Ivan Lijic v Lydia Bocan

CMCT's decision on ownership of the crypt

1. In December 2015, the plaintiffs made a request to CMCT to make a determination pursuant to s 61 of the Cemeteries and Crematoria Act 2013 (NSW) (the Act) with respect to the interment right to the crypt. On 3 June 2016, the plaintiffs made a request to CMCT to make a determination pursuant to cl 33A(2) of the Crown Lands (General Reserves) By-law 2006 that the plaintiffs were the holders of the burial licence for the crypt.
2. On 6 September 2016, CMCT issued a Notice of Decision which determined that the first defendant was to remain the holder of the burial licence for the crypt and reasons were published on 13 October 2016. CMCT's position was that the decision could not be appealed.

Commencement of proceedings

1. On 7 March 2017 the plaintiffs sent a Calderbank offer to the first defendant which was not accepted. The offer was put on the basis that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that the first defendant held the burial licence on trust for the plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs would accept an outcome whereby the plaintiffs were "added as recorded owners of the burial licence for Crypt 2048".
2. On 18 May 2017, the plaintiffs commenced these proceedings by filing a statement of claim against the first defendant.

Joinder of CMCT

1. Around June 2017, the plaintiffs made the decision to join CMCT to the proceedings for the purpose of ensuring that any orders made by the Court as between the plaintiffs and the first defendant could be implemented. The plaintiffs submitted it was reasonable and necessary to join CMCT given its previous involvement in the dispute. The plaintiffs' written submissions in paragraph [18]-[19] state that the decision to join CMCT was prompted by CMCT's uncompromising stance and failure to uphold principles of contract law in its decision about the crypt, as well as statements made by CMCT that the decision could not be appealed.
2. On 26 June 2017, lawyers for CMCT sent a Calderbank offer to the plaintiffs explaining that it understood CMCT was joined to the proceedings on the basis that declaratory relief against the first defendant may be of limited effect if CMCT was not joined. In the offer, CMCT set out reasons why it was unnecessary to join it to the proceedings, including that a determination that the burial licence was held on trust could be made without the involvement of CMCT, and that there was no basis for the plaintiffs to think CMCT would act in contempt of any order. For those reasons, CMCT offered to file a submitting appearance save as to costs in the proceedings, on the basis that the plaintiffs would undertake that: No issues relating to CMCT's conduct in relation to Crypt 2048 will be ventilated by the plaintiffs in the proceedings or otherwise. No issues relating to CMCT generally will be ventilated by the plaintiffs in the proceedings or otherwise. No disparagement will be made of CMCT by the plaintiffs in the proceedings or otherwise.
3. Lawyers for CMCT sent a further letter on 12 July 2017, noting that the offer remained open and stated that the breadth of the undertakings was necessarily broad because CMCT was unaware of what evidence would be led by the plaintiffs. On 17 July 2017, the plaintiffs accepted the Calderbank offer made by CMCT on 26 June 2017, and provided the undertakings requested in the letter. The plaintiffs' submission at [27] states that CMCT did not voluntarily offer to enter a submitting appearance, and that they arrived at the first listing date prepared to play an active role in the proceedings. It was said by the plaintiffs that CMCT reluctantly acquiesced to a submitting appearance role but only subject to the conditions set out above, which had the effect that they would not be criticised in the proceedings.
4. On 20 July 2017, CMCT filed a submitting appearance to the Court with the following appearance and statement of submission: [CMCT], second defendant, appears and submits to the making of all orders sought, and the giving or entry of judgment in respect of all claims made, save as to costs.

