On the face of s 160, an order that the Commissioner proceed to grant a patent subject to amendments considered appropriate by the Court would come within the expression "any order" in para (e). I think that conclusion follows as a matter of ordinary language. Subject only to having some connection with the subject matter of the appeal, "any order" means any order. This is the more so in a context when the appeal is from a decision which could (as it did in the present case) include a direction that amendments be made.
In any case, an order directing amendments to claims differing from those directed by the Commissioner would amount to a variation of the Commissioner's decision within the meaning of s 160(d).
Since the establishment of the modern appellate court by the English reforms of 1875 and their Australian counterparts, statutes have usually (indeed invariably as far as my experience extends) conferred on the appellate court a right to vary the decision under appeal. The inherent unpredictability of litigation would make absurdly restrictive any provision that confined an appellate court to upholding or reversing in toto the decision below. In the particular context of patent litigation there is all the more reason to think that the legislature intended the appellate court to have wide powers, and at the very least the power to do everything that the Commissioner could have done in making the decision under appeal. Patents are often
complex documents and can deal with technology at the very edge of human understanding. An appeal under s 60(4) can involve evidence quite different to that which was before the Commissioner. New arguments may be advanced and new insights obtained. There may be totally new grounds for concluding that, speaking hypothetically of course, a decision to proceed to grant a patent was correct but that amendments not considered by the Commissioner (perhaps because they arise from new arguments or new evidence) should be directed by the Court.
In arguing against this construction senior counsel for Genetics contended that the jurisdiction of the Court is limited to a decision of "the case" referred to in s 60(1), that is to say whether the patent should proceed to grant. However, "the case" is not limited, as counsel argued, to a jurisdiction to deal with a patent application as accepted; one need only point to the power conferred on the Commissioner himself to direct amendments. I do not think s 60 can be read independently of the rest of the Act and in particular s 160. "The case" in s 60(1) in my opinion comprehends all issues relating to the grant of the patent, including amendments. These are matters which were before the Commissioner and are also before the Court.
The fact that s 104(7) confers an independent right of appeal against a discrete decision of amendment does not lead logically to the conclusion that the jurisdiction under s 60(4), amplified by s 160, excludes questions of amendment being dealt with by the Court.