The method of approach for this purpose of conflict is marked out by the case of McArthur[10], and we accordingly follow it. First, we examine the language of sec. 20 and the determinations, to ascertain its purport apart from any restraining considerations of Constitutions, either State or Federal: next, if necessary, we interpret, which includes its application, the State Constitution (Macleod v. Attorney-General for New South Wales[11]); and lastly, if that be also necessary, and only if necessary, we interpret and apply the Federal Constitution (McArthur's Case). Confining ourselves, in the first instance, to the language of the instruments - section and determination - the central word is "marketing." The determination of the Board is to regulate "marketing," as to (1) "where," or (2) "in what respective quantities" the output of dried fruits may be "marketed." The word "marketed" in the determination must be given the same meaning as it has in the Act (Richards v. Attorney-General of Jamaica[12]). "Marketing" of dried fruits is indeed the central purpose of the Act, as may be seen by reference to its title, to sec. 19 (b), to sec. 20 and to sec. 34, sub-secs. 1 (a) and 1 (c). Other provisions are substantially ancillary to the control of "marketing." The true interpretation of the disputable words when all proper canons of interpretation are applied, is this: - "Marketed" means some commercial act done in South Australia, such as sale, consignment or otherwise, having the effect of supplying the economic demand for dried fruits in some markets. "Where" is universal. It refers to any place in the world where such demand exists. The relation of the two words in sec. 20 is comparable to the relation between firing a bullet from a gun of unlimited range in South Australia at a target situate anywhere. The remaining language of the section is not open to controversy. The construction of the first sub-section, then, is as follows: - The Board has power to determine in what market for dried fruits in the world, and in what respective quantities, dried fruits are to be marketed - that is, so sold, consigned or otherwise commercially dealt with in South Australia as to be thereby supplied to any market for dried fruits anywhere in the world, &c. The determination as an exercise of that power says that so marketing within the Commonwealth, the stated proportional quantities are not to be exceeded. In interpreting the word "marketed" we have not been unconscious of the danger the community runs of having its legislative measures designed for meeting new needs and circumstances of its progress and development frustrated by the comparative want of judicial acquaintance with the current coin of commercial intercourse. The mintage of commercial words and phrases is so rapid, new or specialized values are so frequently given to the verbal coin already in circulation, that Courts may easily fail to perceive the intended meaning of expressions in modern statutes. Parliament is in necessarily closer touch with the ordinary streams of commercial thought and modes of expression than is the Judiciary, and therefore the full connotation of the word "marketed," as used in this connection, has given us much reason for consideration. But one thing is quite clear. The term "market" and, necessarily, its correlatives "marketing" and "marketed" have in recent years considerably expanded with the enlargement and adjustment of international commerce. Even since 1908, when the relevant volume of the Oxford Dictionary appeared, the literature of the subject shows a noticeable alteration in the connotation of the terms "market" and its cognate expressions. Webster's Dictionary (1923 and 1926), when contrasted with the Oxford Dictionary of 1908 and the Webster (say) of 1883, shows the great enlargement in the connotation of the word "market." From denoting the very limited locality itself where the mutual operations of buying and selling took place, it has come to bear also the world-wide conception as the recent Webster in the sixth meaning has it, "the economic extent of the commercial demand for commodities." The seventh meaning is also modern, namely, "opportunity for selling or buying of commodities, or the rate or price offered for them; also, the phase or course of commercial activity by which the exchange of commodities is effected." To a purchaser the terms "market" and "marketing" represent the field of opportunity and the exercise of commercial activity for his requirements. To the seller - which is the aspect with which we are presently concerned - they represent his opportunities and activities. For instance, a wool-sale in Melbourne, attended by American, French, German and Japanese buyers, is a "market" answering both descriptions. To the buyers it represents commercially, as well as locally, the Australian market - the selling market. To the sellers it represents commercially, that is, practically, the markets of the buyers - the buying market. The prices which the buyers are prepared to give are determined eventually by the demand conditions of the consumers on the commercial field occupied by the buyers - conditions of quantity, quality, style, price, &c., as well as circumstances of transport, storage, &c., relevant to that commercial field. Unaffected by any restricted canon of interpretation, the words "marketed" and "where" are universal in respect of locality. But there is one recognized canon of interpretation, namely, that a Legislature is presumed, in the absence of express statement or necessary implication to the contrary, to intend validity, and thereby to intend acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. Legislation