In its draft notice of appeal, the applicant submitted that the primary judge erroneously:
1. found that cl 30.5(a) did not constitute an arbitration agreement under s 7 of the Commercial Arbitration Act in circumstances where s 7 does not impose those requirements;
2. failed to consider the surrounding circumstances that s 8 of the Commercial Arbitration Act gave primacy to arbitration. The National Gas (NSW) Law provided for arbitration in rules disputes under Chapter 8, Part 5A of the Law and arbitration‑like procedures and access disputes under Chapter 6 of the Law, and the Act provides the jurisdiction and procedural requirements for the conduct of an arbitration;
3. found that there was no critical provision for either party to refer the dispute to arbitration or litigation when each party had a right to have recourse to arbitration by cl 30.5(a);
4. found the reference to "arbitration or litigation" in cl 30.5(a) was given content and utility by reason of the possibility that the parties may agree to arbitration pursuant to cl 30.4 where there was no evidence for that finding and it was speculative and not more likely than not when considered in light of the text of the clause;
5. failed to consider the following in construing cl 30:
1. use of the word "recourse" when prefaced with "each party agrees" indicates a right to turn or resort or refer to arbitration vesting in each party; and
2. it provides procedural requirements for a mediation recognising that no law mandates such requirements.
Proposed grounds 3, 4 and 5 address the language of cl 30.5(a); ground 2 identifies a contextual element, and ground 1 is generic.
Ordinarily, leave to appeal is granted only in matters which involve issues of principle, questions of general public importance or an injustice which is reasonably clear: see Carolan v AMF Bowling Pty Ltd. [4] Where legal error is alleged, it is necessary to demonstrate more than arguable error.
It is by no means clear that any issue of principle or matter of general public importance is involved. The key issue in the proposed appeal is whether cl 30.5(a) constitutes an "arbitration agreement" within s 7 of the Act. There is no suggestion that the Agreement is in the standard form or that the terms of s 7 require explication.
The principles of contractual construction relevant to the present case are not controversial. The legal meaning of the critical clause is discovered by reference to the contractual text construed in the light of its context and purpose: see Electricity Generation Corporation v Woodside Energy Ltd; [5] Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd; [6] Victoria v Tatts Group Ltd. [7]
The applicant's argument in this Court is basically that arbitration being consensual, any reference to arbitration in an agreement will result in an "arbitration agreement" and thus satisfy the definition in s 7(1). However, that is not so unless the reference constitutes a written agreement to arbitrate pursuant to s 7(3). The applicant said that the absence of machinery provisions is understandable given the provision in s 21 of the Act as to the effect of a reference to arbitration being received by the respondent. However, s 21 provides for no more than the effect of a request. The absence of a provision of referral in the agreement is relevant to construing a contract which contains no express agreement to arbitrate. Further, the reference to arbitration in cl 30.5(a) may, as the trial judge said, be read as an acknowledgement of the possible result of a mediation, or one might add, of good faith discussions referred to in cl 30.4 which might create an agreement to arbitrate. The reference to arbitration has work to do if the applicant's argument is not accepted. Thus the clause may assume a right but not create one.
The applicant submitted that a construction that the parties might agree to engage in arbitration after the mandatory mediation is incongruous with the wording of the clause which refers to "each Party", not the parties jointly. The applicant also submitted that the word "recourse" in that clause is the "embodiment of a right". The applicant submitted that Manningham and Mulgrave involved different statutory contexts and should not have been applied by the primary judge. As the respondent submitted, it was the applicant which brought Manningham and Mulgrave to the attention of the primary judge, so nothing turns on the last point raised by the applicant. In any event, Manningham and Mulgrave do not assist the applicant here for reasons already noted. In those cases it was tolerably clear that the parties had agreed upon arbitration in the event of a dispute; here, there is no such clear agreement.
The effect of cl 30.5(a) is merely to recognise that arbitration and litigation are options available once mediation has failed. The provision for arbitration under the National Gas (NSW) Law (in relation to disputes which do not include the present dispute) takes the matter no further, although it may possibly provide a reason why there was a reference to arbitration in cl 30.5(a). Those provisions do not pick up and apply to the Agreement principles relating to arbitration of "access disputes" under that law so as to incorporate it into the dispute resolution scheme provided by cl 30 generally, as argued by the applicant below. Nor does the provision under the National Gas (NSW) Law for arbitration of access disputes (which does not include the present dispute) provide assistance in construing cl 30, except to the limited extent just noted.
The use of the term "recourse" in cl 30.5(a) does not lead to any different conclusion. In context that term refers to the availability of arbitration or litigation once mediation has failed; it does not create an obligation to arbitrate, nor a right to require arbitration.
While there may be some doubt as to what is meant by the reference in s 7(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Act to an agreement to submit "certain disputes" to arbitration, that phrase should not be read to refer to an agreement which merely identifies the possibility of arbitration without any express or implicit agreement to submit all disputes or any class of disputes to arbitration, as opposed to litigating. The purpose of s 8 of the Act is to provide a mechanism to ensure that an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable and excludes the power of the court to permit litigation to proceed in the face of such an agreement. It would not assist that purpose to accept that any contractual arrangement which contemplated the possibility of arbitration, without any express agreement in writing to submit a particular category of disputes to arbitration, should result in the unilateral power to enforce arbitration in relation to all disputes.
[2]
Conclusion and orders
There is insufficient doubt attending the decision of the primary judge to warrant a grant of leave to appeal.
The Court orders:
1. Refuse leave to appeal.
2. Order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application.
[3]
Endnotes
(1995) 184 CLR 301; [1995] HCA 36.
[1999] 3 VR 13; [1999] VSCA 158.
[2002] 2 Qd R 514; [2001] QCA 471.
[1995] NSWCA 69 (Kirby P).
(2014) 251 CLR 640; [2014] HCA 7 at [35].
(2015) 256 CLR 104; [2015] HCA 37 at [46]-[51] and [108]-[109].
[2016] HCA 5; (2016) 90 ALJR 392 at [51]-[75].
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Decision last updated: 20 October 2017