The enclosures to the letter of 27 March 2003
8 Jericho sent a letter of 27 March 2003 to the solicitors for Garden Tower who received it on 28 March 2003. It stated that strata levies of $14,699.40 had been paid on 18 April 2001, $9,456.50 had been paid on 10 May 2002 and $10,309.56 had been paid on 3 March 2003, a total of $34,465.46.
9 Garden Tower refused to pay this amount because it said the letter did not constitute evidence of payment by Jericho for the purposes of cl 7(a)(i) of the deed of release.
10 Jericho submitted that the statement in the letter was sufficient evidence of payment. I reject that submission. What was required by cl 7(a) of the deed of release was something more than a bare assertion by Jericho. It called for some documentation or other evidence of payment by Jericho.
11 The letter referred to attached invoices and evidence of receipt of payments. Warren Frazer Ball was the solicitor with the carriage of Garden Tower's defence. He swore an affidavit in which he acknowledged receipt of the letter but said that it did not contain any documents or invoices.
12 No notice had been served on Garden Tower requiring Mr Ball for cross-examination and he was not available for that purpose.
13 The letter was sent by George Esber, a director of Jericho. He was produced for cross-examination. He said he recalled including the enclosures with the letter of 27 March 2003 and it was not possible that he omitted to enclose them. A registered post receipt recorded that the posting was by way of a large envelope.
14 There was no response from Mr Ball on receipt of the letter on 28 March 2003 that the enclosures were missing. A notice to produce the original of the letter was not answered. Nor was there reference to missing enclosures in later correspondence.
15 It was put to Mr Esber in cross-examination that on 6 August 2004, Mr Ball wrote to Jericho's solicitors saying that he did not receive the letter of 27 March 2003, a proposition inconsistent with Mr Ball's affidavit. Mr Esber acknowledged that he was aware that the solicitors for Garden Tower had, at one stage, claimed that they had not received the letter.
16 I have had the advantage of observing Mr Esber in the witness box. I prefer his evidence to that of Mr Ball. It is, to a certain extent, corroborated by the need for a large envelope. It lacks the inconsistencies in the evidence adduced on behalf of Garden Tower on this issue. I find that the enclosures were sent to the solicitors for Garden Tower with the letter of 27 March 2006.
The evidence of payment of $14,699.40
17 It was conceded that if I formed the view that the attachments accompanied the letter of 27 March 2003, Jericho had given evidence of payment of the strata levies paid on 10 May 2002 of $9,456.50 and of the strata levies paid on 3 March 2003 of $10,309.56.
18 It was claimed, however, that the enclosures did not establish the figure of $14,699.40 paid on 18 April 2001. It was conceded that the evidence of strata levy receipts tendered before me established that Jericho had paid this amount. It was argued, however, that no liability arose in Garden Tower prior to trial because of the failure to produce evidence of the payments with the letter of 27 March 2003.
19 The amount in question was made up of levies with respect to five units. The attachments included Local Court statements of liquidated claim with respect to the levies for each of those units together with garnishee orders in the amounts specified in the letter of 27 March 2003 that totalled $14,699.40.
20 In my view, the copies of the Local Court pleadings together with the garnishee orders constituted sufficient corroboration of the assertion that Jericho had paid the amounts in question to satisfy the requirement in cl 7(a)(i) of the deed of release. Those documents supported the statement that the amounts had been paid by Jericho and the inference to be drawn from them is that that assertion was correct.
No cause of action
21 It was submitted that if evidence of the payment of the $14,699.40 had not been given to Garden Tower, the amended summons was invalid because there was no cause of action in existence when the amendment was made and, in any event, the amended summons related back to the original summons. No authority was cited for either proposition.
22 The Supreme Court Rules 1970, Pt 15 r 16 provided that a party might plead any matter notwithstanding that the matter had arisen after the commencement of the proceedings. In Baldry v Jackson (1976) 2 NSWLR 415, the Court of Appeal held that the word "matter" in that rule did not extend to a cause of action because the rules distinguished between a cause of action and a matter. The Court also held that an amendment, duly made, takes effect not from the date when the amendment is made, but from the date of the original document that it amends. The rule now finds its expression in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, r 14.17.
23 However, the Supreme Court Rules 1970, Pt 20 r 1(3A) was inserted in 1995. Part 20 r 1(1) provided that the Court might, at any stage of any proceedings, on application by any party or of its own motion, order that any document in the proceedings be amended, or that any party have leave to amend any documents in the proceedings, in either case in such manner as the Court thought fit. Rule 1(3A) was in the following terms:
"An order may be made, or leave may be granted, under subrule (1) notwithstanding that the effect of the amendment is, or would be, to add or substitute a cause of action arising after the commencement of the proceedings, but in such a case the date of commencement of the proceedings, so far as concerns that cause of action, shall, subject to rule 4, be the date on which the amendment is made."