Problems with short minutes of order

1. On 24 August 2017, lawyers for the first defendant sent short minutes of order to the plaintiffs, which purported to reflect a settlement agreement reached by the plaintiffs and first defendant. On 5 September, lawyers for the plaintiffs executed the short minutes. On 7 September 2017, the Court made orders giving effect to the settlement of the dispute, which relevantly provided that the crypt would be registered by CMCT in the name of the third plaintiff and first defendant as 'tenants in common in equal shares'.
2. On 13 September 2017, CMCT's lawyers wrote by email to the lawyers for the other parties, advising that CMCT was concerned that it could not lawfully comply with the short minutes due to the operation of ss 54 and 56 of the Act, which had the effect that CMCT could only register the crypt to the parties 'as joint holders', rather than 'as tenants in common in equal shares', as stated in the short minutes of order dated 7 September 2017. CMCT's lawyers sent a further email on 13 September 2017 to the parties clarifying that ss 54 and 56 of the Act had not commenced, but that the effect of those sections still arose by the operation of reg 28 of the Crown Lands (General Reserves) By Law 2006 (NSW), which relevantly confined CMCT to transferring a burial licence from one person to two or more other persons 'as joint holders'.
3. On 20 September 2017, lawyers for the first defendant wrote to the parties noting that an application to vary the orders would require a notice of motion and a supporting affidavit, and suggested that the better option would be to leave the orders as they stood and for the parties to resolve the issue by way of a deed. On that same day, CMCT's lawyers wrote to the parties stating that a deed would not be sufficient, and that the orders could not be lawfully complied with by CMCT. CMCT stated that, if it became necessary to file its own motion to correct the orders, it reserved its right to seek costs from the other parties, possibly on an indemnity basis, for the following reasons: The parties had orders entered in the absence of our client, our client having filed a submitting appearance; The orders the parties had entered could not be lawfully complied with by our client (an issue that - we might submit - was raised on 24 August 2017, before orders were entered); If the orders are not vacated and remain on foot, then that will be so despite our clients having raised the impossibility arising from the contemplated orders several times including on 13 September and today; Our client's application would necessarily be urgent due to the conduct of the other parties and not due to its own conduct; Generally, the orders record an agreement reached between the parties in the absence of our client which in any case could not be lawfully complied with by our client; and As our client has filed a submitting appearance, it faces an impediment in approaching the Court to seek to vacate the existing orders.
4. Also on 20 September 2017, the plaintiffs' lawyers wrote to the other parties. In relation to point 2 set out above in CMCT's correspondence, the plaintiffs noted that CMCT only informed the first defendant on 24 August 2017 of its inability to comply with the agreed short minutes, and that the plaintiffs were not informed of the issue about joint holding until 13 September 2017 when CMCT wrote to both parties. The plaintiffs noted that the deadline for variation of the orders was the next day, 21 September 2017, and proposed to resolve the issue raised by CMCT by seeking an urgent variation to the orders.
5. During the morning of 21 September 2017, the plaintiffs and first defendant were corresponding by email about how the orders should be varied. At 11:19am, CMCT's lawyers wrote by email to the parties stating that, if they did not reach agreement by 1:00pm, they expected to be instructed by their client to file an urgent notice of motion and an order seeking costs. The plaintiffs' lawyers replied at 12:42pm asking that no application be made before 3:00pm and that they were seeking instructions. At 1:10pm, CMCT's lawyers replied stating that they had not yet obtained instructions agreeing to the 3:00pm extension and implored the parties to treat the matter as one of pressing urgency. CMCT again noted that, unless a motion was filed by the parties, CMCT would be forced to approach the Court itself including an order to have its costs paid.
6. On the afternoon on 21 September 2017, at 4:54pm, the plaintiffs filed a notice of motion asking the Court to vary the orders made on 7 September 2017, and seeking orders by consent of the plaintiffs and first defendant that purported to correct the problem identified by CMCT about compliance with the earlier orders and other issues relating to survivorship and the future rights of the parties.
7. On 24 October 2017, the Registrar referred the matter to me as Duty Judge to make the orders proposed by the parties. Two of the notations concerned the joining of the third plaintiff's two minor children, who the plaintiffs' lawyers during the hearing said on their recollection were about 14 and 15 years of age. I made the orders subject to the plaintiffs' lawyers receiving instruction to confirm the ages of the children to be joined. The plaintiffs' lawyers wrote to my Associate on the afternoon on the day I made the orders and advised that the children were in fact aged 7 and 13. In those circumstances, the plaintiffs requested that the matter be re-listed, and the orders were not made.
8. On 27 October, I listed the matter for a directions hearing on 16 November 2017. On that date, I entered judgment in the terms of the following short minutes of order agreed between the plaintiffs and first defendant, and without opposition from CMCT: The Court by consent of the parties other than the second defendant and without opposition from the second defendant makes the following order: Varies order 1 made by the Court on 7 September 2017 by deleting the words "as tenants in common in equal shares" and inserting in lieu the words "as joint holders". Notes that it is the intention of the plaintiffs and the first defendant and others to enter into a deed to resolve the other issues between them as to the future holding of the interment rights. Notes that there is no issue as to costs as between the plaintiffs and the first defendant. Notes that the second defendant has served evidence on the other parties and provided brief submissions as to its claim for costs in the proceedings and directs the second defendant to deliver its evidence and submissions to the associate to Robb J by 4pm Friday, 17 November 2017. Directs the plaintiffs and the first defendant to deliver to the associate to Robb J within 21 days their evidence and submissions in response to the second defendant's application for costs. Directs that the issue of the second defendant's costs be dealt with on the papers in chambers.
9. These orders resolved the issue identified by CMCT in the previous order 1 made by the Court on 7 September 2017 by varying those orders and deleting the words "as tenants in common in equal shares" and inserting in the words "as joint holders".
10. The only outstanding matter in the orders concerned CMCT's costs, which I directed would be dealt with on the papers in chambers.