of the British Parliament as to bigamy is primarily intended to cover a bigamous marriage by a British subject anywhere in the world (Trial of Earl Russell[13]). The British Parliament, by its grant of a Constitution to South Australia, might have authorized the Parliament of that State to legislate as widely. It is necessary, therefore, to examine and interpret the Constitution in order to ascertain whether it has done so. Interpretation of that Constitution being necessary, it is found that legislative jurisdiction is limited to South Australia. Macleod's Case[14] establishes the canon of construction that, there being no reason of express statement or implication to the contrary, the enactment should be read down to the extent, and only to the extent, necessary to its validity. Applying that canon, it is necessary and proper to read down "marketed" to commercial acts in South Australia only. Express limitation is out of the question. Necessary implication is, however, admissible. "Necessary implication," according to the opinion of Lord Eldon, adopted in Hill v. Crook[15], "means, not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention that an intention contrary to that which is imputed ... cannot be supposed." When we come to consider the probability of the legislative intention to apply the word "where" outside South Australia, as well as inside, the strength of that intention is undeniable. Sub-sec. 2 of sec. 2 looks to corresponding legislation in Victoria, the competing State in dried fruits as defined. Renmark and Mildura are representative areas. If sec. 20 is confined to South Australian markets the first difficulty is, why trouble about Victoria? What has one State to do with the purely internal trade arrangements of another State? What does it matter to South Australia whether Victoria does or does not restrict the dried fruit trade between Mildura and Bendigo, so long as Mildura is free to trade outside Victoria? Again, if the "marketing" contemplated by the Act is to places purely intra-State, what is meant by "concerted action in the marketing of dried fruits produced in Australia" (sec. 19 (b)) - that is, produced anywhere in Australia? "Concerted action," which is entirely separate and distinct, and therefore necessarily unconnected, is an extraordinary phenomenon, which we are unable mentally to picture. "Simultaneous" action of the kind we could understand, but "concerted" action adds an element that is contradicted by hypothesis of mutual restriction to the one State. One might as well speak of concerted action on the part of the inhabitants of a street in taking their several morning baths or evening dinners. Then there is another peculiarity that finds no raison d'être in the assumption that the Act is confined to intra-State marketing. On that assumption, how can we account for the right of the dispossessed owner of dried fruits under sec. 28 to receive London price less adjustments? If sec. 20 necessarily leaves him entirely free to sell anywhere outside South Australia, why select London as the sole test of value? If, however, Australian trade is intended to be controllable, and London left free, or practically enforced and assisted by brands and labels, a good reason is shown for providing for London value. The presumption would be that compulsory taking was to ensure marketing in the London market, where that was not intended voluntarily. It is also a significant fact that sec. 20 is not preceded by the prefatory words of sec. 28 in respect of sec. 92 of the Federal Constitution. On the whole, the construction of sec. 20 of the statute seems to us overwhelmingly opposed to restricting it to control of intra-State trade. Its natural construction, apart from all constitutional considerations, is unlimited as to space. Macleod's Case[16], while restricting penalization to acts done within the jurisdiction, does not limit the area of the commercial effect of the acts struck at. Before Federation the State Parliaments could validly prohibit the sale of goods for, or their despatch to, any part of the Commonwealth, or India or Patagonia. Therefore, stopping at State law, the determinations which, properly construed, cover for the same reasons precisely the same ground as the section, so far as this case is concerned, are lawful restrictions on inter-State trade. No commercial man - and the determination is intended for commercial men - would for a moment think that it was intended to affect a transaction by him actually entered into outside the limits of South Australia. It refers to the "output produced by each grower." But there is not in the Act or the determination any express limitation of "grower" to South Australia. Nevertheless, everyone would understand "grower" to be limited to South Australia in both instruments; and similarly as to the transactions necessary for "marketing." The words "in the Commonwealth of Australia" would mean to any commercial man, having regard to the context, that the "market" to be supplied was "in the Commonwealth of Australia." He would not unnecessarily attribute absurdity either to Parliament or to Board. The result, then, is that certain acts of trade and commerce in South Australia are so far penalized if they are directed either to forbidden intra-State or inter-State trading. This position reached, it at once, and without dispute, compels the interpretation and application of sec. 92 of the Constitution. The matter is consequently within the original jurisdiction of the Court. Exercising that jurisdiction, the result as to sec. 20 and its attendant determinations is that they are invalidated at least pro tanto in respect of the plaintiff's inter-State trade.