16 The second authority relied upon by the appellants is R v Resource Planning and Development Commission; ex parte Dorney (No 2) [2003] TASSC 69; (2003) 12 Tas R 69. The decision in Dorney, like the decision in Hayward, relates to the amendment of an approved scheme, as distinct from a change made in the course of approving a draft scheme. Dorney involved amendments sought by the Hobart City Council to its approved planning scheme. The draft amendments were publicly exhibited and advertised in accordance with LUPA. In broad terms, for relevant purposes, the amendments proposed a landscape and skyline conservation zone and a bushland conservation and recreation zone, and the only use designated as permitted as of right in those zones was "passive recreation". Other uses were designated as discretionary. Following the hearing required by LUPA, s40, the Commission abandoned the proposals for the two new zones in favour of a community bushland zone covering much the same area, and decided that all uses other than "passive recreation" were to be prohibited in the new zone. Section 41 authorised the Commission to "modify or alter to a substantial degree" the draft amendment. Pursuant to s41B, where an amendment is altered to a substantial degree (as distinct from modified), it is necessary to exhibit, advertise and conduct hearings referable to the alteration. The Commission proceeded as if the changes it had made to the draft amendment were modifications, and had not altered it to a substantial degree. On this basis, the changes were not exhibited, advertised and the subject of a hearing. The owners of land adversely affected by the changes sought prerogative relief as well as relief under the Judicial Review Act referable to the changes Blow J, at 38, held that it was not reasonably open to the Commission to categorise the changes made to the draft amendment as mere modifications, as distinct from alterations to a substantial degree. At par63, his Honour held that in the absence of the re-advertising required by LUPA in relation to such alterations, or the provision of other appropriate notice to the adversely affected owners, they had been denied procedural fairness. His Honour set aside the decision of the Commission to approve the draft amendment as changed. The appellants contend that consistent with this decision, it should be held that the changes in dispute made by the Panel to the draft of the Meander Valley Planning Scheme resulted in it being "altered to a substantial degree", and that this required that those changes be publicly exhibited. The decision in Dorney is plainly distinguishable. The changes made to the draft amendment to the Hobart Planning Scheme dealt with in Dorney deprived the affected owners of rights of use, whereas the changes in question in this case broadened the rights of owners. More particularly, the provisions of LUPA that applied to the amendment of the Hobart Planning Scheme are markedly different to those that applied to the approval of the draft Meander Valley Planning Scheme. The former included an express requirement that where a draft amendment to an approved scheme was "altered to a substantial degree", it must be re-advertised, etc. There was no similar statutory requirement in relation to the latter. The appellants also referred to Blow J's conclusion at par52 that under the applicable legislation councils were not subject to any duty to accord procedural fairness to those who might be affected by the provisions of a draft planning scheme or a draft amendment to a planning scheme, but that it was the role of the Commission, rather than councils, to afford procedural fairness to such persons pursuant to the Resource Planning and Development Commission Act 1997, s10(1)(b)(v). This conclusion in relation to the Commission does not assist the appellants. The extent to which LUPA made it the role of the Panel to afford procedural fairness to those affected by a draft planning scheme is governed by the terms of LUPA and, as already explained, no such requirement was imposed in relation to the modification of a draft planning scheme. Moreover, Blow J was dealing with the Commission, not its predecessor, the Panel, and in concluding as he did, his Honour placed some reliance upon the Resource Planning and Development Commission Act, s10(1)(b)(v), which provides that where the Commission holds a hearing, it must observe the rules of natural justice. No similar provision applied to the Panel.