The parties' positions on CMCT's costs

1. Having set out the relevant background of the proceedings I will now turn to the question of CMCT's costs. It is appropriate to begin by outlining CMCT's submissions as to its costs, and then the submissions of the plaintiffs and first defendant, which were written in response to CMCT's submissions.

CMCT's position on costs

1. CMCT seeks an order that the other parties pay its costs on an indemnity basis in the amount of $23,000, on the ground that the proceedings were doomed to fail and that it was unnecessarily joined. In the alternative, CMCT submitted that the circumstances in this case warrant the making of an ordinary costs order up to 26 June 2017, when CMCT's offer to file a submitting appearance was made, and an indemnity costs order from that time. Further in the alternative, CMCT submitted that the Court should make an ordinary costs order up to 6 September 2017, when the 'tenancy in common' orders were first entered, and an indemnity costs order from that time.

Reasons why CMCT says the proceedings were doomed

1. CMCT submits that it is entitled to indemnity costs because the proceedings were not properly commenced or properly maintained for the following reasons. First, the plaintiffs' solicitor on the record holds a restricted practicing certificate in breach of rule 7.1(6) of the UCPR. Secondly, the relief claimed in the statement of claim is 'internally inconsistent', because it sought conflicting declarations that had the effect that first defendant would hold the burial licence on trust in 4 equal portions, but also required the first defendant to execute documents to transfer ownership of the crypt in 2 equal portions. Thirdly, the statement of claim did not disclose a 'reasonably arguable view of the law' pursuant to cl 2(1) of Schedule 2 to the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014, because the 'tenancy in common relief' claimed could not be reconciled with CMCT's statutory powers preventing the holding of burial licences by way of a tenancy in common.
2. The plaintiffs say that CMCT's second and third submissions are academic and based on semantics, and that an oversight or error in drafting does not render a claim void or untenable, nor does it render the claim to be without reasonable prospect of success.

Joinder of CMCT to the proceedings

1. CMCT submitted that there was no need to join it to the proceedings and relied on the reasons it set out in its Calderbank offer to the plaintiffs dated 26 June 2017, which I have set out above.

Costs incurred by CMCT

1. A solicitor for CMCT stated in his affidavit affirmed on 3 November 2017 that the costs incurred by CMCT were in relation to: Perusing the Statement of Claim and considering the implications of it; Advising the second defendant in relation to the various options it had available to it in response to the Statement of Claim, including but not limited to filing a submitting defence save as to costs; Preparing for and attending the directions hearing of the matter on 20 June 2017; Providing the second defendant with advice from time to time at need; Providing the second defendant with advice in relation to the making of an offer of settlement; Engaging with the solicitors for the other parties in relation to reaching the agreement that led to the second defendant filing a submitting appearance in response to the Statement of Claim; Urgently engaging with the solicitors for the other parties after the entry of the orders made on 6 September 2017. This engagement included a significant number of emails; Appearing before Registrar Walton and later Robb J on 24 October 2017 and subsequently advising and taking instructions; Engaging in further correspondence with the other parties and Robb J's associate; Preparing this affidavit and collating the documents to be exhibited alongside it; Advising the second defendant in relation to the 16 November 2017 hearing and seeking instructions; Considering the relevant facts and law in order to prepare submissions in relation to the second defendant's costs; and Appearing at the 16 November 2017 hearing.

