25 It might be said that there is doubt about whether waiver is a doctrine that has operation independent of contract, estoppel or election. It is an interesting debate, but academic for the purposes of this appeal, for there is no doubt that this is a case involving election. Mr Weld did not submit to the contrary. However, he did submit that the appellant is precluded from obtaining any relief arising out of any election that the first named respondent may have made because election was not pleaded. The statement of claim, par23 pleads that "the first defendant has waived the operation of the condition precedent in cl 5.2(b) of the agreement". However, there is no doubt that the whole case was conducted upon the basis that the claimed waiver arose out of the alleged election by the respondents on 21 February 1997 not to rescind the contract but to proceed with it. If the appellant's pleader is to be criticised for using the word "waived" instead of "elected," then he or she is in good company. A cursory reading of the judgments of the High Court in cases involving election show that their Honours use "waiver" interchangeably for "election". See, eg, Perry v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd (supra) at 553, 560 and Sandra Investments Pty Ltd v Booth (supra) at 159. Mr Weld did not submit that the respondents did not understand at trial, that the plea in the statement of claim, par23 was waiver by election nor that any unfairness would arise from entertaining Mr Blow's submissions on election. There is no substance in Mr Weld's submission that as the appellant only pleaded waiver, it can not now argue that an election was made on 21 February 1997.