of the Board to make by-laws ? and the second is, if not within the powers, is it made valid by sub-sec. 2 of sec. 30 ?

(1) The by-law impugned has been already set out. It begins by forbidding offal to be removed from the abattoir premises exe as prescribed by this by-law. This provision seems to mean that the by-law must either stand as a whole or fall as a whole - seems to negative severability of the parts so that some may stand and some

may fall. Then, as to heads and feet and tail-tips of cattle, the H.C. or A- 1925.

Board is to take them all at its own price. As to tongues, tails and

hearts, also livers, cheeks, palates, and scrag meat, sufficient for

butchers' retail trade requirements, the Board " will permit" the owner to take them if desired. Each of these items is comprised

within the meaning of " meat '' (supra) as being a part of an animal ; such as is used for human consumption ; it cannot be called " oftal." As to kidney-fat, caul-fat (with some exceptions), rough fat and gut- fat, the Board is to take all, and pay for it at the current market rates to be fixed by the Board immediately before the end of each month as for the month next ensuing. As to stomachs intended for the production of tripes, they are to be cleaned and cooked 'in the Board's tripety by or for the owner, at a charge of 6d. per tripe ; and all stomachs not so intended are to become the property of the Board "without payment for the same." 'The Board will take all " other offal" without payment. As for sheep, the Board "will permit" the owner to take tongues and kidneys, and any

heads and frys required for trade purposes; but any surplus is to become the property of the Board without payment. The provision for the kidney-fat, caul-fat, gut-fat and rough fat of sheep is the 'same (substantially) as the provision as to fats in cattle; and the Board will take all " other offal" without payment.

It is unnecessary to set out in detail the similar provisions as to pigs and calves. As to casings, the Board " will permit " the owner 'to sell them to any person who has obtained permission from the Board to treat them on the abattoir premises ; but will not permit them to be removed therefrom before treatment. As to meat mdemned as unfit for human consumption, the Board will purchase "it all at prices to be fixed by it. In considering the effect of by-law No, 24, it should be observed that under by-law No. 25 all hides and skins (although included under the term " offal") "shall be the property of the owner of the carease." One would ve thought that they were his property already: the owner of the whole is the owner of the parts.

Now, on considering these provisions, this is clear: that they wolve the compulsory acquisition of property by the Board - in

some cases, with compensation; in other cases, without comp tion. Even where there is to be compensation the amount is to be fixed by the Board. I suppose, therefore, that the wor "confiscation " would be appropriate ; but I do not like to use term which has such sinister associations in popular discussions, What is there in the power to make by-laws to justify such provisi There is, as I have said, a general power to make by-laws for carrying into effect the purposes and provisions of the Act. The Board has power to conduct abattoirs, to purchase animals or meat, to slaughte animals either on its own behalf or on behalf of any other person

and disposal of offal or other matter, and apply any manufacturi process thereto, and convert it into a merchantable article and the same (sec. 14). It has a duty to do all such things as may b expedient to prevent diseased or unwholesome meat from p: into consumption in the Metropolitan Area ; but these things be not only expedient, but "in accordance with the Act." I find nothing in the Act that expressly or by necessary implicatio enables the Board to override the British principle - British prejudice some might call it - in favour of the sanctity of private property and it is our duty as a Court of law to enforce this principle unle the Act clearly negatives it.

But, without calling in aid this principle, it will be admitted that the Board must show affirmatively the power claimed, and there i nothing in the words of the Act that shows clearly an intention to confer this power.

The learned Judge of first instance has dismissed the suit, fin that the Board has the power to make the by-law under the wor in sec. 30 (1) (1). By-laws may be made "for regulating a controlling the use" of the abattoirs. There is no other pow to take offal withont paying for it; but this power, according to the decision, authorizes the Board to determine whether an ownel of cattle should be allowed to remove any portion of the offal. There is, of course, more than offal affected by this by-law. Accord- ing to the decision, if every owner were entitled to remove the gut-fat, he must be entitled to remove all other parts of the animals, including the blood and the intestines and their contents ; and that would b

impossible or absurd - the abattoirs it is said, could not be used if the H.C. or A.

owners had that right. "The slaughter chambers are arranged "in units so as to permit of several butchers operating at once. The blood of all animals being slaughtered in one unit at the same time, possibly the property of as many as twelve owners, is carried away 'in one drain uniting with the drainage from all the other slaughtering units" (1). There is no doubt that there are grave practical difficulties in working the abattoirs if all the offal of each animal has to be restored to the owner of the animal; but these are difficulties which are due mainly to the construction and organization of these Homebush abattoirs. The judgment, rightly as I think, points out that the principal object of the Act is what his Honor calls the _ "hygienic dressing of meat"; but this object has to be carried out "in accordance with the Act." It may well be that if the by-law be declared invalid there will be structural alterations required, and considerable expense incurred; it may well be that the Legislature may think fit to increase the powers of the Board ; but. my opinion is, that under the existing Act the Board has not, apart from sec. 30 (2), any power to make a by-law to the effect of by-law No. 24. (2) But it is suggested that though the Act may not confer the power to make the by-law, the effect of sec. 30 (2) is to give to this by-law the force of law, inasmuch as neither House of the Legislature has disallowed it. I have set sub-sec. 2 out above. As a matter of interpretation, if we are not fettered by cases decided, it seems to _ me very clear that the only by-laws which are to have the force of ; law are by-laws made under the powers conferred by sec. 30 (1) - "such by-laws." Having been made under sec. 30 (1), they are first to be approved by the Governor in Council, then published in _ the Gazette, and on such publication they shall have the force of law, _ "subject to this Act." I may assume, in favour of the Board, that _ these words "subject to this Act" refer merely to the provision _ Which follows for laying the by-law before the legislative Houses and to the power of either House disallowing the by-law. In the event of disallowance, the by-law does not become void ab initio ; it merely "ceases to have effect." But the whole operation of

H.C. or A. sub-sec. 2 is obviously confined to '* such " by-laws, - by-laws such

as provided in sec. 30, sub-sec. 1. The much discussed case of Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood (1) is not applicable at all That case turned on the peculiar words of two successive Acts of Parliament, and in particular on the words " and the provisions of sec. 101 of the principal Act shall apply to all rules so made as if the were made in pursuance of that section." These words are not us here. That case needs the closest attention before it be applie and I think that the explanation of the case which my brother Stark suggested during the argument is very probably right. But my opinion is that this by-law No. 24 is not made valid by sec. 30 (2),

I think that the appeal should be allowed, the judgment se aside. the declaration made, and an injunction ordered. q

Ricx J. I concur in the reasons of my brother Isaacs, and agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

Srarke J. I agree with my brother Higgins, and concur in the opinion which he has delivered. 4

Solicitors for the appellant, Sly & Russell. Solicitor for the respondent, J. V. Tillett, Crown Solicitor for New South Wales.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (111 paragraphs)