Plaintiffs' position

1. The plaintiffs submit that CMCT's claim for $23,000 in costs is not reasonable and cannot be justified. The plaintiffs raise s 98(4)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), which provides the Court with a discretion to make an order that a party to whom costs are to be paid is entitled to a specified gross sum instead of assessed costs. The plaintiffs then rely on s 60 of the Act, which identifies that the cost to the parties is to be proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute.
2. The plaintiffs submit that a starting point on CMCT's costs must be a deduction to reflect the costs thrown away by CMCT's failure to: Address their concerns on the reasonable prospects of success to the Court in breach of s 56(3) Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW); Communicate their position to both parties on the proposed orders (Annexure E to affidavit of Daniel Miller, referring to the 24 August 2017 email from James d'Apice to Raoul Court to which the plaintiffs not a party) which resulted in further appearances and unnecessarily increased costs to both parties which each now has to bear; Act independently; and Engage in conduct that assisted both the court, and the parties.
3. The plaintiffs rely on statements made by Adams J at [16]-[26] in Midson v Workers Compensation Commission & Ors (No 2) [2017] NSWSC 147 as relevant to CMCT's appearance role in the proceedings. The plaintiffs cited the following parts of that decision as having application to this current matter, notwithstanding that they do not seek costs from CMCT: [22] Thus where an unsuccessful party has made a submitting appearance it is necessary to take into account relevant contextual considerations with respect to the circumstances of the litigation and conduct and role of the parties. [25] …the question of whether a costs order should be made against a submitting party is to be approached according to "an appraisal of the circumstances of the case" and that, in particular, attention must be paid to the context in which the submitting appearance was filed. [26] More recently in Douglas v James (No. 2) [2015] NSWSC 969, McDougall J awarded costs against a defendant who had filed a submitting appearance. His Honour found that the submitting party had delayed ten months before filing a submitting appearance and, in the interim, had "actively promoted and supported the defendant's case". His Honour found at [39] that "she was in a real sense a defendant who took an adversarial position in opposition to the plaintiff's case".
4. For these reasons the plaintiffs have asked the Court to exercise its discretion under the Civil Procedure Act to cap CMCT's costs to a fair and reasonable amount. The plaintiffs submit that an acceptable amount would be $10,000. If the Court is inclined to make that order, the plaintiffs have offered to share the costs with the first defendant in the amount of $5000 each.

Plaintiffs' Calderbank offer to the first defendant

1. In the alternative to the plaintiffs' offer to share with the first defendant the burden of a $10,000 costs order in favour of CMCT, the plaintiffs request the Court to take into consideration a Calderbank offer made to the first defendant on 7 March 2017, and to make such order for costs as the Court deems appropriate. Part of that Calderbank offer stated: In the interests of saving both sets of parties the time and expense of litigation, our clients have instructed us to settle this matter by requesting that Mr Ivan Lijic, Andja Lijic and Mrs Ivanka Jeroncic be added as recorded owners of the burial licence for Crypt 2048. If an agreement can be reached we propose to document the agreement in a deed.
2. The plaintiffs claim that the Calderbank offer is substantially in the same terms as those two which the parties have now agreed. On that basis, the plaintiffs submit that the first defendant should bear the weight of CMCT's costs.

Filing fees for first defendant's failure to pass on information about CMCT's legislation concerns

1. Further, the plaintiffs submit that the first defendant's lawyers failed to share the information received from CMCT on 24 August 2017 about the issues raised by the legislation, and failed to implement that information in the orders that the first defendant's lawyers drafted on 6 September 2017. As I have explained, those orders were made by the Court and resulted in further costs and appearances to correct the error. The plaintiffs ask the Court to make an order reimbursing them for $395 for the filing fee for the notice of motion filed because of the first defendant's failure to draw the plaintiffs' attention to CMCT's concerns.

Not necessary to join CMCT

1. The first defendant is in agreement with CMCT's submission that it was not necessary to join CMCT to the proceedings. The first defendant submits that the joinder of CMCT was a decision of the plaintiffs, and therefore the first defendant should not have to bear any of CMCT's costs.

