156. In the present case, the allegation of discrimination is one based upon religion. That is clearly one of the grounds of prohibited discrimination. However, the drafting of s 8(3) is such that the grounds of discrimination are not limited to those identified in the example. Nor are they limited to grounds which might be considered to be socially inappropriate forms of discrimination. A prohibition on "discrimination on any ground" would, prima facie, prevent discrimination on grounds such as lack of intelligence, laziness, propensity to violence, unpleasantness of personality, lack of personal hygiene or poor grooming, unless such discrimination involved a "limit set by laws" which were justified under s 28 of the HR Act. While such a result might appear to be an unusual one, it is not obvious how, by orthodox means of interpretation, the terms of s 8(3) could be read down to give them a more confined operation. In Victoria, this difficulty has been avoided by defining the concept of discrimination as limited to discrimination on the basis of attributes identified in the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) s 6. Had it not been so confined, then Mr Kuyken's challenge to a prohibition on beards amongst police would have had to have been analysed differently: see Kuyken v Chief Commissioner of Police [2015] VSC 204. There is no equivalent confinement of the scope of "discrimination" in the Territory. It might be necessary, in order to give some limit to the concept, to fall back upon the notion that "not every differentiation of treatment" will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant: see General Comment No 18 quoted above. That, however, would provide a criterion difficult to apply in practice, necessitating an inquiry of some complexity upon which reasonable minds might differ. Fortunately, because the ground of discrimination asserted in this case is that of "religion" - a ground recognised elsewhere as a socially appropriate ground for discrimination (cf Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) s 7) - it is not necessary to explore any consequences of the scope of s 8(3) which may be perceived to be anomalous.