Indemnity costs for CMCT too high

1. The first defendant submits that CMCT has not made out a case for indemnity costs against the first defendant. The first defendant submits that none of the submissions made by CMCT for an order for costs on the indemnity basis relate to the conduct of the first defendant. However, the first defendant submits that, if it is to be liable for the costs claimed by CMCT being $23,000, then the quantum of those costs claimed is excessive, particularly because CMCT did not file a defence.

Costs should be exclusive of GST

1. The first defendant submits that CMCT is seeking costs inclusive of GST, and that CMCT is registered for GST and is therefore able to claim as input tax credits for the GST component of the tax invoices rendered by its solicitors. The first defendant therefore submits that any amount for CMCT's costs should be exclusive of GST.

CMCT should pay the first defendant's costs of CMCT's costs application

1. The first defendant submits that CMCT should bear its own costs of the proceedings generally, and pay the costs of the first defendant of CMCTs' costs application.

The issues

1. CMCT's application for an order for costs raises the following issues: 1. whether it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to join CMCT to the proceedings; 2. whether CMCT took an active role in the proceedings and whether it was reasonable for CMCT to do so having regard to its submitting appearance; 3. whether the work undertaken by CMCT was reasonable and necessary; 4. whether all or some part of CMCT's costs should be paid on the indemnity basis, whether by reason of the Calderbank letter dated 26 June 2017 or otherwise; 5. whether the plaintiffs' Calderbank letter of 7 March 2017 to the first defendant requires the first defendant to pay a greater proportion of costs of CMCT; 6. whether the first defendant should pay the filing fees paid by the plaintiffs as a result of its failure to pass on or implement information received from CMCT on 24 August 2017; 7. if CMCT is entitled to costs, whether the plaintiffs should bear the costs of CMCT because the plaintiffs joined CMCT to the proceedings; and 8. if CMCT is not entitled to costs, whether CMCT should pay the costs of the plaintiffs and first defendant of CMCT's costs application.
2. I will deal with these issues collectively as follows.
3. The present is a singularly unfortunate dispute, where misadventure and the inability of all parties to cooperate in an effective manner have led to an argument about costs that has exacerbated the burden for costs that will ultimately be borne by the parties.
4. One source of difficulty is that the underlying dispute has effectively been settled without the Court being called upon to resolve the issues between the parties.
5. As the plaintiffs contributed to the cost of the crypt with the defendant, it was at least not unreasonable for them to expect that they would share the title to the crypt with the first defendant.
6. CMCT could be expected to have expertise in the effect of the operation of the statutory provisions that regulate the cemetery and the title to the crypt (although those statutory provisions are not free of complexity, as is reflected in the matter referred to at [15] above). CMCT, if acting reasonably, would have explained any difficulty to the plaintiffs, given their relationship to the deceased and their contribution to the cost of the crypt, and if indeed CMCT was entitled to transfer the burial licence to the first defendant alone, common decency would have caused CMCT to be open to facilitating some sensible resolution that reflected the reasonable expectations of the plaintiffs. It appears that CMCT instead took the hard-line that its decision was final.
7. It was not unreasonable in my view for the plaintiffs initially to join CMCT as a defendant to ensure that it was bound by any decision made by the Court. In fact, the wisdom of CMCT being joined has been borne out by the fact that it appears that the plaintiffs and the defendants settled their dispute on terms that could not be implemented by CMCT. The Court has not been required to decide the question whether multiple holders of burial licences can only do so as joint tenants, or whether they can hold as tenants in common. However, the plaintiffs and the first defendant have not submitted that the position adopted by CMCT was wrong.
8. In the ordinary case, the proper and reasonable course for CMCT to have taken would have been to file a submitting appearance save as to costs, and depending upon what the circumstances permitted, warning the other parties in advance that it could not comply with any order that the burial licence be held by the other parties as tenants in common; informing the other parties of that fact after CMCT became aware of the terms of any proposed consent orders; or doing so after it became aware that such orders had been made.
9. It appears in the present case that CMCT became aware of the proposed terms of the settlement between the other parties before the Court made orders by consent in terms of the short minutes of order, and warned them about the problem, but because of a mischance arising out of the timing of the events, the Court made the orders asked for by the plaintiffs and the first defendant.
10. CMCT was entitled to require the other parties to find some other solution to their dispute, and to cause the Court to vary the order whereby the plaintiffs and the first defendant would hold the burial licence as tenants in common. However, I cannot see that there was any particular urgency in having the problem corrected, and it would have been reasonable for CMCT, while insisting that the problem be fixed, to allow the other parties to find some alternative solution to their problem in a cost-effective manner.
11. As the plaintiffs and the first defendant appear to accept that the initial version of the orders that they joined in asking the Court to make had a legal flaw, they shared between them the responsibility for the need for all of the parties to incur additional legal costs to rectify the problem.
12. I do not accept that it is appropriate for the Court to attribute blame for the unnecessary need of the parties to incur costs differentially as between the plaintiffs and the first defendant. In particular, I would not order the first defendant to pay the filing fees of the notice of motion on the ground that her solicitors failed to act immediately to pass on CMCT's position concerning the effect of the legislation conveyed to the first defendant's lawyers on 24 August 2017. The lawyers for the plaintiffs should have worked out how the legislation operated before they commenced the proceedings on behalf of the plaintiffs, and the lawyers for the first defendant should also have done so, before they allowed their client to agree to the terms of the original short minutes of order.
13. Little needs to be said about the effect of the Calderbank offer served by the plaintiffs on the first defendant on 7 March 2017. The ultimate resolution of the proceedings bears little relationship to the outcome that the plaintiffs agreed to accept in their offer, and it would be unrealistic to suggest that they have achieved a materially better result than they offered to accept. The making of the offer is not material to the costs orders that should be made in this case.
14. The reality is that the conduct of none of the parties is particularly edifying in the present case. It is most likely that excessive legal fees have been incurred by all parties by reason of a failure to seek a reasonable solution to the original problem cooperatively from the beginning.
15. This observation applies also to the conduct of CMCT, which I believe has contributed to the unfortunate outcome from the beginning. It is not unreasonable to expect the operator of a cemetery to have some sensitivity for the feelings of the family of the deceased. In any event, in my view CMCT dealt with this dispute too aggressively, and ought to have approached the resolution of the dispute on a basis that positively limited the legal fees that CMCT incurred.
16. I do not accept that any of the conduct of the other parties justifies an order against them that they pay CMCT's legal fees on an indemnity basis. I do not believe that the device of the service of a Calderbank letter is an appropriate vehicle for a party in the position of CMCT to impose the risk of indemnity costs on the other parties to these proceedings. There was no legal dispute between any of the other parties and CMCT that could sensibly be the subject of a settlement. The purpose of the service of Calderbank letters is to promote the compromise of claims between litigants. CMCT's interest in the proceedings was only to ensure that whatever outcome was reached between the parties was consistent with the statutory regime with which CMCT was required to comply.
17. Nonetheless, CMCT was joined as a party involuntarily, and it was entitled to protect its position legally. It was entitled to react to the disclosure that the other parties proposed to settle the dispute on a basis that was not consistent with the statutory regime to which CMCT was subject, and when the orders were made nonetheless, it was entitled to take steps to correct that outcome.
18. CMCT is entitled to an order for its costs, and the question is how the appropriate amount of those costs should be determined. The sum of $23,000 in my judgment is likely to be excessive, particularly as it has been calculated on an indemnity basis. The difficulty is, on the basis of the information that is now before the court, it is difficult for the Court to fix a lesser figure that is fair and not arbitrary.
19. The $10,000 figure for costs submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs is essentially arbitrary.
20. In my view, the plaintiffs on the one hand and the first defendant on the other should be ordered to pay CMCT's costs in equal shares.
21. I will publish these reasons for judgment and give the parties an opportunity to negotiate and attempt to agree upon an appropriate amount of costs to be paid to CMCT. Without deciding the issue, it would appear to me that an amount in the order of 60% of that claim would be reasonable.
22. If the parties cannot agree, they should relist the matter at 9:30 AM one morning by arrangement with my associate. At that time I will make directions for the service of brief evidence and submissions, and fix the matter to be argued orally at 9:30 AM one morning, with the view to fixing the amount of costs by a gross sum costs order after oral submissions within the time then available.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 22 June 2018